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Much of social psychological theorizing is entrenched in a dualism between
two distinctive mental systems – one associative, the other rule-based. In par-
ticular, in the field of evaluations, the contemporary dual systems approach em-
phasizes the separated existence of distinct implicit and explicit attitudes. How-
ever, in recent times, theoreticians have been seeking an understanding of social
psychological topics through models that can handle real-time interactivity be-
tween component parts. Thus, this dissertation applies the framework of dynam-
ical systems towards key social psychological topics typically construed through
dual systems theory. In Chapter 2, we provide evidence that explicit evaluations
are gradually unfolding from the self-organization of multiple biases. By analyz-
ing hand-movement trajectories in an explicit attitude report task, we show that
while our participants are about equally likely to report liking white people and
black people, their formations of these two responses show qualitatively distinct
processing dynamics. These findings support the notion that the mind hosts a
continuously evolving blend of evaluative decisions from which the eventual ex-
plicit decision emerges. In Chapter 3, we provide preliminary evidence that the
dynamics of formulating an explicit evaluative judgment is even biased by sub-
liminal evaluative conditioning. These findings would challenge the notion that
explicit and implicit attitudes partake in two distinct psychological ”channels,”
suggesting instead that a dynamically interactive mind underlies the preparation
of an eventual explicit decision. Finally, in Chapter 4, we sketch out a dynam-
ical systems approach to motivated control. We provide dynamical systems in-
terpretations for three constituent aspects of control – selection, goal pursuit, and
top-down flexibility, and thereby craft a perspective on motivated control which
respects the existence of specialized neurobiological systems, but creates space for
more than two of them, and allows them to continually interact.
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1.1 The Automaticity Revolution in Social Psychology
1.1.1 The existence of implicit social information
External Primes
A rich set of experiments during the ”automaticity revolution” of experimental
social psychology has demonstrated that the way people think, decide, and be-
have can be strongly influenced by environmental primes - that is, subtle expo-
sures to information that an individual does not consciously notice or recognize.
For instance, when participants unscrambled twenty sentences containing words
related to the cultural stereotype of elderly people (e.g., wrinkle, bingo, Florida),
these participants, despite being unaware of the elderly theme, walked down the
hallway significantly more slowly than control groups. When the sentences con-
tained a hidden message of rudeness (rather than politeness), the participants in-
terrupted a social exchange more readily (Bargh, Chen & Burrows, 1996, Study
1). When the sentences contained a hidden message of cooperation (rather than
competition), participants became more likely to cooperate than defect in a shared
resource task (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel 2001). In fact,
participant behaviors were influenced by information that is subliminal. Partici-
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pants behaved significantly more angrily at a botched computer program if they
had received subliminal exposures to pictures of African American. (Bargh, Chen
& Burrows, 1996, Study 3). The main thrust of this research was that, even though
people sense that they are fully in control over cognitive decisions such as whether
interrupt a conversation, cooperate with a partner, express internal anger, or to
rush off to an engagement, unidentified environmental forces can exert control
over these behaviors.
Implicit Mental Representations
Further research demonstrated that people′s decisions and behaviors can be gov-
erned by unidentified subconscious forces not just from the environment, but from
their own minds. Measures of cognitive associations (such as the Implicit Associ-
ations Test ; Greenwald & Banaji 1995) measure people′s spontaneous, unwanted,
or subconscious associations to many concepts, and these associations do not nec-
essarily parallel people′s deliberative, espoused, or conscious beliefs. A classic
line of research has investigated ”aversive racism” – a situation in which a person
sincerely subscribes to an egalitarian value system, yet harbors unwanted or un-
acknowledged negative feelings and beliefs towards blacks or other marginalized
ethnicities (Dovidio & Gaertner 1986; Dovido & Gaertner 2004). For example,
many participants, regardless of their stated values, display significant quick-
ness in recognizing words like ”violent”, ”dangerous”, and ”lazy” after being
briefly exposed to some representation of black people ((Fazio, Dunton, Jackson,
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& Williams 1995) Supporting the notion that these associations are spontaneous
and need not be consciously experienced, the ”accessibility” of concepts like crim-
inal, lazy, and violent occur even when the representation of black people is sub-
liminal (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park 1997).
Conflict Between Implicit and Explicit
Thus, a person′s implicit associations and explicit beliefs may conflict (Green-
wald and Nosek, 2009; Nosek 2005; Nosek 2007). In fact, the degree of conflict
(vs. congruence) between a person′s implicit and explicit cognition can itself be
a predictor of important behavioral outcomes. For example, the degree of corre-
spondence between a person′s implicit and explicit goals predicts positive future
health outcomes (Schultheiss & Brunstein 1999), such as daily experiences of emo-
tional well-being (Brunstein, Schultheiss, & Grassman 1998). On the other hand,
the degree of conflict between a person′s explicit and implicit levels of self-esteem
predicts anti-social behaviors such as outgroup denigration and violence (Jordan,
Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll 2003). The conflict may be unavail-
able to introspection, as studies have used subliminal conditioning to simultane-
ously create positive explicit attitudes and negative implicit attitudes towards the
same novel object (e.g. Rydell and McConnell 2006).
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The Potency of The Implicit
People′s spontaneous or implicit associations seem to have importance for ev-
eryday life. Although the psychometric tests are merely artificial computer re-
action time measurements, they predict meaningful social behavior (Greenwald,
Poehlman, Uhlmann & Banaji 2009). For example, implicit outgroup associations
can predict a hiring manager′s decision to hire a Jewish vs. Catholic job appli-
cant (Fein & Spencer 1997), an obese vs. non-obese job candidate (O’Brien, Latner,
Halbertadt, & Hunter 2008), or a black vs. white job candidate (McConnell &
Leibold 2001; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner 2002). Much research has sup-
ported the predictive validity of implicit measurements of associations to all sorts
of concepts – races, genders, sexual orientations, body types, self-images etc. For
example, implicit association tests have predicted nurse′s decisions to make ma-
jor career changes (von Hippel, Brenner & von Hippel 2008), pilot′s tendencies for
risk-taking behavior while navigating aircraft (Molesworth & Chang 2009), sui-
cidal people′s likelihood of attempting suicide in the next six months (Nock &
Banaji 2007), doctor′s biases in prescribing heart treatments (Green, Carney, Palin,
Ngo, Raymond, Iezzoni & Banaji 2007), and future political support for enlarging
a U.S. military base in Italy (Galdi, Arcuri, & Gawronski 2008)
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1.1.2 The distinction between implicit and explicit cognition
In general, the experimental findings from the automaticity revolution in social
psychology have been taken to support a distinction between implicit and explicit
cognition.
By implicit cognition, social psychologists loosely refer to mental processes
or contents that the person does not consciously experience, desire, or control,
but which nevertheless influence social perception, decision-making, or behavior.
More specifically, John Bargh (1994) emphasized that, in idealized form, implicit
cognition refers to mental processes that fail to involve (a) intentionality, (b) con-
trolled alterations, (c) subjective awareness, and (d) cognitive resources. That is,
implicit cognition refers to the set of mental processes which an individual (a)
does not intentionally instigate or ”start up”; (b) cannot eliminate, alter, or over-
ride once started; (c) does not subjectively experience insight into their origins,
meanings, or occurrence; and/or (d) does not spend limited cognitive resources to
execute (Bargh 1994; Nosek 2007). For example (Sloman 1996), our visual system
receives information from the retina and assembles a visual image very quickly
and efficiently, without requiring the four features described above.
By explicit cognition, social psychologists loosely refer to those familiar, effort-
ful mental processes that are subjectively experienced and open to our voluntary
influence. With respect to John Bargh′s (1994) four dimensions, cognition is said
to be explicit which an individual (a) influences the process′s instigation or ”start
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up”; (b) may eliminate, alter, or override the process when motivated to do so; (c)
experiences some subjective awareness into the process’ origins, meanings, or oc-
currence; and/or (d) experiences depletion of limited cognitive resources because
of the occurrence of the process. For example, the process of reasoning through
a calculus problem or an LSAT exam generally is considered to require the four
features of explicit cognition.
1.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Automaticity
1.2.1 The dualistic perspective
Based on the automaticity results, social psychological theorizing frequently
draws upon dual systems theory, which holds that the human mind has two
distinct computational systems with qualitatively distinct operating principles
(Strack & Deutsch 2004; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell,
2006; Rydell, McConnell, Mackie,& Strain, 2006; Smith & Decoster, 2000): one
system is implicit, associative, uncontrolled, fast, subconscious, and unintended
(System I; Kahneman & Frederick 2002), and the second system is explicit, rule-
based, controlled, slow, conscious, and unintended (System II).
Dual systems models emphasize the dissociations between the two systems.
The empirical goal is characterizing the systems’ different inputs and outputs.
For example, studies have revealed that implicit attitudes are influenced by en-
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vironmental conditioning, and influence spontaneous behavior, whereas explicit
attitudes are influenced by verbal reasoning, and influence deliberative behavior
(Rydell & McConnell 2006; Strack & Deutsch 2004). The theoretical explanations
of behavior is also rooted in dualistic mechanisms, distinguishing between sepa-
rate implicit and explicit entities. For instance, when person deliberately reports
an explicit attitude rather than an explicit attitude, the mind is believed to retrieve
a distinct representation stored separately in explicit memory (Wilson, Lindsey &
Schooler 2000), or override simple associative network processing with symbolic
rule-based computation (Strack & Deutsch 2004), or trigger a cognitively demand-
ing response selection process which selects the personally endorsed mental rep-
resentation from a set of automatically activated representations (Devine 1989).
However, because of this emphasis on dissociations, it remains unclear how
the two systems would communicate with each other. In particular, because the
explicit and implicit mind are believed to have separate computational forms –
symbolic logical production rules vs. simplistic primitive associations (Sloman
1996; Fodor & Pylyshyn 1998; Pinker 1997) – it is not currently understood how
these forms could interact (Greenwald & Nosek 2009). Yet there are numerous
empirical results reflecting fluid communication between the implicit and explicit
mind, in both directions. Research in evaluative readiness has demonstrated that
a deliberately adopted strategic goal – such as the desire to win a game or to
perform well academically – can moderate implicit attitudes within a matter of
milliseconds (Ferguson & Bargh 2004; Ferguson 2008). Conversely, research on
attitude conditioning has demonstrated that subliminal conditioning to novel ob-
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jects influences people′s explicit attitudes towards those same objects (Olson &
Fazio 2001; Monahan, Murphy & Zajonc 2000).
1.2.2 The dynamical perspective
One primary goal of this dissertation is develop an understanding of the implicit
and explicit mind from within a single dynamical framework, where interactions
and communication is possible. To do this, we draw upon dynamical systems
models of mental processing (Spivey 2007; Port & Van Gelder 1995; Kelso 1995),
which emphasize that interactions underly the formation of mental representa-
tions. Dynamical models see explicit decisions as emerging out of the interactions
of many components in a system. These models would differentiate between im-
plicit and explicit cognition through a notion of ”embedded knowledge” – that
is, knowledge is embedded within many synaptic connections in a neural system,
and mental processing requires neurobiological interactivity in order to gener-
ate an explicit representation. For example, when face recognition centers have
strong training and sufficiently long processing time, neurobiological interactions
can produce success on explicit measures; otherwise, the system succeeds only
on standard measures of implicit cognition, such as priming and savings in re-
learning (O’Reilly, Vecera & Farah, 1993). The corresponding notion that social
judgments and decisions gradually emerge out of interactions of many compo-
nents has been described by researchers applying dynamical perspectives to social
psychology (Vallacher, Read & Nowak 2002; Vallacher & Nowak 1994; Freeman
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& Ambady 2009; Freeman, Pauker, Apfelbaum & Ambady 2010; for similar ap-
proaches, see Judd, Drake, Downing, & Krosnick, 1991; Adolphs 1999; Fogel et al.
1992; Lewis, Douglas, Mascolo & Griffin 1998). These researchers have found ev-
idence, for example, that group norms and individual self-esteem are the results
of dynamical processes extended over time, in which the mind attempts to satisfy
multiple constraints embedded within the initial states of the system (Vallacher,
Nowak, Froehlich & Rockloff 2002). Moreover, neuro-imaging research on atti-
tudes has demonstrated that mental representations gradually evolve from early
amgydala-driven evaluations into increasingly more nuanced reflective attitudes
over the course of recurrent processing dynamics in prefrontal-subcortical circuits
(Cunningham & Zelazo 2007; Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer & Van Bavel 2008).
Because dynamical interactions may underly the formation of an explicit judg-
ment or decision, the active constructivist approach to social decision-making be-
comes particularly useful (Schwartz 1994; Ferguson & Bargh 2007). The active
constructivist perspective holds that a person′s mental representations are not
static, but are constantly reassembled anew upon recall, depending upon ever-
changing contextual cues. For example, people′s self-reported life satisfaction,
which might seem to be a consistent stable mental representation, can vary as a
function of amount of sunshine outdoors (Schwarz 2007). The active constructivist
perspective therefore rejects the traditional file-drawer view of accessing mental
representations from memory (see Klein, Sherman, & Loftus 1996); while it might
seem to be the case that a person has memorized answers to certain ritualized
questions (e.g. ”Are you satisfied with your life?”; ”Did you see the car crash?”),
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instead the mind seems to be actively constructing mental representations on the
spot. The context-dependence of social mental representations (attitudes, self-
esteem, etc.) is quite consistent with the notion of dynamical interactions driving
mental representations. The dynamical approach would suggest that these con-
stantly reassembled mental representations are explained by online dynamical in-
teractive processing that, at the moment of each social report, is attempting to
best satisfy many simultaneously existing constraints. Thus, one moment′s state-
ment that ”I like Republicans” may involve quite different dynamics than another
moment′s statement that ”I like Republicans,” rather than each report calling up
a statically stored representation.
These considerations suggest that social decision-making may not be so differ-
ent from perceptual decision-making, which is often described through dynamic
conflict resolution processes. For example, the gradual formation of a phonemic
representation over the course of hundreds of milliseconds (Did I just hear you
say ”bah” or ”pah”?) can be modeled as the dynamic competition between multi-
ple potential phonemic representations receiving varying degrees of support from
voice onset time, aspiration, and over fourteen other acoustic features (McMur-
ray, Tanenhaus, Aslin & Spivey 2003). In a similar manner, it may be the case
than an explicit social judgment dynamically assembles from a large set of con-
straints or biases. Importantly, some of these constraints could be implicit biases,
where implicit biases refers to ”unwanted” mental contents (social beliefs, views,
and associations) that could have been formed by any cognitive mechanism pro-
ducing unintentional acquisition. Such mechanisms of unintentional acquisition
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might include; unrecognized subliminal conditioning (Olson & Fazio 2001, Olson
& Fazio 2002, Karpinski & Hilton 2001); persistent influences from rejected propo-
sitions (Petty, Brinol & DeMaree 2007; Smith & Decoster 2000); cognitive biases in
the mind′s inferential system, such as illusory correlations between the rare mem-
bers of two categories (Hamilton & Gifford 1976; Hamilton & Rose 1980); or mo-
tivated attempts by the ”psychological immune system” (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson,
Blumberg & Wheatley 1998) to restore damaged self-esteem by altering cogni-
tive beliefs (see Spencer & Fein 1998; Sinclair & Kunda 1999; Balcetis & Dunning
2008). Through such mechanisms, a person may harbor mental contents match-
ing the characteristics of implicit cognition; that is, a person may store mental
contents that the person may not have intentionally acquired, may not necessarily
endorse, may not be capable of controlling, and may not even be aware of – yet
these mental contents could still potentially influence the dynamic formation of
an explicit social decision or judgment.
Thus, in this dissertation, we seek to investigate the real-time dynamics of
forming an explicit social judgment or decision, where real-time dynamics refers
to the moment-to-moment timescale along which a person gradually forms that
judgment or decision. In particular, we investigate the potential influence of im-
plicit information sources, meaning mental contents formed by mental processes
(such as subliminal conditioning, lingering rejected propositions, illusory correla-
tions, or motivated cognition) which are devoid of intentionality, controlled guid-
ance, subjective awareness, and/or cognitive resources. As argued above, there is
some basis for believing that implicit information sources may be influencing the
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real-time dynamics of forming an explicit social judgment. To summarize, the ac-
tive constructivist view holds that explicit social decisions are actively constructed
on the spot, the dynamical systems view holds that dynamical interactions un-
derly those explicit social decisions, and the automaticity perspective holds that
subliminal or unrecognized sources influence explicit judgments. Yet previous re-
search has focused on the influence of how static implicit manipulations influence
static explicit measures, and it remains unclear whether (and how) subliminal or
otherwise implicit informational sources may be influencing unfolding dynamical
PROCESS of explicit social cognition.
1.3 Empirical Goal: How do implicit biases influence the dynam-
ics of forming an explicit judgment?
In chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation, we depart from dual systems theory and
its barriers between the implicit and explicit mind; instead we consider the for-
mation of an explicit attitude as the end result of a dynamical process, extended
over time, within a single interactive system. The term single interactive sys-
tem is meant to encompass an influential class of neural network models such
as Normalized Recurrence (NR; Spivey 2007), Simple Recurrent Network (SRN;
Elman 1990), Dynamic Field Theory (DFT; Erlhagen & Schoner 2002), and Leabra
(Leabra; O’Reilly & Munkata 2000). These models attempt to explain mental func-
tioning with a single system deploying a single set of operating principles. This
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endeavor would seem to be at odds with current dual system models in social
psychology. This is because, if we examine the influential single systems mod-
els that have been developed in the broader cognitive sciences over the past 20
years, we see that these models would certainly get classified as ”associative net-
works” rather than ”rule-based systems.” The single interactive system models
are all constructed as parallel subsymbolic networks, rather than through serial
symbolic logical rules. They all accommodate probabilistic soft constraints, rather
than logical hard constraints. Thus, the single interactive systems models would
match the description of an associative network.
However, while associative systems are assumed by dual systems theory to
be primitive and unsophisticated, single interactive system models should be
thought of as an ”associative system” on steroids. The cognitive capacities of
these single interactive system models far exceed those of traditional associative
systems. In most dual systems models, the associative systems resemble vari-
ous spreading activation networks developed in the 1970′s (e.g., Collins & Loftus,
1974). However, the ”connectionist revolution” in the 1980′s and the ”dynamic
revolution” in the 1990′s have advanced knowledge of what a ”merely” associa-
tive system – that is of what a parallel distributed processing network – can do.
Thus, here we coin the term ”single interactive system models of cognition to refer
to these kinds of models (such as DFT, NR, and SRN, and LEABRA), with the new
term reflecting the fact that these parallel distributed processing networks are no
longer the associative networks of the 1970′s, but self-organizing dynamical net-
works with sophisticated capabilities.
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In particular, the connectionist revolution in the 1980′s took the Collins and
Loftus (1974) notion of associations between discrete symbolic concepts (”dog,”
”cat”, etc.), and extended it to subsymbolic distributed representations (patterns
of activation which may partially resemble several different concepts at once). The
dynamic revolution of the 1990′s took the move one step further by adding cyclic
recurrent processing dynamics. Now, the layers of a connectionist network could
interactively communicate with each other repeatedly over time. After these de-
velopments, it was possible to think about cognitive decisions, motor behaviors,
or internal representations not as static, but as dynamically evolving over time.
With the new features brought on by the connectionist and dynamic revolutions,
single interactive system models began to exhibit quite sophisticated behavior.
Researchers have shown that feedforward connectionist networks (FN) can per-
form deductive syllogisms (Rogers & McClelland 2004), that simple recurrent
networks (SRN) can produce rule-based language (Elman 1990; Christiansen &
Chater 1999; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 1991); that normalized recurrent networks
(NR), can do serial-like visual search (Spivey 2007); and that dynamic field theory
(DFT) can explain the development of ”symbolic thought” (Thelen & Smith 1994;
Schutte & Spencer 2002). Thus, these single interactive system models possess
cognitive capacities that far exceed those of the original associative networks of
the 1970s, even though these models are still parallel distributed processing net-
works, and therefore use operating principles that conform precisely to what dual
systems models in social psychology would call ”System I” rather than ”System
II.”
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How much can these single interactive system models explain? In Chapters 2
and 3 of this dissertation, we demonstrate that a single interactive system frame-
work can be used to explain an apparently System II phenomenon – explicit at-
titudes (see Wojnowicz, Ferguson, Dale, & Spivey, 2009). In particular, we rely
upon a single interactive system framework to describe how an explicit attitude
gradually assembles from simultaneous interaction and rivalry among multiple
implicit and explicit biases. From this perspective (in particular, following the NR
model), the active construction of an explicit attitude occurs in the following way.
In the preliminary moments of processing a stimulus during an evaluation task
(e.g., ”do you like or dislike Black people?”; ”do you like or dislike Joe?”), a set of
informational sources simultaneously provides graded probabilistic support for
multiple potential explicit decisions (see Table 1.1 - still a). However, these infor-
mational sources continuously cascade probabilistic information to an integrative
decision-making region (see Table 1.1 - still b). The integrative decision-making
region accumulates evidence for candidate decisions, forces the potential deci-
sions to compete by way of mutual inhibition (Chelazzi & Miller 1993), and then
sends top-down recurrent feedback to the informational sources, thereby updat-
ing each source′s level of probabilistic support (see Table 1.1 - still c). This cyclic
process reiterates many times, and over recurrent cycles of activation propagation,
the system gradually resolves multiple simultaneously conflicting biases, thereby
settling into a finalized conclusive stable representation (see Table 1.1 - still d). Be-
havioral evidence from chapters 2 and 3 suggest that this model does a good job
of describing the real-time construction of an explicit attitude (for corroborating
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evidence see Freeman, Ambady, Rule, & Johnson 2008), using parallel distributed
processing rather than discrete symbolic logical rules.
Still a Still b
Still c Still d
Table 1.1: A normalized recurrence model of a dynamically self-
organizing deliberative evaluation. A node′s activation is rep-
resented by darkness.
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1.3.1 Chapter 2: The influence of aversive racism
In Chapter 2, we investigate a classic case of implicit-explicit conflict – racial atti-
tudes. Studies on attitudes tend to find low correspondences between implicit and
explicit measures of racial attitudes (typical correlations are between 0 and .33;
Cunningham, Preacher & Banaji 2001; Dovidio, Kawakami & Gaertner 2002; Mc-
Connell & Liebold 2001), whereas implicit and explicit measures can correspond
much more highly in other domains (political views such as pro-choice vs. pro-life
attitudes can have correlations of about .70; Nosek 2005). In general, participants
seem to have roughly equivalently positive explicit attitudes towards both white
people and black people, but they seem to have much more negative implicit at-
titudes towards black people than to white people. From the dynamical perspec-
tive, these findings suggest that the seemingly identical explicit liking judgments
towards black people and white people are merely the end results of very differ-
ent dynamical processes in which there is much greater dynamical conflict during
the real-time dynamics of formulating the liking judgment of black people. In par-
ticular, when participants are forming a liking judgment of black people, implicit
informational sources may be providing particularly strong partial support for
an unchosen dislike explicit attitude. Chapter 2 studies hand-movement trajecto-
ries as a means of tapping the real-time dynamics of forming a liking judgment.
We find evidence that the process of explicitly evaluating black people involves
elevated levels of dynamical conflict, with the conflict manifesting itself within
three features of the dynamics (spatial deviations, strained velocity profiles, and
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disorderliness).
1.3.2 Chapter 3: The influence of subliminal conditioning
In Chapter 3, we attempt to show directly that implicit (rather than explicit) infor-
mational sources can influence the dynamical process of formulating an explicit
social decision. While the studies in Chapter 2 provide evidence that the real-time
process of evaluating black people compared to white people involves greater
dynamical conflict, there is no guarantee that such conflict was produced by im-
plicit informational sources. People may simply possess more conflicting beliefs,
views, feelings, and memories in the explicit realm, and the conflict distributed
across those explicit informational sources may driving the elevated conflict ex-
pressed during the explicit report. To more directly test whether the elevated
conflict traces back to implicit, subconscious informational sources, we employed
a subliminal conditioning paradigm in the studies of Chapter 3. Using subliminal
conditioning, we trained participants to have positive explicit attitudes towards
two novel characters, but to have negative implicit attitudes towards one char-
acter and positive implicit attitudes towards another character. We then tested
whether the subliminal conditioning exerts an influence on the dynamics of form-
ing a liking judgment, even though participants remain completely unaware of
the conditioning. The results provide some supporting evidence that this is the
case.
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1.4 Theoretical Goal: How does a dynamic mental system accom-
plish psychological control?
Psychological control can be defined as the ability to select thoughts and actions
in the service of internal goals (Koechlin & Summerfield 2007). Since the previous
empirical chapters have been concerned with making explicit responses that grate
against implicit biases, it could be said that these explicit responses must have re-
quired some ”psychological control.” In fact, a good deal of research (reviewed
in the introduction to Chapter 4) suggests that overcoming unwanted implicit bi-
ases requires cognitive control. For example, behavior is driven more strongly
by implicit attitudes when cognitive resources are low. Moreover, the prefrontal
cortex, typically described as the center of cognitive control, becomes activated
at higher than baseline levels when people must override prepotent or habitual
tendencies. But these observations raise a whole host of theoretical questions. In
social psychological theory, the predominant models of psychological control are
dualistic: there is a mental system which does the controlling (and that mental
system, depending on the particular theory, might be characterized as rule-based,
explicit, and/or rational), and a system which must be controlled (and that mental
system, depending on the particular theory, might be described as associative, im-
plicit, and/or emotional). Yet the controlled system is generally ”outside” of the
interactive dynamics, in the sense that dynamical properties tend to be stipulated
and described only for the other (associative, implicit, intuitive, etc.) system. So
then what, from the perspective of an interactive system, is psychological control?
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Can we develop a full theory of control within an interactive system, a theory
where we can understand how the primary capacities of a controller could arise
out of dynamical interactions in a parallel distributed system like the brain?
1.4.1 Chapter 4: A dynamical interactive model of psychological
control
In Chapter 4, we sketch a theory of psychological control within a dynamical in-
teractive system. First, we explore dualistic accounts of control to uncover three
primary capacities accorded to the privileged control system – decisive selection,
the strategic pursuit of a distant goal, and flexible toggling between goals. In du-
alistic theories, these capacities are seen to be impossible by the more primitive
system, which tends to be the system which is distributed and dynamic; thus,
such theories make it unclear how a dynamic, distributed system would accom-
plish such feats. However, we briefly argue, as a point of departure, that any
reasonable theory of control must be built out of interactivity. Thus, we begin by
assuming that any theory about the brain must adhere to four common principles
of biologically plausible mental processing, and based on these principles, we at-
tempt to discover how the three control capacities would work from within such
an interactive system. We will discover that in the end, we indeed need multi-
ple specialized systems to perform psychological control, but that computations
within each of these specialized systems take the form of subsymbolic parallel dis-
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tributed processing. For the reason, the mechanisms for interactions both within
and between systems can be made conceptually clear, both at a biological level (i.e.
synaptic connections) and a mathematical level (i.e. coupled firing rates). The pri-
mary result of this chapter is to describe an ”interactive” biologically plausible
realization of the three control capacities. We conclude the chapter by proposing
a crisp geometric hypothesis about how psychological control works in an inter-
active brain, and we apply the hypothesis to an important case of psychological
control of the implicit mind, namely evaluative readiness.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DYNAMICAL INFLUENCE OF AVERSIVE RACISM ON EXPLICIT
EVALUATIVE PROCESSING
2.1 Overview
Note: This chapter has been published under the alternate title: The self-organization of
explicit attitudes.
How do minds produce explicit attitudes over several hundred milliseconds?
Speeded evaluative measures have revealed ”implicit” biases beyond cognitive
control or subjective awareness, yet mental processing may culminate in an ”ex-
plicit” attitude that feels personally endorsed and corroborates voluntary inten-
tions. We argue that self-reported ”explicit” attitudes derive from a continuous
temporally dynamic process, whereby multiple simultaneously conflicting con-
straints self-organize into a meaningful mental representation. As our partici-
pants reported their explicit (like vs. dislike) attitudes towards white versus black
people, we recorded streaming x, y coordinates from their hand-movement tra-
jectories. We found that when participants reported positive explicit attitudes
toward black people, rather than white people, their hand movement paths ex-
hibited greater curvature toward the dislike response. Moreover, these trajecto-
ries were characterized by precisely the movement disorder and competitive ve-
locity profiles predicted under the assumption that the deliberate attitudes were
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emerging from continuous interactions between multiple simultaneously conflict-
ing constraints.
People′s evaluations of stimuli as positive or negative can be activated in mem-
ory in either an unintentional (implicit) or intentional (explicit) fashion (e.g., for
reviews, see Albarracin, Johnson, & Zanna, 2005; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Ferguson,
2007; Petty, Fazio, & Brinol, 2007; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). That is, peoples
attitudes toward stimuli can at times be rapidly and unintentionally activated by
the mere presence of the stimuli, as well as deliberately and intentionally reported.
Research in social cognition over the last two decades has shown that peoples im-
plicit and explicit attitudes toward the same stimulus are sometimes dissociated,
particularly when the stimulus represents a socially stigmatized group or person
(e.g., Nosek, 2005). For example, although very few participants explicitly re-
port more positive attitudes toward white versus black people, such a pro-white
preference nevertheless emerges in many participants implicit attitudes. Partic-
ipants shown computer-based images of black versus white people are signifi-
cantly slower in making lexical decisions about subsequently encountered posi-
tive words (e.g., sunshine, puppy) and faster at making decisions about negative
words (e.g., disaster, cancer), which suggests they evaluated the images of the
black people in a relatively more negative manner (e.g., Fazio, Jackson, Dunton
& Williams 1995; Wittenbrink, Judd & Park 1997). Given that many people show
initial, implicit biases toward traditionally stigmatized groups in society, how do
they overcome them when explicitly reporting positive attitudes toward the same
groups? In other words, how do people generate intentional attitudes, especially
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those that involve potentially conflicting sources of influence?
A variety of theoretical accounts has been proposed to accommodate existing
data on the formation of attitudes and choices, ranging from the broadly framed
dual-attitude models(Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) to the more specific dual-
process models (Devine, 1989; Smith & DeCoster, 2000) to dynamic interaction
models (Judd, Drake, Downing, & Krosnick, 1991; see also Roe, Busemeyer, &
Townsend, 2001, and Heider, 1946). What we find in common in all of these ac-
counts is the co-existence of multiple attitudes and an emphasis on the tempo-
ral dynamics of how they influence evaluative responses. Rather than selecting
among the specific theories, we invoke the encompassing theoretical framework
of self-organization to guide an exploration of those temporal dynamics, with spe-
cific predictions for what should result from multiple attitudes interacting over
time.
Starting from the premise that mental representations in general are dynami-
cally evolving states (Conrey & Smith, 2008), we suggest that explicitly reportable
attitudes are merely the end result of a complex nonlinear time-dependent process
of multiple less-explicit attitudes competing with one another over hundreds of
milliseconds. Mental representations, as implemented in the brain, are distributed
representations: neural populations convey information through patterns of fir-
ing rates distributed across multiple neurons (Rogers & McClelland 2004; Spivey,
2007), even in higher-order decision-making regions (Bogacz & Gurney, 2006;
Lapish, Durstewitz, Chandler & Seamans, 2008). Contemporary decision-making
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frameworks therefore model the decision-making process as a dynamic real-time
evolution of a distributed pattern (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993, Usher & Mc-
Clelland, 2003). In early moments of mental processing, these distributed pat-
terns are partially consistent with multiple interpretations, due to their proximity
to multiple neural population codes, and they therefore provide a vague, prelim-
inary interpretation. However, a continuous accrual of information causes the
distributed pattern to dynamically sharpen into a confident (selected) interpreta-
tion, forcing other partially activated competing alternative representations, deci-
sions, or actions to gradually die out. Thus, in this self-organization framework,
it is possible for one attitude (whose biases rise quickly in activation) to be briefly
prominent during early moments of forming an attitude choice, whereas during
later moments of forming that same attitude choice, a different attitude may take
hold (whose biases are stronger but rise in activation more slowly). That latter
attitude will eventually activate other subsystems, such as language and memory,
thus making the attitude seem explicit. What makes the first attitude implicit is
not necessarily that it was generated in a different subsystem, but simply that it
did not hold sway long enough to activate those language and memory subsys-
tems.
This basic framework places cognitive processes in the same domain as many
other natural phenomena that evolve through self-organizing dynamics (Kelso,
1995; Van Orden, Holden & Turvey, 2003). Self-organizing systems change states
over time, even under constant input: these systems are endowed with internal
constraints which cause them to change states autonomously, because continu-
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ous interactions between component parts (e.g. population codes for an inter-
pretation or behavioral choice) drive that system through a series of intermediate
states towards a stable steady state. In the mind, processing generically involves
recurrent processing loops (or cyclic feedback) between higher-order integrative
regions and lower-level informational sources (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; OR-
eilly, 1998, Spivey, 2007). Moreover, these higher-order integrative regions enforce
representational competition, whereby increasing the activation of one particular
interpretation inhibits alternatives (e.g. Miller 2000; Desimone & Duncan 1995).
In this way, highly probabilistic mental states morph into nearly discrete sym-
bolic representations. Many behavioral studies have supported that higher-order
mental states continuously evolve through the dynamic satisfaction of multiple si-
multaneously conflicting constraints, even for seemingly categorical decisions in
speech perception (McMurray, Tanenhaus, Aslin & Spivey, 2003), syntactic rule
construction (Farmer, Anderson, & Spivey, 2007), and semantic categorization
(Dale, Kehoe & Spivey, 2007). In the present work, we extend this framework
to self-reported attitudes regarding social preferences.
A self-organizing, explicitly reported attitude requires a set of informational
sources, including, for example, semantic features, evaluative conditioning, per-
sonal memories, motivational value, and response context. These informational
sources should continuously cascade intermediate results of processing into in-
tegrative decision-making regions, such as the basal ganglia (Bogacz & Gurney,
2007) and cortical motor areas (Cisek & Kalaska, 2005). These sources send si-
multaneous probabilistic support for multiple candidate decisions; so in early
26
moments of processing, semantic knowledge might be 70% supportive of a like
decision and 30% of a dislike decision. Higher-order integrative regions force the
potential evaluative representations to compete, and then send top-down recur-
rent feedback to the informational sources. Gradually, through multiple cycles of
recurrent processing, the system self-organizes into a coherent response (Spivey,
2007). From this perspective, the research showing pro-white biases in peoples
implicit attitudes (e.g., Fazio et al., 1995) suggests that the black people stimulus
may evoke greater conflict distributed across probabilistic information sources as
the positive deliberate evaluation dynamically emerges. If so, a temporally fine-
grained analysis should reveal that peoples explicit liking judgments for black
people and white people evolve in real-time processing with qualitatively differ-
ent dynamics.
How might we capture such dynamical information in real time? The unfold-
ing cognitive dynamics may be revealed in continuous motor output. Because
mental processing is recurrent, motor representations begin specifying movement
parameters probabilistically rather than waiting for a perfectly completed cogni-
tive command (Erlhagen & Schoner, 2002). In fact, motor commands may initiate
movement before specifying a unique target destination, because motor trajec-
tory parameters can be continually updated mid-flight (Henis & Flash 1995). For
example, manual reaching towards a verbally named target object (e.g. candy)
curves more towards a distractor that has a similar sounding name (e.g., candle;
Spivey, Grosjean & Knoblich 2005). Manual reaching towards an animals taxo-
nomic classification (e.g. mammal) curves more towards the distractor response
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(e.g. fish) for taxonomically equivocal animals (e.g. whales vs. apes; Dale, Kehoe
& Spivey 2007).
The motor execution of explicitly reported attitudes toward different ethnic
groups may exhibit similar nonlinear dynamics. To test whether explicit atti-
tudes toward potentially conflicting stimuli show such competition, we tracked
participants motor trajectories towards like/dislike responses representing their
explicit attitudes. Given the implicit attitude findings concerning black versus
white people, and assuming that explicit attitudes dynamically emerge through
self-organization, we predicted that hand trajectories should show greater motor
curvature towards a dislike response while participants are positively evaluating
black rather than white people. This motor curvature would reveal a greater influ-
ence of a dislike decision during the process of settling into a like decision toward
black people. Additionally, there are two fine-grain predictions that are made
exclusively by a competitive dynamics account of this phenomenon. Assuming
that the black people stimulus evokes elevated dynamic competition between si-
multaneously active like and dislike representations, movement trajectories for
the black people stimulus should exhibit evidence of nonlinear dynamics in their




2.2.1 Study 1: Methods
Streaming x and y coordinates of mouse-cursor movements were recorded from
68 Cornell University undergraduates (43 female) in a simple explicit attitude
task. Trials began with two seconds for participants to view the evaluative re-
sponse options (LIKE) and (DISLIKE) randomly assigned to upper corners of the
screen. Participants then clicked on a small box at the bottom of the screen to
reveal a stimulus word and dragged the mouse toward their selected evaluative
response. The 40 stimulus words included the target stimuli, black people and
white people, as well as 19 positively valenced distractors (e.g. sunshine, babies)
and 19 negatively valenced distractors (e.g. rats, murderers). These 40 stimu-
lus words were presented in two blocks with randomly assigned order. The two
stimulus repetitions were averaged together to yield a single measurement per
participant for all statistical analyses (but not distributional analyses). We ana-
lyzed data only from the 61 participants who reported liking both white people
and black people on both stimulus repetitions.
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2.2.2 Study 1: Results and Discussion
Compared to the white people trajectories, the black people trajectories curved
significantly more toward the dislike response option, as shown in Figure 2.1 (up-
per half). The maximum perpendicular deviation from a hypothetical straight line
connecting the trajectorys start and endpoint was greater for the black people tra-
jectories than for the white people trajectories, t(60)=2.17, p-rep=.94, d=.29. As a
result, the mean distance traveled en route to the like response was also longer for
black people trajectories than for white people trajectories, t(60) = 2.44, p-rep=.98,
d=.32. Responses did not differ in total reaction time, t(60)=1.44, d=.18.
In principle, the observed differential motor curvatures could be generated by
a stage-based sequence of decisional commands, rather than by continuous motor
attraction to the dislike response. If motor execution required the complete pre-
specification of a unique target destination, rather than tracking motor trajectory
parameters that continuously evolve mid-flight, then a mean trajectory could look
differentially curved by averaging in replanned trajectories (where some propor-
tion of trials involve an initial motor command guiding movement directly to-
wards dislike that becomes aborted and replaced by a second motor command
towards like). To accommodate the empirical mean trajectory that initially moves
upward, rather than actually toward dislike, such an account would need to pre-
dict a bimodal distribution of curvatures, with some trajectories very curved and
others not curved. However, the distribution of trajectory curvatures shows no
evidence of bimodality, as shown in Figure 2.2. The degree of bimodality can
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Figure 2.1: Studies 1 and 2: Mean mouse-movement trajectories towards
evaluative targets for the black people and white people stim-
uli
be quantified with a bimodality coefficient, capable of detecting bimodality in a
mouse-tracking paradigm (Spivey et al., 2005). The bimodality statistic is com-





(n − 2)(n − 3)
,
where n is the number of observations in the distribution of interest. The standard
cutoff for inferring bimodality in a distribution is b¿.55. Neither the black- nor
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white-people distributions of trajectories met this cut-off, and in fact the black-
people trajectories form a distribution of movement curvature that is actually
closer to normal, b=.24, skewness=.613, kurtosis=2.57, than the white-people tra-
jectories, b=.301, skewness=.98, kurtosis=3.44.
Figure 2.2: Study 1: Distributions of trajectory curvature show no evidence
of bimodality
We further analyzed these computer-mouse trajectories for evidence of non-
linear competitive dynamics, a signature of complex self-organizing systems. Ve-
locity profiles were constructed by analyzing the temporal derivatives of motion
towards the like response box along the x-coordinate. Movement along the x-
coordinate axis reflects relative confidence in deciding upon one evaluation over
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the other, since the mouse-movements starting location is equidistant between
the two response boxes along this horizontal dimension. Our velocity predictions
come from Usher and McClellands (2003) differential equations for modeling the
dynamics of competition between mental representations:
dx1 = (I1 − x1 − β f2)dt
dx2 = (I2 − x2 − β f1)dt
where in this case x1 and x2 represent the activations of the mental representa-
tions for like and dislike; dx1 and dx2 represent the change in the activation of the
two mental representations in a time step of size dt; I1 and I2 represent excitatory
input to the representations from informational sources; β f1 and β f2 represent the
inhibitory input of each mental representation to the other (called lateral inhibi-
tion); and fi (i=1 or 2) is equal to xi if xi is greater than 0. According to these dif-
ferential equations for competition dynamics, a strong evaluative competitor (x2)
sends intensified and prolonged lateral inhibition (β f2) to the like evaluation (x1).




), reducing velocity toward the attractor early on in pro-
cessing. However, as the more active alternative begins to win the competition,
this lateral inhibition is gradually lifted, thus increasing velocity later in process-
ing to produce greater acceleration. Therefore, strong competition predicts higher
acceleration into the like response box (
d2x1
dt2
) in normalized time Moreover, this
particular dynamic pattern (reduced early velocity and greater later acceleration)
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should lead to greater peak velocity, if jerk is minimized as the system achieves
equivalent integral under the curve (representing net change in activation or lo-
cation). Thus, dynamic conflict does not simply delay processing, but changes its
composition: strong competition should lead to compressed high-spiking deriva-
tive profiles toward the preferred interpretation, even in normalized time.
These mouse trajectories approach the like response boxes with precisely the
temporal derivative profiles predicted by Usher and McClellands (2003) model of
competition dynamics, as shown in Figure 2.3. The black-people trajectories had
significantly greater maximum x-coordinate acceleration (shown as steeper veloc-
ity slope) into the like response box, than the white-people trajectories, t(60)=2.69,
p-rep=.96, d=.41. Moreover, the black-people trajectories had significantly greater
peak velocity (shown as higher velocity curve peak), t(60)=2.65, p-rep=.95, d=.36.
These findings suggest that mental representations for both response alternatives,
like and dislike, may be simultaneously active and competing over time, as in the
Usher and McClelland model.
The spatial disorder analysis investigated the regularity of change in x-
coordinate location over time. Our prediction about spatial disorder draws upon
previous work on natural and physical self-organizing systems, which has es-
tablished that increasingly conflicting constraints on a system′s state invokes dy-
namic state-space trajectories that show more disorder or irregularity in their
pathways (Kauffman, 1993; see also Dale et al., 2007, and McKinstry et al., 2008).
In the present study, a self-organizing framework predicts that the motor trajec-
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Figure 2.3: Study 1: Mean velocities towards the evaluative decision for
the black people and white people conditions in normalized
time
tories for the black people stimulus should have greater disorder than those from
white people trials, even in the segment of the trajectory which has already com-
mitted to a like response. To investigate whether the black people trajectories
have more wiggles, blips, and other such irregularities, we analyzed x-coordinate
location over time, but only after the trajectory began moving in the positive x-
direction. A sigmoidal fit, which very snugly fits curves that continue asymptot-
ing toward like in an orderly regular manner, as shown in Figure ??, was then
imposed on the obtained curve. The black-people trajectories had significantly
greater deviation from the sigmoidal fit, as revealed in a significantly lower R-
squared, t(60)=2.29, p-rep=.92,d=.31, indicating disorderly variation around the
x-dimension in those trajectories.
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The curvature results (Figure 2.1) clearly demonstrate a greater motor attrac-
tion toward the dislike response option for black people trials, indicating some
initial prominence of this negative evaluation in responses that, a fraction of a
second later, manifest as positive attitude choices. It is worth noting that this dif-
ference in curvature emerges in the absence of a difference in total reaction time.
The findings in the velocity and spatial disorder analyses further suggest that this
initial prominence of the negative evaluation may be part of a dynamic process of
parallel competition between partially active positive and negative implicit eval-
uations, the winner of which becomes the explicit attitude choice.
Figure 2.4: Study 1: Hand trajectories exhibit greater spatial disorder dur-
ing evaluations of black people than white people
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2.3 Study 2
As our claim is that multiple partially active mental representations compete for
the privilege of driving evaluative responses, imposing a set of response options
that are not particularly competitive should change the motor dynamics. If the
response box opposite to the like box does not provide any semantic match to the
content of the self-organizing evaluative response, then white people and black
people trajectories should lose their differential curvature. In particular, the tar-
gets black people and white people should evoke much stronger support for in-
terpretations as positive entities than as chemical elements.
2.3.1 Study 2: Methods
Sixty-six Cornell University undergraduates (40 female) were asked to classify
words (e.g. ice cream, sunshine, boron) as something they liked (”LIKE”) or as
the name of a chemical element (”CHEMICAL”). We analyzed data only from the
63 participants who consistently reported ”liking” both black people and white
people on both repetitions of these trials, and who reported in a post-study ques-
tionnaire that they were not forced into selecting like by the paradigm.
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2.3.2 Study 2: Results and Discussion
According to statistical analyses on maximum deviation and distance traveled,
the black people and white people trajectories no longer differed in their curvature
toward the competing response, as shown in Figure 2.1 (lower half), t(62) = -.10, p-
rep=.16, d= -.01. Thus, the results of Experiment 1 are not merely due to responses
to black people involving a longer latency to settle on a positive evaluation, and
thereby drifting for longer in empty regions of movement space before curving
toward the like response box. Rather, the dislike response option in Experiment
1 is actively pulling movement trajectories toward it, in a way that the chemical
response option in Experiment 2 does not do.
There were no significant differences in maximum acceleration, t(62)=-1.06, p-
rep=.64, d=.17 or peak velocity, t(62)=-1.39, p-rep=.74, d=.22, which if anything
trended toward higher values for white-people trajectories. Likewise, there were
no significant differences in spatial disorder, t(62)= -.13, p-rep=.19,d= -.02.
2.4 Study 3
Whereas we frame our results with respect to explicit attitudes toward people
of different races or ethnicities, the mouse-cursor response trajectories to black
people and white people in Experiment 1 may have diverged due to subtle con-
founds that do not refer to people at all. For example, perhaps these differences
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reflect different evaluations of the color terms black and white that precede the
term people.
2.4.1 Study 3: Methods
Seventy-one Cornell University undergraduates (37 female) were asked to clas-
sify stimuli as something they liked (”LIKE”), or disliked (”DISLIKE”). The meth-
ods were the same as Study 1, except that the crucial stimuli in this experiment
were the terms African Americans and Caucasians, rather than ”black people”
and ”white people.” We analyzed data only from the 64 participants who consis-
tently reported ”liking” both African Americans and Caucasians on both stimulus
repetitions.
2.4.2 Study 3: Results
The African-American trajectories curved significantly more towards the dislike
response than Caucasian trajectories, t(63)=3.65, p-rep=.99, d=.56, as shown in
Figure 2.5, which shows averaged rightward and horizontally-flipped leftward
trajectories.
The motor trajectories temporally evolved in accordance with the competitive
velocity predictions, as reported in Experiment 1. The African-American trajec-
tories, compared with the Caucasian trajectories, had significantly greater max-
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Figure 2.5: Study 3: Mean mouse-movement trajectories towards evalua-
tive targets for the stimuli African Americans and Caucasians
in the third study
imum x-coordinate acceleration, t(62)=3.55, p-rep=.99, d=.47. These trajectories
also obtained higher peak velocity, t(62)=4.54, p-rep=.99, d=.63. Moreover, as seen
for black people trajectories in Experiment 1, the African-American trajectories
exhibited greater spatial disorder (than Caucasian trajectories), even once mov-
ing towards like, as indicated by significantly greater mean deviation from the
sigmoidal fit, t(62)=2.49, p-rep=.94, d=.44. In tandem, these results demonstrate
that the same general constellation of findings is observed with the labels African
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American and Caucasian as was observed with the labels black people and white
people.
2.5 Discussion
Peoples hand-movement trajectories for explicitly evaluating black versus white
people distinguished themselves along three properties of the dynamics: shape,
time, and order. These findings suggest that explicit attitudes evolve through
continuous temporal dynamics during real-time mental processing, with graded
motor curvature revealing the influence of dislike tendencies. There was no ev-
idence for cleanly separated (i.e., discrete, rather than continuous) explicit deci-
sions, whereby an initial response was executed solely toward the dislike response
box and then a corrective response was executed mid-flight toward the like re-
sponse box. Rather, the results suggest that a dynamic competition process may
be what allows a single explicit attitude choice to emerge from multiple, poten-
tially conflicting evaluative influences (e.g., Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Usher
& McClelland, 2003). Thus, the mind, rather than switching from one singular
(implicit) decision to a different singular (explicit) decision, may host a continu-
ously evolving blend of (implicit) evaluative decisions from which the eventual
(explicit) behavioral choice emerges.
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CHAPTER 3
THE DYNAMICAL INFLUENCE OF SUBLIMINAL CONDITIONING ON
EXPLICIT EVALUATIVE PROCESSING
3.1 Overview
3.1.1 A ”dual channels” model of evaluative decisions
The term ”simultaneous contradictory belief” (Sloman 1996) has been coined to
describe situations in which people simultaneously believe two contradictory re-
sponses. Examples include people’s contradictory responses to the Muller-Lyer
illusion, statements like ”technically, a whale is a mammal,” and separate pulls
from similarity and logic in the Linda-the-bank-teller problem. In such situations,
people report feeling their minds pulling them in two different directions at once.
Social psychology theory frequently suggests that, at a broader scale, people
can be ”Of Two Minds” (e.g. Smith & Decoster 2000, Gawronski & Bodenhausen
2006, Strack & Deutsch 2004). Seemingly, mental systems can clash – such as when
rationality clashes with intuition, when a temptation gets the better of a person,
or when cerebral and emotional selves disagree. In particular, the automaticity
revolution has emphasized the potential clash between the implicit and explicit
minds (e.g. see Chartrand & Bargh 1999; Berridge & Winkielman 2003). For ex-
ample, dual attitude models (Wilson 2000; McConnell and Leibold 2001; Rydell &
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McConnell 2006) hold that implicit attitudes and explicit attitudes are completely
separable. They are trained by different kinds of information (e.g. subliminal vs.
verbal) and they direct different kinds of behavior (e.g. controlled vs. uncon-
trolled).
Empirical research has been generated to support the existence of simultane-
ously contrasting beliefs at the implicit and explicit levels. For example, in one
set of studies (Rydell & McConnell 2006) participants were trained to learn about
a new person, Bob, over the course of 100 learning trials. For each trial, partic-
ipants would see the picture of Bob, along with some verbal information poten-
tially characterizing his behavior. These behavioral statements reflected behav-
ior that was either clearly positive, as in ”He donated a pint of blood to the Red
Cross,” or clearly negative, as in ”He cheated on a take-home exam from the uni-
versity.” Participants were supposed to guess whether the sentence characterized
Bob accurately or not. For participants in condition A, the good sentences always
characterized Bob (and the bad sentences were always uncharacteristic). For par-
ticipants in condition B, the bad sentences always characterized Bob (and the good
sentences were always uncharacteristic). However, participants encountered di-
rectly contrasting information at the subliminal level. In condition A, the pictures
of Bob were always preceded by a 25 millisecond negative subliminal prime (like
”vomit,” ”death”), whereas in condition B, the pictures of Bob were always pre-
ceded by a 25 millisecond positive subliminal prime (like ”flowers,” ”happiness”).
The researchers found that such training leads to countervailing effects: par-
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ticipants in condition A exhibited positive explicit attitudes but negative implicit
attitudes, whereas participants in condition B exhibited negative explicit attitudes
but positive implicit attitudes. Moreover, when the same participants were ex-
posed to the opposite procedure (i.e., after testing, participants in condition A
were exposed to the condition B training), the results reversed. The results are
shown in Figure 3.1.
Based on these results, the researchers argue that people are ”of two minds”
and can simultaneously hold independent contradictory attitudes. These dis-
tinct attitudes were formed from distinct environmental inputs: explicit attitudes
formed and changed in response to consciously accessible behavioral statements,
whereas implicit attitudes formed and changed in response to subliminally pre-
sented primes. Moreover, based on other studies in the field (McConnell & Lei-
bold 2001; Dunton et al. 2002), these distinct attitudes drive distinct behaviors:
explicit attitudes drive the verbal contents of behavior, whereas implicit attitudes
drive nonverbal communication. The idea is of two independent channels of men-
tal processing.
The notion of two distinct channels leaves little room for notion of interactiv-
ity. The researchers conclude that their results ”seem incompatible with models of
evaluation that assume explicit attitudes are simply modified version of implicit
attitudes accessed from memory.” However, the notion of strictly independent
channels seems to grate against one of the mind′s major fundamental tasks – that
information conveyed by specialized groups of neurons must be functionally in-
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Figure 3.1: Primary findings of Rydell & McConnell 2006
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tegrated in order to guide behavior (Tononi, Edelman, & Sporns, 1998). The mind
would be rather impoverished if its learning from subliminal evaluative condi-
tioning could not influence adaptive behavior – and in fact, evidence that this
occurs has been obtained many times (e.g. Zajonc 1968; Nisbett and Wilson 1977).
Thus, in this study, we ask whether it is possible that a more sensitive measure
would reveal that explicit attitudes are actually tracking, at least in the early mo-
ments of real-time processing, the results of the subliminal conditioning?
The theoretical interest in this question comes from a single interactive sys-
tems approach to social decision-making (described in detail in Chapter 1). From
this perspective, explicit mental representations, such as attitudes, gradually un-
fold in real-time processing as information sources dynamically self-organize into
a coherent decision. This model would predict that if participants in a study were
trained to like Bob, but participants in the cohort condition were exposed to sub-
liminally negative associations and participants in the control condition were ex-
posed to subliminally positive associations, then participants in the cohort con-
dition would have more conflict distributed across information sources, and thus
may exhibit greater evidence of dynamical conflict while making their decision.
This dynamical interactive approach to evaluative decision making was sup-
ported by the empirical results in the aversive racism chapter (Chapter 2). Because
of the documented widespread existence of aversive racism, the chapter expected
greater conflict during the real-time evaluative processing of black people then
during the process of evaluating white people. The single interactive systems
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model in turn predicts the degree of conflict initially distributed across informa-
tion sources should manifest itself in the dynamic process of making an evaluative
decision. The analysis of mid-processing hand-movement trajectories supported
this view of greater dynamical conflict during the evaluations of black people.
However the research in Chapter 2 failed to address exactly which informational
sources are contributing to the evaluative dynamics. The dynamic formation of an
explicit attitude towards different ethnicities could depend upon solely declara-
tive information (semantic knowledge, personal memories, task context, etc), and
not draw at all from subliminal conditioning. Perhaps, somehow, subliminal con-
ditioning is simply too weak of an influence to alter explicit evaluation processes.
Thus, the Rydell and McConnell research raises a particularly interesting ques-
tion: Can subliminal conditioning be an informational source to the dynamics of
constructing an explicit evaluation? This is precisely the question we study in
this chapter. Thus, in this study, we taught participants about two novel (fake)
characters. One character was described through dissociated training (positive
behavioral statements, negative subliminal conditioning), and the other character
was described through consistent training (positive behavioral statements, pos-
itive subliminal conditioning). After the learning phase, we gave participants a
two-alternative forced choice (LIKE vs DISLIKE) attitude task, and we tracked
the hand-movement trajectories of the participants. We predicted that subjects
would report liking both novel characters but that their hand-movement trajecto-
ries would curve more towards dislike for the dissociated stimulus then for the
consistent stimulus. Such a result would show the real-time influence of sublim-
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inal information on the early moments of explicit decisions. This finding would
support the theoretical notion that explicit representations (here, attitudes) grad-
ually unfold from the self-organization of implicit biases.
3.2 Pilot Study
3.2.1 Pilot Study: Methods
At a broad level, we trained participants using the following procedure
STIMULUS ASSOCIATIVE PRIMING STATED FACT
Joe Bad Good
Bob Good Good
Our experiments roughly followed the previously discussed procedure of Ry-
dell and McConnell (2006). We trained participants through a ”learning task” (ac-
tually an attitude induction procedure), whereby participants would learn about
two novel characters, Bob and Joe. The pictures used for Bob and Joe were ran-
domly selected from a bank of five pictures. For each character, subjects viewed
50 trials of behavioral statements that may potentially describe the character, such
as ”He donated a pint of blood to the Red Cross” or ”He cheated on a take-home
exam from the university.” Participants were asked guess whether the statement is
true or false. As it turns out, following Rydell and McConnell (2008), the positive
statements are always true, and the negative statements are always false. Dur-
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ing the learning task, we attempted to induce implicit attitudes towards the novel
characters through a subliminal priming technique. The picture for one novel
character (randomly selected, but we refer to him as ”Joe”) was always preceded
by a negative subliminal prime (like ”vomit,” ”death”). In contrast, the picture
of the other novel character (”Bob”) was preceded by a positive subliminal prime
(like ”flowers,” ”happiness”).
More specifically, the learning task was implemented on a computer with a
screen refresh rate of 85 Hz and a screen resolution of 1024x768 pixels. For each
participant, the subliminally negative character was randomly assigned to be
named either Bob or Joe, and the subliminally positive character was given the
other name. Moreover, the pictures for each character were randomly selected
from a bank of 5 pictures. The learning task overall comprised a bank of 50 pre-
constructed trials for the subliminally positive character and 50 pre-constructed
trials for the subliminally negative character. As the task unfolded, a trial was
randomly selected (without replacement) from the bank of 100 trials. Each trial
began with with a fixation cross printed in Trebuchet 28 MS font and flashed at
the center of the computer screen for 200 ms. Following the fixation cross, the
subliminal prime appeared for 25 milliseconds. The prime was always negative
for the character selected to be subliminally negative, and was always positive for
the character selected to be subliminally positive. The negative subliminal primes
were: ugly, war, hurt, stink, corpse, death, hell, pain, spider, and trash. The posi-
tive subliminal primes were: flower, friend, gift, happy, kiss, smile, puppy, party,
pretty, and kitten. The prime was displayed in 20pt Trebuchet MS font, and was
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forward and backward masked by the nonsense word ”zxcvbnm,” also displayed
in Trebuchet 20 MS font for 25 ms. At this point, the display appeared which in-
cluded the character’s picture and a potential behavioral statement. In particular,
the behavioral statement appeared in Trebuchet MS 20pt font located where the
prime had been. Simultaneously, the character’s picture appeared centered above
the behavioral statement at a size of 250x270 pixels. The picture-plus-behavioral-
statement display appeared until the key d or k was pressed, reflecting the par-
ticipant’s choice about whether the statement was characteristic of the character
or not. At that point, the appropriate feedback (either ”The behavioral statement
WAS characteristic” or ”The behavioral statement WAS NOT characteristic”) was
displayed for 3000 ms. Following Rydell and McConnell (2006), each character
was shown with 25 positive behavioral statements and 25 negative behavioral
statements, and for each character, the positive behavioral statements were always
described as characteristic, and the negative behavioral statements were always
described as not characteristic, in an attempt to induce positive explicit attitudes
to both characters. Following the feedback, the next trial began.
Since the hypothesis predicts an influence of the subliminal training condition
on the dynamics of constructing an explicit evaluation, after training, the proce-
dure of Spivey, Knoblich & Grosjean (2005) was followed, and participants took
a mouse-tracked explicit attitude task. Participants were asked to report whether
they liked or disliked various stimuli. Trials began with two seconds for partic-
ipants to view the evaluative response options (LIKE) and (DISLIKE) randomly
assigned to upper corners of the screen. Participants then clicked on a small box
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at the bottom of the screen to reveal a stimulus word and dragged the mouse to-
ward their selected evaluative response. The 20 stimulus pictures included the
target pictures, pictures of Bob and Joe, as well as 9 positively valenced distractor
pictures (e.g. John Kennedy) and 9 negatively valenced distractor pictures. These
20 stimulus pictures were presented in four blocks with randomly assigned order.
The four stimulus repetitions were averaged together to yield a single measure-
ment per participant for all statistical analyses.
Mouse-cursor movements were recorded from 25 Cornell University under-
graduates. For each study, we analyzed hand-movement trajectories only from
the participants who reported liking both Joe and Bob on all four stimulus repe-
titions. 12 subjects chose dislike on every trial for at least one picture, and were
therefore excluded.
3.2.2 Pilot Study: Data Analysis Methods
Because the study intended to capture a potentially subtle influence on processing
dynamics, we wanted to devise analytical measures which reduce measurement
error as much as possible. In many studies which apply Spivey et al. (2005)′s
mouse-tracking layout for two-alternative forced choice cognitive tasks, the re-
searchers quantify the spatial deviations between trajectories in a fairly crude
manner, measured the maximum deviation of a given point-to-point hand move-
ment from a hypothetical straight line connecting the stimulus box to the selected
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response option. However, maxima are known to be noisy statistical measures,
and they reduce the complexities of a spatially selected trajectory with many
points into its coordinates at a single privileged point. Thus, to obtain a more
sensitive measure of spatial deviation, we wanted to develop a measure of spatial
deflection that would capture information about the trajectory as a whole.
Figure 3.2: A technique for measuring the spatial deflection of hand-
movement trajectories
As our computerized recording of hand-movement trajectories samples hand-
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location at a frequency of 33 Hz, every obtained hand-movement trajectory is de-
scribed by a discrete sample of points. We can find the Euclidean distance between
any two successive points in the hand-movement trajectory for which we have
data using the standard formula di =
√
(xi+1 − xi)2 + (yi+1 − yi)2, where i = 1, . . . imax,
where imax is the index of the final sample for the trajectory. Then, the total distance
taken in a trajectory is given by D =
i=100∑
i=1
di. Moreover, the total distance traveled
so far, Di is a partial sum, Di =
i∑
j=1
d j. For example, D3 = d1 + d2 + d3. Finally, the
percentage distance traveled is Pi = Di/D. Using this method, we can simply com-
pare each point in the hand-movement trajectory to the corresponding point in the
hypothetical straight line based on matching Pi′s – percentage distance traveled.
In order to do this, we first interpolate 100 distance-normalized points along each
trajectory (so that this process gives us the interpolated x,y coordinates when the
person has moved 1% of its total spatial distance, 2% of its total spatial distance,
and so forth).
To illustrate the main idea of the metric, see Figure 3.2. In that figure, we see
matching points in the trajectory for 1 percent distance traveled, 25 percent dis-
tance traveled, 44 percent distance traveled, and 88 percent distance traveled. We
can makes these kinds of pairings for all the points in our hand-movement tra-
jectory. Then, we simply ask: what is the average horizontal distance between
each of these points? This measure might be called ”mean horizontal deflection.”
The horizontal deflection measure focuses on the x-coordinate, which provides
the dimension of competition, rather than the y-coordinate, which is spatially or-
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thogonal to the axis of competition. The horizontal deflection measure has the
advantage that it uses the shape of the whole trajectory, rather than just a single
outstanding point of it. We note that the spatial deflection measure distinguishes
between trajectories in previous data sets as does the original maximum deviation
measure. For example, in the Wojnowicz et al. 2009, Study 3, this spatial deflec-
tion measure corroborated the conclusion that when participants reported liking
African Americans, their hands curved more towards the dislike response than
when these same participants reported liking Caucasian Americans , t(62)=2.56,
p=.01.
3.2.3 Pilot Study: Results and Discussion
In Figure 3.3, we see mean mouse movement trajectories for 13 participants. While
there were not enough participants to warrant statistical analyses on trajectory
properties, the trajectories do show deviation in the predicted directions.
Moreover, the table below provides distribution of dislikes for the 12 people
who chose dislike every time for at least one picture,
Disliked the Subliminally Bad Guy: 8
Disliked the Subliminally Good Guy: 3
Disliked Both Guys: 1
Thus, although the small sample size prohibits statistical analyses, the pilot
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Figure 3.3: Pilot Experiment: Mean hand-movement trajectories towards
the like decision for negatively conditioned and positively con-
ditioned stimuli
55
study provides suggestive evidence that the subliminal conditioning may possi-
bly influence the real-time dynamics of explicit decision-making, sometimes suffi-
ciently strongly to actually push the participant fully towards a ”dislike” decision.
3.3 Study 4
3.3.1 Study 4: Methods
In Study 4, we replicated the pilot finding in a larger study allowing for inferen-
tial statistics. In order to increase our effective sample size, we desired to decrease
the very high percentage of pilot study exclusions (48%) caused by people consis-
tently choosing ”dislike.” Thus, in this study, we modified the original methodol-
ogy in the following ways:
* In the instructions, we reminded participants to report their evaluations
based on the characters′ personalities, behaviors, and perspectives, rather than
their appearances.
* During pilot study debriefings, many participants stated that they selected
dislike because the guy seemed too ”fake” or cheesy. Therefore, we made the pos-
itive statements true 92% of the time, and the negative statements false 92% of the
time, so that each stimulus person performed bad behaviors on four trials out of
25 (and likewise failed to perform good behaviors on four trials out of 25). Fur-
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thermore, these behaviors were softened to be more realistic, such that statements
such as ”Bob always smiles at his colleagues every day” were rewritten as ”Bob
usually smiles at his colleagues.”
* We made the distractor exemplars more extreme (e.g. Hitler), and thereby
changed the response alternatives to ”like” vs. ”hate,” assuming that participants
would be unlikely to report ”hating” Bob or Joe.
3.3.2 Study 4: Results and Discussion
The study had n=93 participants. Like the other mouse-tracking studies in this
dissertation, we first exclude the participants (n=28) who failed to click like to both
crucial stimuli on all trials. The mouse-movement plots for participants (n=65)
who reporting liking the two characters on all four trials are shown in Figure ??.
We found greater spatial deviation towards ”HATE” for the character who was
negatively subliminally primed, t(64)=2.23, p=.029.
The table below displays the choices of the 28 subjects who selected ”hate” for
one of the men at least once.
Subliminally Bad Man Subliminally Good Man
Trial 1: 18 9
Trial 2: 17 7
Trial 3: 17 6
Trial 4: 17 4
Thus, this study suggests that subliminal conditioning influenced the real-time
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Figure 3.4: Study 4: Mean hand-movement trajectories towards the like
decision for negatively conditioned and positively conditioned
stimuli
dynamics of explicit decision-making, sometimes sufficiently strongly to actually
push the participant fully towards a ”dislike” decision.
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3.4 Study 5
3.4.1 Study 5: Methods
In Study 5, we crafted the symmetric reversal of Study 4. That is, over the course of
the 100 learning trials, we attempted to create negative explicit attitudes. There-
fore, this study followed the procedure of Study 4 precisely, with the exception
that the behavioral information described the two men as performing the negative
behavior on 92% of all trials and as failing to perform the positive behavior on 92%
of trials. As in Study 4, positive subliminal primes were flashed for 25 ms before
all pictures of one randomly selected character, and negative subliminal primes
were flashed for 25 ms before all pictures of the other character. The same explicit
attitude mouse-tracking task was provided for this study as for Study 4, with the
exception that for this symmetric reversal study, we presented the response op-
tions, ”LOVE” and ”DISLIKE”
3.4.2 Study 5: Results and Discussion
The study had n=71 participants. Like the other mouse-tracking studies in this
dissertation, we first exclude the participants (n=7) who failed to click dislike
to both crucial stimuli on all trials. The mean hand-movement trajectory plots
for participants (n=63) who reported disliking the two men on all four trials are
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shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Study 5: Mean hand-movement trajectories towards the dislike
decision for negatively conditioned and positively conditioned
stimuli
This study provides no evidence to support the hypothesis that subliminal
conditioning influences the real-time dynamics of explicit evaluation. One pos-
sible alternative explanation for the failure of this study is negativity dominance
(Fiske 1980; Rozin & Royzman 2001; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer & Vohs
2001). Negativity dominance, a robust effect in the social psychological literature,
refers to the fact that people pay more attention and give more weight to negative
information than positive information. From a psychological standpoint, then,
this study went beyond a mere flip. Since each person did the negative behav-
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ior 22/25 times (and failed to do the positive behavior 22/25 times), there simply
may not have been a strong enough basis for liking these people, let alone loving
them.
3.5 Study 6
3.5.1 Study 6: Methods
In Study 6, we investigated the real-time influence of subliminal conditioning
upon more stable attitudes. In the training task, we exposed people to sixteen
concepts which people generally have strong positive feelings about, like ”par-
ties” and ”summer.” However, during the training task, we randomly selected
half (i.e, eight) of these concepts to be preceded by negative subliminal primes.
In particular, the evaluative training task conformed to the following setup:
1 ) Inter-stimulus-interval (2000 ms)
2 ) + (centered, Trebuchet MS, 28 pt., 1000 ms)
3 ) Prime stimulus (Trebuchet MS, 28 pt., 25 ms)
4 ) Blank screen for 150 ms
5 ) Target stimulus (Trebuchet MS, 28 pt., ends on d-key or k-key)
As before, the experiment was displayed on a computer with a screen refresh
rate of 85 Hz and a screen resolution of 1024x768 pixels.
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Following the evaluative training, we asked participants to report whether
they liked or disliked these concepts, and we mouse-tracked their responses. We
wanted to compare the trajectories for the negative subliminally primed concepts
to the trajectories for the positive subliminally primed concepts. Each concept
was presented twice in the mouse-tracking measure, so the mean conditional tra-
jectory for each subject included a maximum of 16 trials.
3.5.2 Study 6: Results and Discussion
The study had n=30 participants. Due to the relatively large number of trials
(16) we recorded from each subject for each condition, we analyzed data from all
subjects, discarding any trials in which ”like” was the non-selected option. Figure
3.6 shows the results.
There were not significant differences in spatial deviation (and if anything, a
puzzling trend in the opposite direction). However, interestingly, we found that
participants’ hands were dragging in their movements towards like for the con-
cepts which received negative subliminal primes. In particular, we measured
velocity using the Spivey et al. (2005) method of computing 101 t-tests over the
time-normalized trajectory, and requiring at least six consecutive statistically dif-
ferent comparisons to conclude a statistically significant difference overall. This
analysis revealed that the negative subliminal priming condition had significantly
smaller x-coordinate locations from timesteps 78 to 95 (p-values: 0.0347 0.0271
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Figure 3.6: Study 6: Mean hand-movement trajectories towards the like
decision for negatively conditionedand positively conditioned
stimuli
0.0288 0.0291 0.0324 0.0281 0.0202 0.0131 0.0106 0.0091 0.0104 0.011 0.0142 0.0187
0.0261 0.03 0.0328 0.0459). This slowness covers much of the second half of their
hand-movement trajectories (from about x=.5 to x=1), as revealed in Figure ??
It is unclear why this study produced results in the domain of velocity, rather
than curvature. However, this observation that the negative subliminal primes
significantly dampened hand-movement velocity for approaching a ”like” evalu-
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ation in a spatialized decision-making layout, even for such overwhelmingly pos-
itive concepts as ”sunshine” and ”parties,” demonstrates the power and influence
of subliminal primes on the dynamics of explicit evaluation.
3.6 Conclusions
In sum, potentially contrary to many dualistic formulations whereby explicit and
implicit attitudes derive from independent sources, we find possible dependen-
cies in more sensitive behavioral measures. In particular, we find preliminary
evidence that the real-time dynamical formation of an explicit attitude may be
moderated by subliminal evaluative conditioning. We found that negative sub-
liminal conditioning may be strong enough to cause feelings of hatred towards a
person who performed good behaviors 92% of the time, and to cause feelings of
dislike towards concepts like ”sunshine” and ”parties.” Moreover, the evidence
suggests that these temporary negative inclinations sometimes become strong
enough to overpower verbal information, provoking a negative deliberative judg-
ment. These findings, if corroborated by further research, would have potential
implications for evaluative decision making in everyday life, to the extent that en-
vironmental forces (or untrustworthy manipulative agents, such as advertisers or
politicians) can create classical conditioning procedures that the participant does
not notice or recognize. Moreover, these findings (if corroborated by further evi-
dence) would suggest that if people are indeed of two minds, then these minds are
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not independent channels, but immediately interactive, with verbal information




A DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTROL
4.1 Introduction: The interactive control problem
4.1.1 Psychological control is required to override implicit biases
In Chapters 2 and 3 of the dissertation, we argued that social judgment and
decision-making can be described as a dynamical process of resolving conflict be-
tween (explicit or implicit) informational sources. Here we argue that the focus
on conflict locates questions about the formation of an explicit social judgment
firmly in the realm of psychological control. Psychological control can be defined
as the ability to select thoughts and actions in the service of internal goals (Koech-
lin & Summerfield 2007). The main point is that, if an individual wants to achieve
transiently desired goals, then he cannot respond automatically to stimuli; rather,
his mind must strategically maintain certain representations, views, beliefs, and
feelings, and strategically inhibit others.
What does this notion of psychological control have to do with the automatic-
ity revolution in social psychology? If a white person with institutional power
(a middle school teacher, a professional executive making hiring decisions, a city
court judge, a police officer) is an aversive racist, then he may be liberal, educated,
and strongly committed to an egalitarian value system, but he could still harbor
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unacknowledged negative feelings and beliefs towards black people. To prevent
racial bias, this person must therefore exert psychological control – strategically
maintaining the representations, views, beliefs, and feelings supporting a posi-
tive view of black people, and strategically inhibiting the representations, views,
beliefs, and feelings supporting a negative view of black people.
In particular, findings related to implicit racism (reviewed in Chapter 1) would
suggest that the person would need to exhibit psychological control over implicit
sources of information in order to express an intended social judgment. Empirical
evidence supports this speculation. For example, the application of racial stereo-
types (alongside other forms of heuristic judgments) increase when people are
tired and presumably have depleted cognitive resources – that is, racial stereo-
typing is more prominent in the early morning for night people and in the late
night for morning people (Bodenhausen 1990). In fact, just after white people
have interacted socially with black people, they exhibit diminished performance
on a Stroop task, and moreover the amount of deterioration is correlated with
their implicit racism (Richeson & Shelton 2003). These behavioral results are fur-
ther supported by brain imaging studies investigating the role played by vari-
ous brain regions during the processing of race-based stimuli, for example the
amygdala (widely believed to subserve negative emotional reactions, especially
fear; Davis 1992) and the prefrontal cortex (widely believed to subserve executive
control functionalities; Fuster 2008). The brain imaging studies have shown that
when a person is processing race-based stimuli, their initial amygdala activation
is predicted by their implicit racism scores, and that eventually their prefrontal
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cortex becomes activated and suppresses the early amygdala activation (Phelps et
al. 2000; Cunningham, Johnson, Raye, Gatenby, Gore & Banaji 2004).
Even outside the racial domain, psychological control is apparently required
to manage the influence of implicit sources on deliberative cognitive decision-
making. In the behavioral realm, people′s behaviors seem to be predicted by their
standards and values when control resources are high, but by their implicit atti-
tudes when their control resources are low. For example, when control resources
are high, people′s eating behaviors are predicted by their dietary standards and
not their implicit attitudes towards candy; yet when their control resources are
low (due to emotional suppression), people′s eating behaviors are predicted by
their implicit attitudes towards candy, and not their dietary standards (Hoff-
mann, Rauch, & Gawronski, 2007). Moreover, in brain imaging studies, overrid-
ing implicit associations, which are thought to reflect people′s habitual, prepotent
thought patterns (e.g. insect=unpleasant; flower=pleasant), requires the activa-
tion of the prefrontal cortex (Chee, Sriram, Soon & Lee, 2000).
Thus, managing and overcoming the biases within the implicit mind seems
to require psychological control. Indeed, we would expect that the mind exerted
psychological control to report the explicit social judgments that it did in Chap-
ters 2 and 3 of the dissertation. So the question immediately raised is: what is
psychological control? How should we think about psychological control given
the dynamic interactivity demonstrated in the first two chapters of the disserta-
tion?
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4.1.2 What is psychological control? The dualistic perspective
A major theme in contemporary psychology is that the mind can be parti-
tioned into two separate systems. For example, in his Nobel Prize acceptance
speech, the prominent economist and psychologist Daniel Kahneman popular-
ized a pre-existing distinction between ”System I” vs. ”System II” (Kahneman
2002; Stanovich and West 2000). The properties accorded to these systems are
listed in Figure 4.1. System I is more primitive. Its operations are fast, automatic,
effortless, and difficult to modify or control. System II is obviously more sophisti-
cated. Its operations are slow, optional, and voluntarily controlled.
Kahneman′s systems are important because they capture the essence of the
theoretical dualisms pervading many disparate fields of study: conscious vs. sub-
conscious; explicit vs. implicit; controlled vs. automatic (social cognition, psy-
chotherapy); rational vs. intuitive, deliberative vs. impulsive (judgment and de-
cision making, behavioral economics, philosophy of mind); rule-based vs. as-
sociative; formal logical vs. connectionist ; (neural networks, cognitive psychol-
ogy); cognitive vs. behaviorist (history of psychology); goal-directed vs. stimulus-
directed; strategically planned vs. habitual (social neuroscience). In many cases,
these dualisms are constructed as separate ”systems” (planning system vs. habit
system; rational system vs. intuitive system, etc.)
We bring up Kahneman′s systems here because psychological theorists often
think about ”psychological control problems” through these dualisms. In the
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Figure 4.1: Dual systems of cognition, from Kahneman & Frederick 2002
study of stereotyping and prejudice, people are thought to automatically intro-
ject statistical relationships (unknowingly picked up from mass media, education,
or pop culture), which may diverge from the self-avowed principles they have
constructed through careful deliberative reasoning (Devine 1989). In behavioral
economics, people are thought to display illogical behavior, such as affirming the
consequent, when simple heuristics for judgment supply an ”intuition” which
can lead people astray from the more rational conclusions of effortful, controlled
deliberation (Kahneman and Frederick 2002). In social neuroscience, the brain
is believed to store automatic, habitual behaviors in certain brain structures (e.g.
the amygdala, basal ganglia, and lateral temporal cortex), but to rely upon higher
order brain structures (e.g. the prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and
medial temporal lobe, including the hippocampus) to monitor and override those
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automatic habits (Lieberman 2006).
As suggested by Kahneman′s scheme, a key feature of these dualistic theories
is that the second system is posited as the controller system, and the first system
is posited as the automatic system. Psychological control means that the person
must exert sufficient effort and motivation so as to engage the second cognitive
system and thereby supplant the potentially undesired conclusions of the first
cognitive system. People fail to meet their goals when they have trouble subordi-
nating their wild, unruly primitive system (filled with its temptations, emotions,
cognitive heuristics, mere associations, and/or momentary distractions) to their
more dispassionate controller system.
4.1.3 The three capacities of a psychological controller
But what exactly does Kahneman (and other dualistic theorists) mean in saying
that the second system is ”controlled”? We break down the capacity for con-
trol into the following three capacities which are commonly taken (in dualistic
schemes) as unique capacities of the controller system:
• Decisive selection: By ”decisive selection,” we mean that dualistic theories
see the executive controller system as uniquely equipped to select a decision
from much larger pool of nascent candidate representations that coexist in
the more primitive system. For example, it is believed that people achieve
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control over unintended racist associations when the control system delib-
eratively selects from many unintentionally activated and potentially biased
knowledge structures (Kunda & Spencer 2003; see also Devine 1989, Hig-
gins 1996), or similarly, when it selectively stamps its personal endorsement
upon one of many cultural received stereotypic associations (Wittenbrink,
Judd, and Park 1997; Petty, Brinol, & DeMarree 2007). The controller sys-
tem is seen to exert its behavior at the ”cognitive bottleneck” (Baars 1993),
perhaps located in the brain′s synencephalic junction (Merker 2006), where
the brain selectively compresses information from a massively parallel, dis-
tributed system of highly specialized processors into a single serial stream
of coherent content.
• Strategic goal pursuit: By ”strategic goal pursuit,” we mean that dualistic
theories see the executive controller system as uniquely equipped to pur-
sue distant future goals (Strack and Deutsch 2004). As Strack and Deutsch
(2004) write, ”While the impulsive system is driven by immediate percep-
tual input, the reflective system is able to abstract from the immediate input
and bridge temporal gaps.” A proposed function of the conscious experience
associated with the control system is that it allows the person to think into
the future (Baumeister & Masiocampo 2010). However, we can engage this
control system only when we have sufficient motivation and effort (Fazio
1990); otherwise, we will respond to the environment reflexively.
• Top-down flexibility: By ”top-down flexibility,” we mean that dualistic the-
ories see the controller system as uniquely equipped to flexibly switch be-
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tween goals depending upon the context. From a dual systems perspective,
whereas the impulsive system is relatively rigid, the controller system can
adopt a strategic goal transiently (Strack & Deutsch 2004). From this per-
spective, a person′s evaluations of black people should be a function of psy-
chological control. Evaluations would be ”stimulus-driven” by default; so
barring some controlled redirection, a person′s evaluation of black people
would be driven by the gradual accumulation of stereotypic cultural knowl-
edge and fear conditioning accrued by the amygdala. However, thanks to
the existence of System II, participants in a psychological experiment could
override their automatic racial evaluations in the service of transient goals
such as pleasing the experimenter, and such an override would require the
use of the prefrontal cortex and the controller system (Phelps et al. 2000;
Stanley, Phelps & Banaji 2008). It is therefore the control system that al-
lows flexible adherence to goals rather than rigid responding. It has been
said that psychological control means engaging in internal, control-driven
behavior, rather than simply external, stimulus-driven behavior (Monsell &
Driver 2000).
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4.1.4 What is psychological control? The need for an interactive
theory
The dualistic approach faces a serious problem, however, in its lack of interactiv-
ity. When dual systems theories adopt a computational perspective, they posit
that the controller system uses rules and the primitive system uses associations,
and it is not clear how these computational forms could interact (Greenwald &
Nosek 2008, Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2006). Yet in any high-performing con-
trol system, the control component and the slave component must interact with
each other. A potent controller must be capable of influencing its slave system,
and a responsive controller must be capable of reading the state of its slave sys-
tem (Betsekas 1976). Moreover, there is a mounting empirical case supporting that
Kahneman-like dual systems (the implicit, or the intuitive, or the impulsive, or the
stimulus-driven vs. the explicit, or the rational, or the reflective, or the internal-
driven) must interact during real-time cognitive processing (e.g. see Chapters 1,
2, and 3 of this dissertation).
Thus, a question of major importance is: what does psychological control look
like within an interactive system? The dual systems perspective has elucidated
what psychologists might mean by psychological control. Psychological con-
trol refers largely to three capacities – decisive selection, the pursuit of distant
goals, and the flexible handling of transient goals. How could the these capacities
emerge from within a dynamically interactive system?
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4.1.5 O’Reilly′s four principles of real-time mental processing
To build a model of interactive control, we must demand that all elements
of our model can be described by a single set of common operating princi-
ples. The single set of operating principles we use is the fundamental princi-
ples of biologically-plausible real-time mental processing. The four principles of
biologically-plausible real-time mental processing are laid out variously across
different sources (O’Reilly 1998, Spivey 2007, McClelland 1979), but they largely
trace to a paper by Randall O’Reilly (1998). We will refer to them as the four
neurocomputational principles. These four principles are described below:
• distributed representations: Mental representations are distributed pat-
terns of activity across a population of neurons, i.e., distributed represen-
tations (Rumelhart & McClelland 1979). Preliminary patterns that are par-
tially consistent with multiple interpretations of a stimulus dynamically self-
organize over time into a stable pattern roughly corresponding to a unique
cognitive interpretation with its accompanying behavioral response. The
pattern self-organizes because synaptic connections between distributed
units encode previously learned patterns of covariation, so that recurrent
processing sharpens the distributed activity into a confident interpretation.
• partial cascading: However, a mental representation dynamically evolves
in tandem with input from other brain regions as well. A brain region
that projects to another brain region cannot help but transmit the constant
changes in activity that it undergoes while it is processing its information.
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Decades ago, it was thought that the brain, like a computer, manipulates
symbols in feedforward processing stages, with neural subsystems waiting
until stable completed representations have been computed before passing
that information on to the next processing stage. However, it is now known
that the majority of neurons in a brain region have inter-region connections,
and not just intra-region connections, thus causing them to continuously cas-
cade their evolving pattern of activation to other regions (McClelland 1979).
• recurrent feedback: Moreover, as a mental representation dynamically
evolves, it feeds back the ongoing results of that dynamic evolution to its
informational sources (its input regions). That is, brain regions that are
connected to one another are typically connected bidirectionally (Douglas,
Koch, Mahowald, Martin & Suarez 1995). As a result, the feed-forward cas-
cade of information is constantly accompanied by a feedback cascade of
top-down modulation of that information. This continuous recurrence of
information flow means that higher-level cognitive interpretations are not
completely separable from lower-level informational sources (Spivey 2007).
• inhibitory competition: Finally, a mental representation reaches its finalized
confident form with the help of neural competition. Multiple mental repre-
sentations that are partially active engage in inhibitory competition through
lateral connections (O’Reilly 1998). For example, when a monkey views a
visual display containing a target shape and a distractor shape (e.g. a trian-
gle and a square), neural recordings from the inferotemporal cortex reveal
that neuronal population codes for both shapes begin increasing firing from
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baseline, until eventually some point is reached where the population code
for the cued shape accrues greater firing at the expense of the population
code for the distractor shape (Chelazzi & Miller 1993).
We note that these principles are precisely followed by the ”single interactive
system” models described in the introduction. Single interactive system models
are an influential class of neural network models such as Normalized Recurrence
(NR; Spivey 2007), Simple Recurrent Network (SRN; Elman 1990), Dynamic Field
Theory (DFT; Erlhagen & Schoner 2002), and Leabra (Leabra; O’Reilly & Munkata
2000).) These single interactive system models, rather than appealing to compu-
tationally distinct formats of logical rules and network associations, attempt to
explain mental functioning with a single set of operating principles. As a result, it
is possible to understand how components of the model interact. Thus, we follow
the single interactive systems models as a starting point for building a theory of
interactive control.
4.1.6 The dynamical systems perspective on mental processing
These four neurobiological principles support a mathematical description of how
mental representations dynamically form in real-time processing. The branch of
mathematics is called dynamical systems. Dynamical systems studies how an
interacting system changes over time. Dynamical systems are built out of mathe-
matical expressions called differential equations. A differential equation is a rule
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describing how some entity changes over time. For instance, a differential equa-
tion might describe the growth of a population of people given a certain birth rate,
death rate. Or it might describe the upcoming firing levels of a single isolated neu-
ron given its current firing levels and an inherent rate of decay. Now imagine a
”system” composed of many possible components. Then, mathematically speak-
ing, a dynamical system is a set of many such differential equations which are
mutually dependent, or ”coupled,” and which describe how the state of all the
components change over time. For instance, a dynamical system might describe
the interactive growth of many different populations of people given birth rates,
death rates, and immigration and emigration rates. Or it might describe the firing
levels of many interacting neurons, since each neuron′s firing rate in the future
depends upon its own current firing rate as well as that of all the other neurons
with which it interacts (i.e. is synaptically connected to). So a dynamical system
is nothing more than a set of equations modeling how the current states of the
many components of the system co-determine each other′s temporal evolution.
In a system with three components, a dynamical system simply takes the form
x˙ = f (x, y, z)
y˙ = g(x, y, z)
z˙ = h(x, y, z)
where x, y, z represent the states of some components of the system (e.g. pop-
ulations levels of three countries, the firing rates of three interacting neurons), the
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dot represents the temporal derivative (instantaneous change in time), and f , g, h
represent arbitrary functions (i.e. rules describing the interdependencies of the
components).
Dynamical systems have geometric interpretations (that is, they can be under-
stood through spatial reasoning). Since a dynamical system in mathematics is a
set of coupled differential equations and their corresponding solutions (assum-
ing that the particular dynamical system is one for which solutions exist) , then
our statement simply means there are geometric ways to interpret the behavior
of these solutions. We will focus on four spatial concepts or geometric phenom-
ena from dynamical systems theory that will help us to understand psychological
control in an interactive way. For the sake of developing intuition, we will ini-
tially describe these spatial concepts not with respect to mental processing, but
with respect to a poker game.
So let us imagine a poker game. There are five poker players who each put 20
dollars into the pot, and they promise to play until one player has all the money
(100 dollars). We define five variables – each variable describing the amount of
money a player has at a given time. Moreover, for the sake of illustration, we
will assume that the particular poker game is deterministic (that is, we assume
a God-like ability to determine how much money the players will have in the
future based on how much they have right now and the time elapsed so far in the
game). So in this setting, we can form a set of differential equations to describe
how the distribution of money evolves over the course of the game. In other
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words, our dynamical system simply describes the amount of money each poker
player has at a given time. Of course, in a real poker game, the evolution of the
dynamical system is stochastic (i.e. probabilistic – we cannot predict how much
money everyone will have in the future based on how much they have right now),
but we will describe this dynamical system as if it were deterministic in order to
illustrate our spatial concepts.
Geometric concepts from dynamical systems theory
• state space: The possible states of an dynamical system with n variables.
(For the poker game, n = 5). The geometric interpretation comes from the
fact that we may assign a spatial axis to each variable in the system. Then,
we can consider the state of the system as a whole as being a single point in
n-dimensional space. Thus, over time, the system takes a trajectory through
n-dimensional space. The state space becomes some subset of n-dimensional
space which describes regions where the trajectory could possibly travel.
In the example of our poker game dynamical system, the state space could
most simply be described as 5-dimensional space (where each dimension
describes the money held by each player). Alternatively, for a more precise
description, the state space would be the four-dimensional linear subspace
given by points (v,w, x, y, z) such that v + w + x + y + z = 100.
• attractors: A set of points in the n-dimensional space towards which
the system will eventually drive itself over time if left unperturbed
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by external input. The set of attractors is much smaller than the
whole state space. For example, since the five poker players promise
to play until one player wins, the set of attractors are given by
{(100, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 100, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 100, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 100, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0, 100)}.
• attractor landscapes: A surface over the n-dimensional space which de-
scribes the pull of neighboring locations in state space on the system′s
current location. The common image (as in Figure 4.2) is that of a mar-
ble sitting on a rugged landscape with peaks and valleys. The mar-
ble represents the system′s current location in state space, and the at-
tractor landscape determines the movement of the marble (depending
possibly on a push from external sources). When the slope is steep,
the marble will move quickly. When the slope is shallow, the marble
will move slowly. When there is no slope, the marble stays put (and
would be settled into an attractor point). For the poker game with the
rule of playing until a single player wins, the attractor landscape could
take on various forms, but it must have valleys over the five points
{(100, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 100, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 100, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 100, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0, 100)}. If
player v tends to give up easily when his money is low, then the attractor
landscape will have very steep descents into the locations v = 0, that is into
regions of state space described by (v,w, x, y, z) = (0,w, x, y, z). In contrast, if
player v is very stubborn and begins to play extremely conservatively when
his money is low, then the attractor landscape will have very shallow de-
scents into the locations v = 0, that is into regions of state space described by
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Figure 4.2: An attractor landscape.
(v,w, x, y, z) = (0,w, x, y, z).
• projections: We have described the state space for the poker game as living
within a five-dimensional space of points (v,w, x, y, z), and in particular being
the four-dimensional linear subspace given by points (v,w, x, y, z) such that
v+w+ x+y+z = 100. The state space is currently four-dimensional, but its di-
mensionality could be temporarily reduced due to the imposition of tempo-
rary poker rules or temporary behavioral tendencies on the parts of the play-
ers. For example, imagine that player z is imagining that he will throw all
his money out the window at the end of the game. Then although the poker
game is a dynamical system taking trajectories through four-dimensional
space, the true amount of money these players can expect to take home can
be most accurately described by projecting these trajectories onto the three-
dimensional space of points (v,w, x, y, z) such that v + w + x + y + z = 100 and
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z = 0. However, consider that later on in the game, player z changes his
mind. Then the system is again moving through the four-dimensional space
(v,w, x, y, z) such that v + w + x + y + z = 100, and there is no need to project
the dynamical systems’ trajectories onto a smaller subspace.
Now we may describe how the geometric framework would apply to biolog-
ically plausible mental processing. Imagine a very small brain containing only
three neurons, which are currently firing at rates of 20 Hz, 40 Hz, and 55 Hz. As-
sume that these three neurons interact with each other (that is, the firing rates
of each neuron depends upon the others). Then the brain is a dynamical system,
whose current location in three dimensional space is given by (x, y, z) = (20, 40, 55).
Of course, a real brain or brain region can have an arbitrary number, n, of com-
ponents or dimensions. As the neurons interact with each other, the dynamical
system takes a trajectory through that n-dimensional space. Thus, the dynamical
systems perspective allows us to ask geometrical questions about mental process-
ing, like: What are the eventual spatial destinations of the system? What are the
shapes of the trajectories that the mind takes there? How does learning effect the
paths that are possible?
In fact, at this point we may describe the four neurocomputational principles
once again, highlighting their spatial interpretations within a dynamical systems
framework. Neural systems, like the poker game system, are actually a stochas-
tic dynamical system, but to make our primary points, it will suffice to describe
neural processing as if it were a deterministic function of inputs.
83
The four neurocomputational principles of real-time mental processing (rein-
terpreted via geometric concepts from dynamical systems theory)
• distributed representations: Mental representations can be thought of as dis-
tinctive patterns of firing rates distributed across a set of neurons, whereby
the same set of neurons can therefore encode many mental representations.
Geometrically, a distributed pattern across n neurons (such as shown in Fig-
ure ??) is a point in an n-dimensional space. As these neurons interact (by
sending electrical impulses through synaptic connections), the system nav-
igates itself to certain regions of the space, ”population codes”, which cor-
respond to finalized interpretations. The mind traverses into such regions
of space because other patterns are unstable – they represent uncertainties
in the system, and interactions between components push the state into a
meaningful location (with respect to previous learning). Thus, these pop-
ulation codes are ”attractors” of the dynamical system. Empirical neuro-
science has revealed many examples of state-space population codes: for
example in the hippocampus (Willis, Lever, Cacucci, Burgess, & O’Keefe
2005; Manns, Howard & Eichenbaum 2007), in the anterior cingulate cortex
during a supervisory monitoring task (Lapish, Durstewitz, Chandler & Sea-
mans 2008), in the temporal cortex during a visual object recognition task
(Rolls and Tovee 1995), and in the olfactory bulb during discrimination be-
tween multiple odors (Mazor and Laurent 2005).
• partial cascading: Mental representations in any integrative region of the
brain dynamically evolve over time, moving from indeterminate regions of
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the space towards one of the population codes or attractors. Because of the
principle of partial cascading, the integrative region is continually comput-
ing tentative interpretations, rather than waiting until earlier regions have
fully completed their processing duties. There are many examples of this
principle of gradual accumulation of information over time (e.g. Rolls &
Tovee 1995; Gold & Shadlen 2000; Gold & Shadlen 2007). From a dynamical
systems perspective, these higher-level regions can be described as taking
state space trajectories which are evolving in tandem with the accumula-
tion of evidence from lower-level sources of information. As the distributed
pattern evolves, it becomes successively closer to the final pattern, and this
dynamic evolution towards that attractor corresponds to the accrual of evi-
dence for that interpretation.
• inhibitory competition: In principle, the system could beeline towards its
eventual destination in a predetermined path, with the speed along that
path reflecting the accumulated support for the mental interpretation. The
principle of competition asserts that the system can take multiple possi-
ble trajectories to the same endpoint interpretation, depending upon the
moment-to-moment evidence supporting the various candidate interpre-
tations. In human brains, lateral inhibition (i.e. intra-layer inhibition) or
normalization imposes the competition process whereby multiple candi-
date representations compete for limited resources (e.g. Cleland, Johnson,
Leon & Linster 2007) Neural recordings have revealed many examples of
competitive dynamics, whereby the system′s path towards its final decision
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varies by the support for various interpretations – there is competition be-
tween different visual shapes for selective attention inferior temporal cortex
(Chelazzi, Miller, Duncan, & Desimone 1993), competition between mul-
tiple partially active motor behaviors in dorsal premotor cortex (Cisek &
Kalaska 2005), and competition between candidate decisions in a perceptual
decision-making task in LIP (Gold & Shadlen 2000). Thus, there are many (in
fact, uncountably infinitely many) possible state-space trajectories towards
one attractor location, and the particular pathway taken reflects the graded
levels of support for alternative interpretations during the intermediate mo-
ments of real-time mental processing.
• recurrent feedback: The higher-level regions of the brain could continu-
ously receive evidence from its lower-level informational sources, host a
competition between candidate mental representations, and then spit out
the winning representation. In that case, the system would be ”feed-
forward” – that is lower-level informational sources would remain sacro-
sanct/pristine/untouched; they would not change in response to the dy-
namic competition. In contrast, we see that these higher-level regions of the
brain actually provide recurrent feedback to the lower-level regions of the
brain, or the informational sources. That is, these higher level regions then
reach back and influence the states of the incoming informational sources.
Thus, this phenomenon supports the interpretation of a top-down biasing
of dynamic competition (Miller and Cohen 2003; Desimone 1998). As we
will see, the top-down biasing could be constructed as a projection of the
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source dynamics onto lower-dimensional subspaces.
Now let us summarize the dynamical systems interpretation of real-time men-
tal processing, considering a ”zoomed-in” scale of how a neurally-implemented
mental representation develops in real-time processing. More precisely, we in-
vestigate the spatial scale of firing patterns of neurons within some given brain
region integrating evidence from informational sources. For instance, we could
investigate the firing pattern of a population of neurons in temporal visual cor-
tex dedicated to visual object recognition (”Is that a chair? A table? Or Michael
Spivey?”) based on incoming information from more primary occipital visual ar-
eas (Rolls & Tovee 1996), or we could investigate the firing pattern of a population
of neurons in LIP determining visual attention (”Where should I attend to in the
visual field?”) based on incoming information from relevant sensory areas, such
as the direction of stimulus motion in MT (Ganguli et al. 2008; Shadlen & New-
some 2001; Roitman & Shadlen 2002). The four neurocomputational properties
imply that the mental representation in the integrative mental region (which for
these tasks would be temporal visual cortex; or LIP) would dynamically evolve
towards some stable resting population code. Initially, the incoming distributed
pattern received by the integrative brain region may be partially supportive of
multiple interpretations, but that distributed pattern gradually moves towards
some attractor mental representation that represents a clear, finalized interpre-
tation. These mental representation dynamics are caused by lateral inhibition,
which causes some representation to win out over the others, but they are en-
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hanced by the iterative cycles of information processing between the information
sources and the integrator region. In particular, these iterative cycles involve par-
tial cascading – that is, new information keeps coming in from the sources – and
by recurrent feedback – that is, the source representations become increasingly
constrained by the continuously evolving higher-level interpretation.
4.1.7 Goal of this chapter
The main goal of this chapter is to develop a dynamic interactive theory of control.
In order to make interactions understandable, we appeal to a single set of operat-
ing principles (O’Reilly′s four neurocomputational principles) so that we describe
mental processing in an interactive way. Based on these operating principles, we
import a dynamical systems interpretation of mental processing. Our goal is to
develop an understanding of how the three psychological control capacities (se-
lection, goal pursuit, flexibility) would look within an interactive dynamical sys-
tem. We will discover that, within the dynamical systems framework, the three
control capacities have clear geometric interpretations.
The appropriate understanding of psychological control is not immediate – it
does not fall out of what has already been done. In neuroscience, there has been
a blossoming of research into population codings and their dynamics. However,
”although such processes have been investigated in some depth for perceptual
and spatial domains, much less is known regarding the network dynamics that
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govern higher-order cognitive processes.” (Lapish, Durstewitz, Chandler, &Sea-
mans, 2008). In cognitive science, ”it has proven difficult for the field to converge
on a fully satisfying, mechanistic account of what exactly working memory is,
and how it fits into a larger model of cognition” (O’Reilly, Braver, & Cohen 1999).
And in social psychology, dual systems models make it unclear how the controller
system’s rules and the reflexive system’s associations could interact. Thus, there
is a general interest across the board in psychology in developing an interactive
approach to psychological control.
One question that may arise is this: what about the single interactive system
models (e.g. NR, SRN; see Chapter 1)? On first glance, it might seem that a sin-
gle interactive system model could explain psychological control with all three
of its capacities. The single interactive system models not only describe interac-
tions (between units, layers, and/or brain regions), but interactions are actually
part and parcel of their processing mechanisms. Moreover, the single interactive
system models are neurobiologically plausible (O’Reilly 1998). Thus, single inter-
active system models would seem to have great potential for explaining psycho-
logical control.
However, single interactive system models have seemed able to describe only
the ”slow learning system” of the brain, i.e. the posterior cortex (see O’Reilly,
Braver, & Cohen 1999). That is, although single interactive system models, like
the posterior cortex, are capable of processing sensory stimuli and language, it
turns out that they seem poorly suited for modeling cognitive control via flexible
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strategic goals. We have previously mentioned two cognitive tasks that require
flexible switching between strategic goals: the Stroop task and the Wisconsin Card
Sorting Task (WCST). Both of these cognitive tasks require participants to flexibly
toggle their cognitive processing in accordance with actively maintained strate-
gic goals that may switch from trial to trial. In the brain, it is widely believed
that good performance on these two cognitive control tasks requires the use of the
basal ganglia and the prefrontal cortex to flexibly toggle between goals (Cohen,
Braver & O’Reilly 1996). Computational work has arrived at the same conclusion.
In particular, single interactive system networks without specialized flexible con-
trol mechanisms (which look like the basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex) seem to
lack the computational capacities to excel at (1) switching between goals (toggling
outputs based on flexible strategic goals) and (2) transferring knowledge between
goals (e.g., Rougier et al., 2005).
Thus, to understand psychological control, we will need to turn to brain re-
gions whose gross fundamental processing properties differ from the posterior
cortex (a slow-learning, integrative brain region which the single interactive sys-
tem models described above generally most closely resemble; O’Reilly, Braver &
Cohen 1999). In particular, the basal ganglia has processing features enabling it
to compute strategic motivational value, and the prefrontal cortex has processing
features enabling it to implement flexible strategic goals (Botvinik, Niv & Barto
2009; Montague et al 2004; Botvinick 2008; Koechlin & Summerfield 2007). Thus,
very recent work in the computational modeling of neurobiological systems have
gone beyond the single interacting system models, incorporating multiple regions
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with distinctive computational properties (e.g. Rougier et al. 2005; O’Reilly &
Frank 2006; Botvinick, Niv & Barto 2009). These multiple interacting system
models consider the single interacting system models as models of the posterior
cortex, so they add additional specialized processing components reflecting the
involvement of regions such as the basal ganglia and the prefrontal cortex.
However, it is critical to note that these multiple interacting ”systems” are not
differentiated from each other in the same manner as the dual ”systems” of so-
cial psychology. In contrast to the dual systems of social psychology, all of these
multiple brain systems are parallel distributed processing networks, whose cog-
nitive processing is fundamentally characterized by interaction both inside brain
regions and between brain regions. What justifies the use of the term multiple
systems isn’t distinct computational formats (i.e. symbolic rules versus associa-
tions) or a wall of separation between the systems (whereby communication is
unclear), but rather the fact that the parallel distributed processing within these
regions have distinctive specializations (in terms of neuromodulation, connectiv-
ity patterns, firing rate stability, etc.) which are functionally meaningful.
4.1.8 A note on computation vs. systems
In this dissertation, we make an important distinction between computation and
systems.
As for computation, the psychological literature on control tends to describe
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computation in two ways. Dualistic computation refers to the positing of a dis-
tinction between rule-based computation (serial processing, hard constraints, etc.)
and associative computation (parallel processing, soft constraints, etc.). This kind
of computation is advocated by dual systems theory. It completely unclear how
dualistic forms of computation would interact. Interactive computation refers to
a single set of computational principles, such as O’Reilly′s four neurocomputa-
tional principles, which could subserve interactions between all elements in the
system described. For this paper, the term interactive computation will refer pre-
cisely to parallel distributed processing conforming to the four principles of bio-
logically plausible real-time processing.
As for systems, the number of systems is an observer-dependent quality which
depends upon the question being addressed. Mathematical models of reality in-
evitably abstract over existing features, but can still produce meaningful results
to certain classes of questions. Even individual neurons differ in ways that are
important for predict spiking behavior based on that neuron’s characteristic re-
covery timescales, sensitivity to subthreshold potential fluctuations, and resetting
due to ionic conductances (Izhikevich 2003). For convenience, we have coined
the terms ”single interactive systems” and ”multiple interactive systems” to dis-
tinguish between various models of social cognition. The term single interactive
systems uses the term ”single” because the artificial neurons in those models are
largely homogenous and undifferentiated before training (although note that even
networks like the SRN already differentiate between feedforward and recurrent
nodes). In contrast, the term multiple interactive systems (defined above) used
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the term ”multiple” to reflect that fact that the parallel distributed processing in
different simulated brain regions can have distinctive specializations (in terms of
neuromodulation, connectivity patterns, firing rate stability, etc.) which are func-
tionally meaningful.
In this way, we claim that it is possible for a model of social cognition to accom-
modate multiple systems, but to rely upon a single set of computational principles.
This statement will become clearer as the argument of this chapter unfolds, but the
take-home point is that the multiple systems would be defined by their specialized
computational variations, but their computations would all conform to O’Reilly’s
single set of four biologically plausible computational principles. This ”multiple
systems, single computation” scheme provides an avenue for social psychologists
to think about psychological control in a way that is interactive.
4.2 Selection: Dynamic contraction
In this section we argue that from a dynamical systems perspective, selection is
spatial contraction. Dynamical systems offer a geometric interpretation: if each
of the n components is assigned to an axis, then the state of the system can be
represented as a point in that n-dimensional space. Moreover, as time passes, the
system takes a trajectory through that n-dimensional space. The trajectories taken
depend upon the external ”inputs” to the system (i.e. where the system is ini-
tialized), as well as the internal processing dynamics of the system (the equation
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governing the system’s evolution). The systems may have specific stable loca-
tions, called ”attractors”, towards which it gravitates. (In mathematics an attrac-
tor is a region of state space that ”attracts” all nearby points as time passes.) All
other locations in the system are unstable, and the system will push itself away
from them. Thus, a dynamical system performs ”selection” by bringing itself to
one of the attractors. In this way, from a dynamical systems perspective, selection
is ”spatial contraction”: as the system continues to operate, a very large set of pos-
sible states early on is reduced to a a much smaller set. We illustrate this notion
with examples, and discuss the implications for selection in the mind.
4.2.1 Selection via point attractors
Figure 4.3: A point attractor in state space, from Chris Eliasmith
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In the simplest case, a dynamical system has a single stable point – this is called
a point attractor.” Consider a hayfield in Southeastern Canada where there are
three perennial grasses competing for resources such as food, space, and sunlight
– Kentucky bluegrass, quack grass, and timothy grass (Taylor & Aarssen, 1990).
The competition between these grasses is ”intransitive” (A > B, B > C,C > A). That
is, if they were coexisting in pairs of two, the quack grass species would com-
petitively exclude the kentucky bluegrass, the kentucky bluegrass would com-
petitively exclude the timothy grass, and the timothy grass would competitively
exclude the quack grass. But the system includes all three grasses, and this intran-
sitive competition prevents the dominance of a competitive dominant species. In-
stead, there is a certain ”attracting point” of species coexistence, i.e. a particular
ratio of each species, to which the system will eventually move from any initial
conditions, as shown in Figure 4.3. The precise location of this attracting point
is set by the characteristics of the physical system – the climate, predation, para-
sitism, etc.
The existence of a single point attractor, besides describing the system′s even-
tual destination, can be considered as helping the system to resist perturbations.
That is, once the system has moved into the attractor, small displacements from
the attractor will relax back into the attractor. For example, consider how the
brain keeps the eyes still (Seung 1996). When the eyes are still, premotor neurons
(in medial vestibular nucleus (MVN) and the prepositus hypoglossi (PH)) send a
constant eye position signal to the motor neurons controlling two extrocular mus-
cles, the lateral and medial recti. The firing rates of those motor neurons in turn
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are linearly related to horizontal eye position, by the equation: v = v0 + kE, where
v gives a vector of neural firing rates, v0 gives the firing rates at E=0, and k pro-
vides the slope of influence between the eye position and the neural firing rates.
The neural measures are vectors k, v, v0 ∈ Rn, and the horizontal eye position is
given by the scalar E ∈ R. When the system is perturbed (e.g. experimentally,
if the oculomotor nerve is electrically stimulated to random v), the eye will drift
horizontally from the fixed point, but the firing rates are then sucked back into
their prestimulation values after a transient deflection. Thus, the eyes are held
still. This feature can be represented through the bowl-shaped energy landscape
(see Figure 4.4), which represents a potential function defined on the state space,
in analogue with the physical idea of potential energy.
Figure 4.4: A bowl shaped attractor landscape, from Seung 1996
Although these systems are very simple, they are performing selection. They
are privileging one state of the space over others – a certain stable coexistence
across multiple species, a particular position for the eyes. Other examples are
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commonplace: the airplane′s wings are held in a consistent location despite wind
intrusions, old pocket calculators compute the irrational number
√
2 through a
dynamic procedure which brings initial state successively closer to
√
2, etc.
In a sense, these dynamical systems seem to be striving for a ”goal.” In the
motivation literature, classic features of goal pursuit include: vigorous acting to-
wards attainment of the goal, persistence in the face of obstacles, and resumption
after disruption (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel 2001). For
example, imagine that a young boy keeps bringing you to the ice cream shop, no
matter where you are in the town, and even after you stop for a bit or distract him
by showing him a cool car – in that case, you would assume that the young boy is
”motivated” to eat ice cream. In other words, our very method for inferring other
people′s goals is by observing the above three features. But note that our simple
dynamical systems share at some of these qualities: they move towards certain
privileged states (they settle into attractors), and they return to these states even
after disruption (resistance to perturbation).
4.2.2 Competitive selection via multistability
However, these systems don’t clearly satisfy Patricia Devine (1989)′s notion of
control, which we’ll call the principle of ”competitive selection.” In her activa-
tion/application model of stereotyping, multiple associations are partially active
in parallel, but the system eventually imposes a single choice. The situation of
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competitive selection can be envisioned if we simply modify the earlier systems
with single point attractors so that there are multiple possible attractors. In the
case that competition is so fierce as to produce competitive exclusion, then there
could be one attractor where the Kentucky bluegrass survives (and the other two
species die); a second attractor where the quack grass survives (and the other two
species die), and a third attractor where the timothy grass survives (and the other
species die). Then, in early moments of the system – say, immediately after an
ecological tragedy or large-scale planting endeavor– there will be simultaneous
co-existence of all three species. However, over time, as the perennial grasses in-
teract by competing for space, sunlight, and nutrients, one grass will eventually
win out over the other grasses. If the system is deterministic, this eventual fate
(and the intermediate states) depends solely on the initial state of the system – the
system is then governed by an equation characterizing its evolution.
To illustrate, consider the Lotka-Voltera model for two competing species. The
system is given by the equation:
dx
dt
= x(1 − σ1x − α1y)
dy
dt
= y(2 − σ2y − α1x)
where x is the first species, y is the second species, and the other variables
are parameters governing the strength of competiiton. We show trajectories for a
particular instantiation of this system, where 1 = 2 = 2;σ1 = σ2 = 2;α1 = α1 = 4,
as in Figure ??. Note that the system is normalized so that the number of animals
are given in units (% of the system′s eventual carrying capacity).
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Figure 4.5: The Lotka-Voltera model for two competing species
The red lines show a ”separatrix,” which separates trajectories of the system
with different properties. Whereas in the southeast quadrant, states flow towards
the dominance of species x, in the southwest quadrant, states flow towards the
dominance of species y. But different states engender different degrees of com-
petition: the closer the system starts out to the separatrix in these quadrants, the
stronger the fight by the losing species. In the northern quadrants, the system has
far more inhabitants than it can hold at capacity, and so both species die off at
quick rates before eventually the winning species accelerates towards the steady
state carrying capacity level.
Thus, this dynamical system meets the notion of control offered by Devine
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(1989) – multiple possible states (i.e. x or y) are simultaneously activated in par-
allel, but the system eventually selects one state over the other. But note that, in
contrast to dual systems models, this selection process does not require the inter-
vention of an external controller, but self-organizes through the interactions of the
components, which are competing for limited resources. These component parts
could be species competing for food (in an ecological model), or candidate repre-
sentations competing for selection to drive consciousness or behavior (in a model
of cognition).
4.2.3 Thesis: Selection as dynamic contraction
Dynamical systems approaches to cognition (e.g. Spivey 2007), as well as other bi-
ologically plausible models of cognition (Miller 2000; Desimone & Duncan 1995;
Cisek & Kalaska 2005; Erhlagen & Schoner 2002), describe mental representations
as ”competing for selection.” For these models, at the time scale of real-time cogni-
tive processing, a region of the mind entertains simultaneous partial blendings of
multiple interpretations, rather than having the system instantaneously teleport-
ing from discrete interpretation to discrete interpretation (Spivey 2007). That re-
gion accumulates evidence for a given decision gradually over time, and because
of the ongoing dynamic competition between multiple candidate decisions, it can
take multiple possible pathways to the same eventual location. These differential
pathways represent different considerations of, or different imprints from, alter-
native interpretations, depending on the distance to the multiple attractors at any
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given time. Thus, it is said that the dynamical systems perspective emphasizes
not just the symbolic, but also the ”subsymbolic” (Smolensky 1995): that is, in the
intermediate moments of mental processing, the mind simultaneously hosts par-
tial coactivation of multiple candidate representations. At a mathematical level of
analysis, this is no different from how in a harshly competitive ecological system,
multiple species may simultaneously coexist, before one dominant species even-
tually wipes out the rest. This notion of competitive selection follows from the
four fundamental principles for describing biologically-plausible mental process-
ing described earlier (O’Reilly 1998), which would endow mental representations
with attractor-like dynamics.
In dual systems theory, selection is a property of the controller. The associative
system is often considered to be a spreading activation network (Collins & Loftus
1975), leading to the partial activation of multiple, sometimes conflicting, mental
concepts. Selection occurs only when an external controller steps in to make a
final selection. In contrast, in a dynamical system, ”selection” has occurred with-
out the intervention of any external power. The act of selection has not required
the intervention of a separate system which operates according to distinct com-
putational principle of logical rules. As a result, a dynamical system is said to be
self-organizing in its selections. The initial condition or input to a competitive dy-
namical system generally possesses ambiguities with respect to its eventual fate
– and thus its distance in state space to various attractors may be construed as
tentative ”interpretations” in a decision-making process(Cree, McRae, & McNor-
gan 1999), just as the ecological system might tentatively consider resolving into
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victory for Kentucky bluegrass while heading towards a definitive victory for the
timothy grass. But note that the system′s own internal dynamics drive it through
intermediate states into the eventual finalized decision (i.e. into an attractor), not
the external intervention of an outside agent.
Thus, we have demonstrated that from a dynamical systems perspective, the
first aspect of control, ”selection,” may spontaneously emerge from the dynamic
interactions between component parts. However, this observation is just a pre-
liminary step in solving the problem of interactive control. Selection is simply
categorization plus time-dependence. But seeing a person walking down the hall,
and progressively categorizing that person as the lunch lady – or hearing a blend
of sounds and decomposing them into separate sources – does not fully capture
the meaning of ”executive control.” Thus, we turn to the next property of control:
strategic goal-pursuit.
4.3 Strategic goal pursuit: Attractor landscapes acknowledging
distant end-states
This section is concerned with ”strategic goal pursuit,” which we define as: grad-
ually manipulating the environment over the course of many actions in order to
realize some distant future goals. Since this chapter of the dissertation hopes to
sketch out an interactive theory of psychological control, in this section, we would
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like to explain strategic goal pursuit (a particular facet of control) in an interactive
way. In particular, we would like to explain how strategic goal pursuit could occur
from within the scope of interactive computation, drawing upon a SINGLE set of
interactive brain-like computational principles. The computational principles we
will use are the four principles of biologically plausible real-time processing, as
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. We begin by discussing how strate-
gic goal pursuit has been discussed throughout the history of psychology. As
we will see, there is a long history of dualisms that prevent the interactive inter-
pretation. We follow up by describing more contemporary, biologically-plausible
interactive approach to strategic goal pursuit. We conclude by describing strate-
gic goal pursuit from a dynamical systems perspective (and correspondingly we
provide a geometric interpretation of how strategic goal pursuit is possible within
an interactive computational model).
4.3.1 Dualistic perspectives throughout the history of psychol-
ogy
Aristotle′s perspective on goal pursuit
This mystery of strategic goal pursuit has puzzled many throughout time. When
people pursue their goals, they seem to be manipulating the environment towards
some final goal lying in the distant future. Yet a necessary condition of causality
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seems to be reference to the past. For example, a well-known principle of statistical
mechanics (Penrose 1979; see also Jaynes and Bretthorst 2003) takes it as an axiom
that probabilities referring to the present time can only depend on what happened
before, not what happened after. The mystery of strategic goal pursuit is this: how
is it possible for a scientific model to explain how agents select actions leading
them to satisfy their distant goals in the future?
As far back as Greek times, the puzzle caused problems and suggested dual-
istic solutions. Aristotle distinguished between two different kinds of causality –
”teleological causality” – which is the desired end, or the sake for which things are
done, such as walking for health – and ”efficient causality” – which is the common
understanding of cause, that which immediately sets a state of affairs in motion,
such as the first domino knocking over the second. Because efficient causality rep-
resents the modern, scientific definition of cause as the relation of cause and effect,
teleological behavior appears quite mysterious. How can apparently teleological
behavior – behavior which seems purposeful and goal-like – happen in a way that
is scientifically causal?
Behaviorism′s perspective on goal pursuit
Strategic goal pursuit remained mysterious for behaviorists. Behaviorism at-
tempted to explain human behavior through its consequences: rewards and pun-
ishments. Yet one major problem faced by behaviorism is that in real life, very few
actions produce an immediate slap in the face, kiss on the lips, or chocolate chip
104
cookie. Indeed, it is a rare life circumstance where a single behavior produces
immediate primary reinforcement. In contrast, actions typically have long-term
consequences on reinforcement. Therefore, if people want to bring about future
primary reinforcement, they must learn to strategically manipulate their environ-
ment. The mystery of strategic goal pursuit is the mystery of how to explain this
process.
For example, a chess player who wants to win the game must, through strat-
egy and planning, navigate the state of the board to checkmate. At any given
point, a chess player must determine the relative goodness or value of moving
pieces to various possible locations on the chess board. But the goodness of any
state of a chess board depends upon your partner′s upcoming move, which is a
stochastic random variable (i.e., you might be better at predicting it than a random
number generator, but you cannot predict it with certainty). In fact, the goodness
of any state depends upon events still further in the future – for example, your
own move subsequent to your partner′s move. But since your second next move
depends upon your partner′s preceding move, you cannot plan to make any par-
ticular move with any certainty. And so on and so forth, stretching out over many
steps into the potentially distant future. Thus, the goodness of any state of a chess
board depends upon long stretches of many stochastic behaviors, stretching into
the future, each of them building upon the other. Each successive step into the fu-
ture possesses an increasingly higher order of what we’ll call ”recursive stochas-
ticity.” This property of ”recursive stochasticity” is part of what has made strategic
goal pursuit seem so mysterious to models of human behavior.
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Due such complications, the problem of strategic goal pursuit, like the prob-
lem of natural language, stymied behaviorism′s attempt to provide a complete
account of the mind. Behaviorists’ primary approach to explaining purposeful,
teleologically-driven behavior was through associative chain theory. They rea-
soned that minds could gradually create chains of associations running back-
wards from the goal to the starting point. For instance, a rat in a maze engages in
random exploratory behavior; the rat eventually finds the goal box by chance; the
sight of the goal box starts to cause small anticipatory goal responses (salivation;
chewing); and eventually even these earlier stimuli become associated to antici-
patory goal responses. In this way, rats eventually form a chain of associations
running backwards from the goal behavior to the starting box. The proposed
mechanism was attractive because it explained apparently teleological behavior
through an ”efficiently causal” mechanism, which therefore did not violate the
laws of physics. Yet this rigid, deterministic chaining, while successful in explain-
ing certain rat movements towards goal boxes, seemed unable to explain anything
remotely as complicated and flexible as chess playing.
In its attempt to explain these more goal pursuit situations, behaviorism got
stuck on the question of how to assess the ”goodness” of any state (or how ”sat-
isfying” it should be to reach that state). According to Thorndike′s Law of Effect,
responses which lead to satisfying consequences should be ”stamped in” by expe-
rience and thus occur more frequently; responses which lead to unsatisfying con-
sequences should be ”stamped out” by experience and thus occur less frequently.
In situations such as the chess game, where people strategically pursue goals over
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many steps, behaviorists were forced into an infinite regress: It′s satisfying to cap-
ture the rook. It′s satisfying to set up the board so that you can soon capture the
rook... Etc. Thus, in order to explain higher-order human behavior, behaviorists
often resorted to the notion of ”automatic self-reinforcement”- the notion that peo-
ple can reinforce themselves even when reinforcement wasn’t physically present.
For instance, B.F. Skinner (1961) proclaimed that a writer is reinforced by the fact
that his ”verbal behavior may reach over centuries or to thousands of listeners or
readers at the same time.” (206).
Such a stance failed, because it came across as tautological. Thorndike′s Law
of Effect struck many as vapid and meaningless if states can be called ”satisfy-
ing” only when a person′s behavior retroactively proves that it must have been
so. Philosopher Daniel Dennett (1981) described automatic self-reinforcement as
begging the question in order to maintain the bigger theory: ”One saves the Law
of Effect from persistent counter-instances by the ad hoc postulation of reinforcers
and stimulus histories for which one has not the slightest grounds except the de-
mands of the theory. For instance, one postulates curiosity drives, the reduction of
which is reinforcing, in order to explain ’latent’ learning, or presumes that when
one exhibits an apparently novel bit of intelligent behavior, there must have been
some ”relevantly similar responses in one′s past for which one was reinforced”
(74-75). Noam Chomsky (1959) noted that in these cases, behaviorism accom-
plished no more than the standard ”mentalese” from colloquial language: ”X is
reinforced by Y (stimulus, state of affairs, event, etc.)” is being used as a cover
term for ’X wants Y,’ ’X likes Y,’ ’X wishes that Y were the case,’ etc. Invoking the
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term reinforcement has no explanatory force, and any idea that this paraphrase
introduces any new clarity or objectivity into the description of wishing, liking,
etc., is a serious delusion.” According to these critics, behaviorists were overlook-
ing the very question at hand: how could a person assess the goodness associated
with each possible state?
The cognitive revolution′s perspective on goal pursuit
Prompted by these failures of behaviorism, the cognitive revolution occurred, and
researchers began to re-interest themselves in ”hypothetical principles,” for exam-
ple, the internal cognitive processes mediating between stimulus and response:
attention, categorization, memory, judgment, goal pursuit, and so on. The cog-
nitive psychologists carved out an approach to human intelligence that was an-
tithetical to behavioristic mechanisms that simply replicated past learning. They
claimed that human intelligence must go beyond the behavioristic conditioning
of rats. As the Spanish physician Juan Huarte wrote in his treatise on the na-
ture of human intelligence: ”One may discern two generative powers in man,
one common with the beasts and plants, and the other participating of a spiritual
substance. Wit (intelligence) is a generative power. The understanding is a gen-
erative faculty.” Chomsky (1968) centered his critique of behaviorism upon this
generative property. As Chomsky writes, ”The normal use of human language is
innovative, in the sense that much of what we say in the course of normal lan-
guage use is entirely new, not a repetition of what we have heard before and not
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even similar in pattern [...] to sentences or discourse that we have heard in the
past.”
For many cognitive psychologists at that time, a system of formal logical rules
was precisely the computational scheme necessary to go beyond merely reproduc-
ing the past; that is to be able to understand and produce entirely new expressions
of thought. For example, Chomsky and Miller (1958) observed that a speaker of
English can understand and produce more sentences then there are seconds in a
lifetime. On this basis, Chomsky and Miller argued that these sentences couldn’t
have been learned individually, through operant conditioning, but that instead, a
far smaller set of powerful generative rules must be generating these sentences.
In sum, the cognitive psychologists at the time of the cognitive revolution distin-
guished between two accounts of the mind. Behaviorism′s learning mechanism,
in responding only to past conditioning, was ”merely reproductive.” In contrast,
cognitive psychology′s account of human intelligence, thanks to its powerful rule-
based structure, was freed from past conditioning and therefore ”productive.”
Why would strategic goal pursuit require a ”rule-based system” which for-
mally manipulates discrete symbolic representations using logical rules (see Slo-
man 1996)? First, recall that a rule-based system is said declare ”arbitrary vari-
ables;” a rule-based system can declare the variable ”x”, and reason with ”x”,
without determining the precise value of x, and then bind concepts to these ar-
bitrary variables later (Barsalou 1999). This computational form is believed to
allow the reasoner to transcend the specific content of the material. That is, rule-
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based computations allow for ”universal applicability,” which means the indi-
vidual can exhibit equal accuracy regardless of the nature of the material – fa-
miliar or unfamiliar, tempting or untempting. This is what is meant when it is
claimed that the rule-based system is a ”purely logical” entity (Smith, Langston,
& Nisbett 1992). For this reason, the rule-based system seems well-suited for goal
pursuit. Whereas the associative system fixates on stimulus properties and their
potentially unwanted motivational pulls, biases, intuitions, temptations, and su-
perstitions (Gawronski & Bodenhausen 2006; Fritz & Strack 2004; Smith 1996;
Baumeister, Bratslavska, Muraven & Tice 1998; Kahneman & Frederick 2002), the
rule-based system can reason purely logically, thereby overcoming the confines of
”stimulus control” and past training. Thus, rule-based system has become very
basis of ”executive control” in social psychology. In fact, the rule-based system is
believed to underly universally applicable moral ”rules,” which should hold re-
gardless of how tempting the particular situation, and which might represent the
penultimate act of ”executive control” or ”goal pursuit.”
Dual systems’ perspective on goal pursuit
Following in this tradition, contemporary dual systems models encapsulate a du-
alistic understanding of motivation that has pervaded psychology′s history. The
concept of motivation is cleaved into strategic goal pursuit vs. simple condition-
ing. Whereas the rule-based system is capable of strategic goal pursuit, the as-
sociative system capable only of simple conditioning. For example, consider the
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Reflective-Impulsive Model (Deutsch & Strack 2004), which is perhaps the dual
systems model which most directly addresses motivation. This model would ex-
plain a person′s reactions to chocolate M&M′s in a dualistic way. On this model,
an individual might automatically reach for the chocolate M&M′s; on the other
hand, the individual might forgo the chocolate M&M′s and reach for an apple in
the fridge. If the person reaches for the M&M′s, the cause of behavior is located
in the past; the M&M′s ”caused” the person to reach for them. In contrast, when
people opt for the apple in the fridge, the cause of behavior is located in the distant
future, when the person will achieve a very fit body.
Note how the rule-based system in contemporary dual systems theory serves
the same ultimate purpose as Chomsky’s production rules. Both posit the exis-
tence of a sophisticated distinct system which, due to its privileged computational
form, is uniquely capable of pursuing future-located outcomes – thereby accom-
plishing ”teleological causality.” Conversely, note how the associative system in
dual systems theory serves the same ultimate purpose as a behavioristic mecha-
nism. Both are seen as possessing impoverished forms of computation, with the
ultimate causes of behavior located in the past, and therefore these mechanisms
are relegated to subserving ”efficient causality.” Thus, dual systems theory sees
strategic goal pursuit as a distinct pole in a binary opposition, simply reinstating
the dichotomies that run throughout the history of psychology, from Aristotle to
the cognitive revolution.
111
4.3.2 Toward an interactive perspective on goal pursuit
Can we construct a biologically plausible, interactive model that generates con-
vincing teleological behavior, but is scientifically causal? If behaviorists struggled
because of their restrictive short-term focus on the consequences of single behav-
iors, then perhaps it is possible to extend behaviorism so that it handles extended
sequences of behaviors. But in order to do so, we will need to formalize the no-
tion of ”automatic self-reinforcement, ” Skinner′s notion which Chomsky found
objectionable. If we could rigorously define ”automatic self-reinforcement,” then
we could understand how when a person pursues a goal (such as trying to win a
chess game), that person needn’t wait for the direct reinforcement at the end of the
game, but could ”effectively reward” himself as he navigates effectively through
the various intermediate stages of the game. That is, the player′s mind could re-
ward itself for catching the rook, or for getting into position to catch the rook, for
setting up the means for getting into a position to catch the rook, etc. In short, we
would want to understand how minds can compute an ”internal value” which
it could assign to environmental (or cortical) states, and then create internally-
driven rewards for navigating to more highly valued states.
A mathematical definition of internal value
How should ”internal value” be defined scientifically? This question has attracted
major interest from researchers across disciplines: mathematicians (e.g. Sethian
112
and Vladmirsky 2001), operations researchers (e.g. French 1982), financial engi-
neers (e.g. Glasserman 2004), computer scientists (e..g Watkins and Dayan 1992),
and neurobiologists (e.g. Botvinick, Niv & Barto 2009) – all of them loosely united
under the umbrella term of dynamic programming (Bellman 1952).
Dynamic programming′s first major maneuver is to transform the problem
into a graph theoretical formalism. Consider examples such as people playing
a chess game (and trying to select moves which maximize their chances of win-
ning), rabbits traversing through the forest (and trying to minimize opportunities
for predation), or professional movers navigating a heavy piano through a convo-
luted NYC apartment (and trying to minimize the work applied in joules). These
scenarios can all be modeled through a graph theoretical representation where
there are (a) a set of possible states (configurations of the chessboard, physical
location in the forest, physical location in the apartment combined with various
positioning of the piano in the hands); (b) a set of probabilities for transitioning
between states (e.g. the probability of transitioning from a starting chessboard
state into checkmate is 0), (c) a set of actions available at each state which influ-
ence or perhaps fully determine the transitional probabilities (e.g. the chess play
selected, the chosen speed and direction of motion through the forest), and (d)
a set of corresponding costs/rewards associated with these transitions (effort re-
quired to hold the piano in a certain position between two locations) and/or states
(the reward of winning the chess game).
Thus, ”strategic goal pursuit” can be considered in these graph theoretic terms,
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where the agent is trying to minimize costs or maximize rewards over multiple
steps, hoping to reach distant goals despite uncertain, reciprocal interactions with
other people or the environment. The problem is to define the optimal action
policy, which is a set of probabilities for choosing different actions given differ-
ent states of the environment. In order to determine the optimal action policy,
dynamic programming must construct an internal value metric assessing the good-
ness of being in any particular state. Thus, dynamic programming requires the
individual or agent to engage in ”automatic self-reinforcement.”
Dynamic programming can define a value metric on environmental states
through an expression known as the Bellman equation (Bellman 1952). This value
metric compresses a great deal of complexity about the structure of a goal pursuit
situation. To illustrate, let us make a simple generalization, fairly common in the
neurobiological literature on motivated goal pursuit (e.g. Montague, Dayan & Se-
jnowski 1996), that an agent pursuing some goal will try to maximize not rewards,
but returns (that is, some function of a reward sequence). A common example of a
return function is an immanence-weighted sum of future primary reinforcement
(Sutton & Barto 1998). For example, in discrete time, where time can be modeled





= rt+1 + γrt+2 + γ2rt+3 + . . . ,
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where the ”immanence weights” γi−1 are numbers between 0 and 1 and thereby
simply represent a ceteris parabis preference for earlier rewards over later rewards
– i.e. they are discounting terms which give successively smaller weightings to
primary reinforcement value arriving successively later in time.
In this scenario, the value of a state at a given time and under some action
selection policy is equal to the expected returns:
Vpi(st) = Epi{Rt|st = s}
where V(st) is the value of state s at time t, and pi refers to the action policy
chosen by the agent.
On first glance, this whole construction may seem to have accomplished little
more than behaviorist theory. On the surface, the definition of ”returns” R may
seem to be merely allowing behaviorism′s notion of rewards to inhabit different
periods of time (e.g. the environment might deliver the reward at time t+2 instead
of at time t). However, this seemingly innocuous change – and the correspond-
ing construction of V , the internal value or goodness of being in a particular state
– is a metric which compresses an enormous complex information into a single
value, and which possesses qualitatively new properties. As argued in a separate
document by the author of this dissertation (available upon request), the above
construction of value V can be interpreted, from a dynamical systems perspective,
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as the state-space distance to reward in a multistable stochastic action-dependent
dynamical system. To unravel the claim, it can be shown that internal value com-
presses information about the probabilistic arrival into multiple end-states (mul-
tistability), combined with the the time/steps needed to get to these end-states
(distance), across multiple possible pathways (path stochasticity), and where an
agent’s own unpredictable future actions at each step in the process can change
the values of all these quantities (action-dependence).
Thus, dynamical programming solves the mystery of teleological behavior. By
constructing a formalized, computable metric for ”internal value,” dynamic pro-
gramming can implement goal pursuit by simply stipulating the following prin-
ciple: Actors should always select actions which maximize the ”internal value” of
the upcoming state. This approach has a wonderful advantage: since actors are
chasing value gradients at every step, dynamical programming has transformed
teleological causality into efficient causality. Thus, presuming that an actor has
access to internal values, that actor can pursue goals in a way that is efficiently
causal – and can therefore make ”simplistic” associations between stimulus and
response very intelligent indeed.
The estimation of internal value
However, the remaining question is: how can actors actually compute the values
of intermediate states? So far we have merely defined internal value and posited
that the brain, in principle, may be using this quantity to provide itself with ”au-
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tomatic self-reinforcement.” But the problem of estimating the value of states is no
trivial matter – in fact, the dynamic programming literature has devoted a great
deal of research towards solving ”the value estimation problem” (e.g. Bertsekas
1976). Generally dynamic programming algorithms solve this problem through a
learning procedure which involves looping through a series of values relevant to
a goal pursuit problem. For a simple example, in the setting of discrete temporal
stages (such as a chess game) with a predetermined number of stages, K, the pro-
cedure for value estimation would require looping backwards through: a set Tk
of possible future temporal stages, a set of possible states Xk−1 in which the agent
could find itself at future stage k − 1, a set Wk−1 of stochastic environmental influ-
ences wk−1 possible at stage k − 1, a set of probabilities pwk−1 which are assigned to
each stochastic environmental influence wk−1, a set of possible actions Uk−1 that the
agent could choose based on the state xk−1 and the stochastic environmental influ-
ence wk−1, etc. These looping procedures for value estimation are computationally
intensive. In particular, they have three distinguishing properties that would, at
the level of qualitative description, seem to make strategic goal pursuit require
a productive rule-based system, and to be non-implementable through an inter-
active parallel distributed processing mechanism. In particular, the procedure
would seem to require set-theoretic quantification and recursionin order to iterative
looping through sets of values, and both of these capacities have been claimed to
be sin qua non of rule-based systems (e.g. Pinker 1997, Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988;
note however that recursion has become a capacity of single interactive systems
since the dynamical revolution in cognitive psychology.). Moreover, the value
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estimation algorithms often begin by knowing only the reinforcement properties
of the end states, and the recursive loops described above would generate inter-
nal values by backwards-computing from the end-goal. Such an algorithm would
be said to be impossible by behavioristic or associative systems (e.g. Chomsky
1969; Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988), because they would seem to require backwards
propagation algorithms in neural networks, which are believed to be biologically
implausible.
The above considerations suggest that strategic goal pursuit would require
an entirely different mechanism or system than the constructed system of ”mere
associations” – thus supporting the claims of dual systems theory in social psy-
chology. However, recent research has uncovered how internal values can be de-
termined through a simple, local, biologically plausible procedure known as the
temporal differences method (Sutton 1998). To illustrate, let us assume the ex-
istence of an internal ”critic” whose job is to predict the value of a given state:
Pt ≈ Vt = rt+1 + γrt+2 + γ2rt+3 + . . . .
If the predictions are correct, then two successive predictions must both satisfy
the following equations.
Pt−1 = rt + γrt+1 + γ2rt+2 + . . .
Pt = rt+1 + γrt+2 + γ2rt+3 + . . .
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Thus, the internal critic can exploit a convenient consistency principle which
arises from the simple subtraction of power series. Namely, a correct prediction
of internal value must satisfy the condition:
Pt−1 = rt + γPt
Thus, the critic can compare two adjacent predictions (along with the delivery
of some amount of reward), and thereby improve the accuracy of its predictions.
The extent to which two adjacent predictions fail to satisfy this consistency condi-
tion is the ”temporal differences error”:
δ = rt + γPt − Pt−1
If the temporal differences error is positive, then the earlier prediction Pt−1
underpredicted its target rt + γPt, and thus the earlier estimation of value should
be increased in magnitude. And vice versa if the temporal differences error is
negative. In this way, the critic can use the temporal differences error to update
its predictions. It has been shown (Sutton & Barto 1998) that under fairly general
conditions, this updating method will eventually cause even wildly incorrect or
random initial predictions (Pt) to converge to the correct values. (Vt).
Note the import of this mechanism: The original prediction problem which
required computations extending out into the (potentially infinitely) distant fu-
ture has now been reduced into a consistency condition that involves only two
adjacent predictions! This very fact undergirds the name ”temporal differences
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method” – the error which drives learning depends merely upon a difference be-
tween information available at two neighboring moments in time. As a result,
there is no longer a need to worry about stochastic recursion or backwards propa-
gation, for the same reasons as in the simple operant condition case – we are only
comparing adjacent time steps. Moreover, this mechanism learns values through
sampling of the environment, rather than relying upon set theoretic quantification
over a known model of the world (which it doesn’t have). Finally, the mechanism
is a biologically plausible bootstrapping method, meaning that, unlike the more
theoretical Monte Carlo techniques, the mechanism can teach itself on-line, rather
than having to wait for the final outcome to learn.
4.3.3 Brain implementation in multiple interacting systems
The basal ganglia and the actor/critic model
In the brain, a subcortical region known as the basal ganglia is believed to be im-
portant for implementing temporal differences and therefore strategic goal pur-
suit (Barto 1994). The basal ganglia is an interconnected set of regions, as shown
in Figure 4.6, that are connected to the cortex and thalamus.
To model motivated cognition, the striatum of the basal ganglia is sometimes
(e.g. Houk, Adams & Barto 1995) cleaved into an ”actor” (located in the dorso-
lateral striatum; denoted DLS in Figure 4.7) and a ”critic” (located in the ventral
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Figure 4.6: Many recurrent loops within the basal ganglia, from Bar-Gad
et al. 2003
striatum; denoted VS in Figure 4.7).
The critic ′s job is to learn the internal value of various (cortical) states. Thus,
the critic is part of the brain which can provide ”automatic self-reinforcement” in
the derided idea of Skinner. When the cortex has transitioned into a more highly
valued state then expected, the adaptive critic should provide ”effective reinforce-
ment,” even if there is no primary reinforcement directly from the environment.
In order to perform this task, the adaptive critic is believed to learn value repre-
sentations through the computation of the temporal differences error, which helps
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Figure 4.7: The actor/critic model of the basal ganglia, from Niv et al.
2010
it to adjust its value representations to greater accuracy. The temporal differences
error is defined in equation (4.1) below:
δ = rt + γPt − Pt−1 (4.1)
Most, but not all, papers in the literature specify that the basal ganglia reports
a temporal differences error through the firing of dopamine neurons, often in the
SNc. The dopamine diffusely enters the synapses connecting sensory neurons
critic neurons. Since dopamine has neural plasticity properties (Reynolds & Wick-
ens 2002), the learning at these synapses will bolster or atrophy in accordance with
the magnitude of the temporal differences error (Nakahara, Amari & Hikosaksa
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2002) . In this way, the synaptic connection weights from the sensory cortical re-
gions to the striatum′s critic neurons eventually converge on storing the internal
value of a state.
According to the actor/critic theories of the basal ganglia, dopamine should
train the critic by reporting a temporal differences error. In particular, this means
that dopamine should fire whenever the person experiences what we might call
”unexpected motivational gains” – either from mispredicted rewards or unexpect-
edly good state transitions. As it turns out, there is evidence that dopamine fires
in both situations.
Let us first consider mispredicted rewards. According to actor/critic models, if
the environment delivers an expected reward, dopamine should fire above base-
line levels; and if the environment fails to deliver an expected reward, dopamine
should fire below baseline levels. In particular, dopaminergic firing should be a
monotonic function of the extent to which the delivered reward on a given trial
differs from the expected value of reward. Fiorillo et al (2003) provides support-
ive evidence for this hypothesis. Fiorillo et al (2003) trained monkeys in a classical
conditioning procedure in which distinct visual stimuli indicated the probabilities
(P=0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0) of a liquid reward being delivered after a 2-s delay. Panel
”C” in Table 4.1 shows the dopaminergic responses of neurons to the delivery of
reward to these various visual stimuli. The dopamine firing is a perfectly mono-
tonic function of the extent to which a reward deviated from expectation: the
lower the probability that the stimulus precedes reward, the greater the dopamin-
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ergic response when the reward was delivered. Moreover, Panel ”D” in Table
4.1 shows the symmetric case holds when expected rewards fail to appear. The
higher the probability that the stimulus precedes reward, the greater the suppres-
sion of the dopaminergic response. These findings provide strong evidence that
dopaminergic neurons are tracking reward prediction errors.
Table 4.1: Dopamine fires in response to mispredicted reward, from Fior-
illo, Tobler, & Schultz(2003)
However, if dopamine is representing the temporal differences error, then
its firing should predict more than just immediately delivered rewards. Rather,
dopamine should be critiquing transitions between patterns of neural activity in
the cortex (as argued by Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996). Looking at equa-
tion (4.1), even if no primary reinforcement is obtained on a given trial, dopamine
should fire if the cortex unexpectedly transitions into a higher valued state than it
expected. In other words, dopamine should track state improvements – or rather,
those that are unexpected. In the example of the chess game, if you accidentally
stumble into a position where you can checkmate your opponent, then dopamine
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should fire. In other words, dopamine should be functioning as Skinner′s ”auto-
matic self-reinforcement.”
Unfortunately, because contemporary neuroscience research has focused on
reward mispredictions, there are few published paradigms providing a direct test
of state improvement. However, at a gross level of analysis, it is already clear
that the striatum does track state improvements. A nice example is provided by
Seymour et al (2004). (However, it should be cautioned that the study was done
on pain rather than rewards, and uses fMRI-BOLD rather than electrophysiologi-
cal recordings of dopamine, so conclusions relevant to the actor/critic model are
limited. At the current moment, papers are being generated demonstrating more
directly that dopamine plays a role in state improvement (e.g. Baker & Holroyd
2009).) In the Seymour study, human subjects underwent a learning experiment in
which electric shocks were delivered to their hands in response to various visual
stimuli. The experimental design conformed to the methodology below:
Thus, from the beginning of a trial, there is a 50% chance of getting either cue
A or cue C. Cue A is relatively highly valued (in terms of pain predictions): it
has an 82% chance of transitioning into cue B determining high pain, compared
to an 18% chance of transitioning into cue D determining low pain. In contrast,
Cue C is relatively low valued (in terms of pain predictions): it has an 82% chance
of transitioning into cue D determining low pain, compared to an 18% chance of
transitioning into cue B determining high pain. Thus, Cue A is a more highly
valued state than Cue C.
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Figure 4.8: A methodology for documenting state improvement, from Sey-
mour et al. 2004
Below are the fMRI-BOLD recordings from the ventral striatum, contrasting
trial type 4 to trial type 2. What this shows is that in the first few seconds, the brain
has completely unpredictably (50/50) transitioned into the more highly valued
state (cue A) rather than the more weakly valued state (cue C) – therefore the right
ventral striatum becomes excited from baseline. Then, the brain transitions into
the same second state (cue D), a weakly valued state, and in the case when this
state transition was not predicted, the right ventral striatum becomes depressed
from baseline. Thus, the striatum is indeed tracking the value of stochastic state
transitions in a multi-step pathway to an operant.
On the other hand, the dorsolateral striatum is known as the actor (Botvinik,
Niv & Barto 2010). The actor′s job is to learn action policy mappings. That is, the
actor must take sensory information from the posterior cortex and make a behav-
ioral choice. But how can the basal ganglia solve the ”action selection” problem –
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Figure 4.9: fMRI-BOLD results suggesting state improvement, from Sey-
mour et al. 2004
that is, how can it discover which actions are expected to bring about the highly
valued states with respect to its current goal? As it turns out dopamine plays a
dual role. Not only dopamine train the critic, but dopamine also trains the ac-
tor. From a functional perspective, whenever the critic reports a positive temporal
difference error, then the individual′s action has brought him into a more highly
valued state than expected, and so the individual needs to increase tendency to
make that action. This functional need is subserved by the biology; dopamine
is released diffusely, and when it permeates the ”critic” neurons of the ventral
striatum, it also permeates the ”actor” neurons in the dorsolateral section of the
striatum (Joel, Niv & Ruppin 2002) Thus, just as dopamine aided in the learning
of state′s value (by adjusting the weights between the dorsolateral striatum and
the SNc), dopamine will also encourage learning of actions that are expected to
maximize gains in internal value (by adjusting the weights between the ventral
striatum and the posterior cortex). In this way, dopamine influences which be-
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havioral choices are favored in the basal ganglia based on the potential value of
upcoming environmental states.
4.3.4 Thesis: Goal pursuit as dopamine-sculpted attractor land-
scapes
The dynamical systems approach to mental processing becomes relevant because
the actor is implemented in a real biological brain, so in principle, its computa-
tions should conform to O’Reilly′s four neurocomputational axioms (which im-
ply a dynamically evolving mental representation.) And indeed, the basal gan-
glia although it is subcortical rather than cortical, is well-known for its recurrent
”loops-within-loops” structure (Bar-Gad, Morris, & Bergman 2003; see again Fig-
ure 4.6). Many current theories of basal ganglia function, such as its potential
implementation of a multi-hypothesis sequential probability ratio test (Bogacz &
Gurney 2007), documents that neurons in the output regions of the basal ganglia
(GPi and SNr) implement a distributed representation, and that distributed rep-
resentation dynamically evolves over time because it receives partial cascading
from its informational sources, and because it forces potential action selections to
compete with each other (Bar-Gad, Morris, & Bergman 2003; Bogacz & Gurney
2007). Thus, the ”actor” of the basal ganglia looks very much like the integrative
layer of a normalized recurrence network that was used to describe posterior cor-
tical functionalities, despite the fact that we are now incorporating motivational
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information. Thus, even in this highly ”hot” motivated area (the basal ganglia is
directly connected to the lateral hypothalamus believed to subserve primary re-
wards), the actor gradually settles upon a behavior choice over repeated cycles of
activation flow.
Now let us argue that in a dynamical system, learning means sculpting the at-
tractor landscape. In an interconnected neural system such as the brain, learning
means changing the strength of synaptic connections (Bi & Poo 1998), and because
the strength of synaptic weights determines the real-time dynamical interactions
which will cause the system to settle into an attractor over the course of recurrent
processing (see four neurocomputational principles), then changing the synap-
tic strengths means changing the attractor landscape of the dynamical system
(see geometric interpretation of dynamical systems theory). Thus, the statement
”learning sculpts the attractor landscape” is true in principle for a given neural
network. Moreover, empirical research confirms that the statement is meaningful
for real biological behavior. For example, it has been shown on work on biman-
ual coordination (Yamanishi, Kawato, & Suzuki 1980; Schoner, Zanone, & Kelso
1992) that a newly formed attractor basin can be made widened or narrowed,
deepened or shallowed depending on how that newly formed basin cooperates
or competes with the pre-existing structure of the entire system. In particular, the
spontaneous self-organizing coordination tendencies for bimanual hand coordi-
nation have stable attractors at 0 degrees or 180 degrees. When people are trained
to tap their hands at a 90 degree relative phase difference (e.g. by synchronizing
with visual metronomes), the recent training competes with spontaneous tenden-
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cies, and so the formed basin of attraction is shallower (signifying greater error of
performance) and has a wider, less articulated shape (signifying greater variability
of motion) than the deep, narrow basins of attraction that would be formed with
further training at 0 degrees or 180 degrees. In fact, dynamical systems theory
predicts that the entire attractor landscape changes with learning; as Kelso (1995)
writes, learning changes not just one thing, it changes the entire system. To illustrate
this, the researchers from the previous studies used a ”scanning probe” over the
course of many days of learning the 90 degree pattern, whereby at the beginning
of each day, they tested subjects’ ability to hold not just the 90 degree pattern, but
all possible 12 different relative phase patterns located at discrete 15 degree steps
between 0 degrees and 180 degrees. They found that learning the 90 degree pat-
tern changes their abilities to perform the patterns at all other relative phases. As
Kelso (1995) writes, ”This is a far cry from the acquisition of habits and associa-
tions through repetition that have tended to dominate theories of learning in one
form or another.” Putting this all together, we see that learning is the evolution of
attractor landscapes. The bimanual coordination researchers documented that dif-
ferent individuals have different attractor layouts at day 1, before any learning
takes place. These initial layouts get morphed in idiosyncratic ways into new at-
tractor landscapes that somehow ”work” for maintaining the 90 degree pattern.
Moreover, when recalling the 90 degree pattern from memory, the attractor layout
snaps back in the direction of the initial landscapes.
So now we can make an argument about how strategic goal pursuit works
in an interactive brain. Namely, the question is this: how should we consider
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strategic goal pursuit from a dynamical systems perspective, given what we know
about reinforcement learning, and given that learning sculpts the attractor land-
scapes of dynamical systems? To make our argument, let us return to our notion
of modeling mental processing with a single interactive system model such as nor-
malized recurrence. How should our single interactive system model get adjusted
to accommodate the functionalities of the actor/critic?
Let us say the actor neurons of the striatum plays the role of the integrator re-
gion in the self-organizing normalized recurrence network, and posterior cortical
regions play the role of the informational sources. The notion is reasonable, be-
cause the actor neurons in the striatum help determine the behavior choice based
on posterior cortical information about the sensory environment. So in that case
we have a Normalized Recurrence network between the posterior cortex and the
dorsolateral striatum. Now let us ask about the role of the critic and dopamine
for the Normalized Recurrence network. Recall that dopamine trains the action
policy in the basal ganglia by modulating the strength of the synaptic connections
between cortex and dorsolateral striatum. But in a normalized recurrence net-
work, the strength of synaptic weights between sources and integrator governs
the ”partial cascading” of information during the cyclic exchanges of informa-
tion between source and integrator. Moreover, since dopamine influences which
actions tend to get selected over others, dopamine will end up (indirectly) influ-
encing the ”lateral competition” determining the competitive dynamics between
behavioral choices.
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The upshot is that, so long as dopamine firing depends upon the critic′s de-
termination of value, and that dopamine influences how the system ”learns” to
integrate behavioral choices out of informational sources, then we can say from
a dynamical systems interpretation that the mind takes trajectories in a high-
dimensional states space where value permeates the space – and the continuous
trajectories are driven at every step by the implications for goal-pursuit. In other
words, thanks to the work of the critic, the attractor landscapes acknowledges
distant end-states. We summarize this point as saying ”motivation sculpts the at-
tractor landscape.” Note that this geometric notion describes how strategic goal
pursuit would work within an interactive distributed system – it does not stipu-
late the intervention of some computationally external duality, such as a distinct
generative rule-based system, or a non-efficient kind of causality.
Setting aside the geometric interpretation, note that the dynamical systems
perspective supports an interactive computational view, rather than a dualistic
computational view, of goal pursuit. Contemporary theorizing in the psycho-
logical sciences (e.g. Sloman 1996; Smith & Decoster 2000; Deutsch & Strack
2004; Bodenhausen & Gawronski 2006) assumes the mind contains two different
kinds of systems: an associative system which learns rote, immediate reflexive
responses through simple conditioning, and a rule-based system which develop
strategic plans for pursuing distant future goals. Thus, the associative system is
”dumb,” falling prey to simple heuristics (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman 2002),
whereas the rule-based system is ”smart,” providing the basis for rationality and
higher intelligence (Andersen 1982). In this section, we have described how a
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merely ”associative” stimulus-response mechanism could subserve the complex,
strategic pursuit of distant goals. In particular, the section focused upon compu-
tational models and neuroscientific evidence for actor-critic models of learning in
the brain. In such models, people’s brains contain an internal critic which tracks
the ”value” of transitions between various environmental states (or their cortical
representations). Whenever the person reaches a more highly valued state than
expected, the critic sends out an internally manufactured dopaminergic reward
signal. Using this signal, the adaptive critic can train the agent to choose behav-
iors which maximize the likelihood of transitioning into a more highly valued
state. In this way, the mind forms stimulus-response preferences which are intelli-
gent. That is stimulus-response associations are more than just knee-jerk reactions
to immediate pleasure and pain; they can instead maximize rewards expected in
the arbitrarily distant future, received with some probability after agents have
guided themselves through potentially complicated stochastic pathways towards
the eventual goal state.
4.4 Flexible top-down processing: The flexible selection of at-
tractor landscapes
In the previous section on strategic goal pursuit, we described how a dynamical
system could gravitate automatically towards mental representations or behav-
ioral choices that would strategically maximize the expected value of states in the
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potential distant future, even in the face of complex uncertainties. However, the
value of a state can only be defined with respect to a goal. Imagine you are a col-
lege student sitting in your car at an intersection where to the road to the left leads
to a convenience store with cheap beer, and the road to the right leads to the cam-
pus library. Under an academic achievement goal, you must turn the right to find
more highly valued environments, but under a socialization goal, you must turn
to the left. The point is that internal value depends upon ultimate goals, but ulti-
mate goals are transient and can shift wildly from moment to moment depending
upon new information. Aligning one′s behavior with respect to transient goals
is part of what is meant by psychological control – in particular by the capacity
of ”flexible top-down processing.” This capacity for top-down flexible toggling
between goals is required to perform well on executive control tasks such as the
Stroop task and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, as both of these tasks require
transient shifts in goal pursuit in response to environmental cues.
In this section, we review recent literature arguing that single interactive sys-
tems (and the posterior cortical functionalities that they usually model) are unable
to provide such top-down flexibility. We go on to review how the neurobiologi-
cal structure of the prefrontal cortex has precisely the right properties to subserve
top-down flexibility. Then we integrate these observations into our dynamical
systems interpretation of psychological control. In the end, we arrive at a descrip-
tion of how to think about top-down flexibility from the perspective of interactive
computation in a parallel distributed system, rather than from the perspective of
dualistic computation.
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4.4.1 Working memory: The information processing require-
ment
In this section, we will make an information processing argument that single in-
teractive systems are insufficient for modeling control. In particular, we will argue
that single interactive systems lack something called ”working memory,” which
is required for top-down flexibility.
Let us start by describing a cognitive task that would be difficult for the single
interactive system models (NR, SRN, DFT, LEABRA). In particular, we will con-
sider tasks related to limited-capacity visual attention (Desimone & Duncan 1995).
In these tasks, participants stare a cluttered visual array, when suddenly a target
appears. The target appears very briefly and is ambiguous (e.g. it might be the
letter C, but it might be the letter O). When participants can correctly provide in-
formation about this briefly flashed visual target, they receive some reward. Thus,
the participant is motivated to perform well at the task. In certain versions of this
task (e.g. Bisley & Goldberg, 2003, 2006), visual cues (e.g. a yellow triangle) ap-
pear, providing some information about upcoming spatial location of the target
(e.g. it will be somewhere in the northwest quadrant). However, the participant
cannot immediately saccade to that region of visual space; rather, the participant
is required to look at a fixation cross at the center of the screen, and can only sac-
cade when the target is flashed. Based on the structure of this task, we could say
that the participant has a internally maintained goal to look at a certain region of
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visual space (e.g. the northwest quadrant).
The task can be made into an executive control task by introducing stimulus-
driven perturbations to the internally maintained goal. For example, while the
participant is maintaining spatial attention somewhere, perhaps in the northwest
quadrant, during the course of that short delay, the computer program can flash
a distractor within an irrelevant region of visual space, say in the southeast quad-
rant. The distractor provokes a conflict between the ”top-down” goal and the
”bottom-up” stimulus. Executive control is required to re-establish the internally-
maintained goal (to look at the northwest quadrant) in the face of the external
perturbation (which automatically draws attention to the southeast quadrant; for
supportive arguments about the use of executive control in these tasks, see De
Fockert, Rees, Frith & Lavie 2001).
Let us now describe a simple interactive system that could perform this task.
In particular, we envision a normalized recurrence network. The integrative layer
would be a layer of lateral interparietal cortical neurons, as the LIP is known to
provide information about spatial attention (Colby et al. 1996; Gottlieb, Kusunoki,
& Goldberg 1998). The LIP layer is indeed described by distributed representa-
tions or ”population codes,” as the pattern of activation in LIP neurons is suf-
ficient to determine where the person is devoting their spatial attention (Bisley
& Goldberg, 2003, 2006). Moreover, LIP engages in dynamic cycles of activation
exchange with lower level sources of visual featural information in the manner
described in the introduction. Thus, we could construct a normalized recurrence
136
network which roughly captures the processing dynamics between LIP and oc-
cipital sources of visual features, and test its performance on the task.
Let us first describe when this single interactive system would succeed on the
Bisley and Goldberg task. After all, the recurrent network of LIP neurons with its
sensory informational sources can easily enforce a ”top-down” goal, according to
the structure of the attractor landscape encoded in its connectivity patterns. For
example, imagine that the participant needs to fixate spatial attention at the north-
west quadrant of the visual field. Then this network of LIP neurons simply needs
to have an attractor at the corresponding region of neural state space (i.e. the con-
nection weights should be constructed so that any n-dimensional state vector of
LIP neuron firing rates x will eventually settle into some attractive location corre-
sponding to maintaining attention in the northwest quadrant x0). In such a situa-
tion, regardless of the current state of the network, when the distractor stimulus
appears in the southeast, that stimulus will be processed by the LIP, disrupting the
pattern of activation corresponding to the maintenance of spatial attention in the
northwest (Bisley and Goldberg 1993, 1996). The previously stable firing pattern
of the LIP neurons becomes disorganized. In other words, the distractor stimulus
is an external perturbation which pushes the trajectory out of its attractor. From
a more folk psychological perspective, the distracting stimulus has grabbed the
participant′s attention ”automatically,” and the participant′s mind needs to exert
some control in order to reinforce the internally maintained goal over the external
distractor.
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Who enforced this control? Nobody, if the dynamical system is wired correctly.
The control is enforced automatically. If the attractor landscape is constructed to
have an attractor for the northwest quadrant, then over the course of 300-400 mil-
liseconds, the LIP will morph back into the original attractor state. The top-down
goal can be enforced upon the external distractor, quite automatically, due to the
simple fact that the dynamical system has an attractor set for the northwest quad-
rant. So there is a somewhat misleading nature to the terms that are sometimes
used to describe this task – that the task requires top-down control vs. bottom-up
processing, or internal control rather than stimulus-based control.
Seemingly, we are done with this section. We have already described the third
functionality of control (flexible top-down processing), without any new machin-
ery than an ordinary dynamical attractor network. In fact, the brain implemented
top-down control over the stimulus, simply due to the fact that a dynamical sys-
tem can perform a selection. In fact, as reviewed in the goal pursuit section of
this chapter, we could do even better, extending this capacity to more complex
environments (where rewards are not immediately offered, and so a person must
pursue state improvement). In this case, as we have already described, the capac-
ity for top-down control could even be made ”intelligent” in the sense of guiding
the system to the right states to maximize expected future rewards, simply with
an adaptive critic teaching this dynamical system how to maximize the value of
upcoming states.
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Mommy, where do attractor landscapes come from?
However, the problem for our model is this: where does the attractor landscape
come from? The task demands undergo dramatic changes from trial to trial: at-
tention might be required first in the northwest, then in the northeast, then in
the southeast, and then in the northwest again. And, recalling the ”productive”
nature of language, a person can follow any sequence of cues, even sequences
it has never experienced. Somehow, the mind must be capable of implementing
immediate, dramatic shifts in the attractor landscape. This functional demand re-
quires changes to the attractor landscape that are quite different then in the Kelso
bimanual coordination studies, where the adaptive critic could gradually train
the attractor landscape to slowly morph into the necessary form over the course
of days. In this simple visual selective attention task, the mind must immediately
shift the internally-maintained goal from trial-to-trial, based on whatever cue hap-
pens to appear. This information processing demand is precisely what is meant
by ”top-down flexibility”
Can’t a standard single interactive system accomplish this feat? Cognitive the-
orizing about informational processing demands suggest that the answer is ”no”
(Rougier, Noelle, Braver, Cohen & O’Reilly 2005; Reynolds and O’Reilly 2009),
and that these working memory tasks require additional components. To outline
these components, we need to investigate the information processing demands
more thoroughly.
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Information Processing Demands of Flexible Top-Down Processing
• flexible updating: In the Bisley and Goldberg task, a fast learning system
would be necessary to rapidly associate the arbitrary cue (e.g. a yellow tri-
angle) with the transient goal to maintain attention at a particular region of
visual space (e.g the northwest quadrant). There are theoretical reasons to
believe that a single interactive system which works like the slow-learning
posterior cortex would not handle this demand very well. The argument
traces back to classic papers on the functional incompatibilities between
”fast learning” vs. ”slow learning” systems (McClelland, McNaughton, &
O’Reilly, 1995). For example, birds must learn species-specific songs, which
is fostered by having sensitive periods early in life (when birds are around
conspecifics rather than dispersing or migrating), learning templates (so
they acquire only conspecific songs), and long-term retention without modi-
fication or delay (for bridging the long gaps in seasonality between breeding
seasons). On the other hand, birds must recover food from stored caches,
which is distributed across their home range and changes every few days.
Thus, the bird must have a form of memory which rapidly updates and
rapidly forgets. The memory required for these two behaviors have been ar-
gued to be conflicting and functionally incompatible. Computational work
on connectionist networks provides an additional argument. Birds excel at
slow gradual consolidation of memories and the extraction of shared struc-
ture. However, they famously show ”catastrophic interference” on paired
associate tasks (McClosky & Cohen 1989) – simple memory tasks requiring
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the rapid acquisition of arbitrary associations. Thus, a ”fast learning” mem-
ory system has been posited to accompany the ”slow learning” memory sys-
tem. This memory system is believed to reside in the hippocampus, since
patients with hippocampal lesions show impairments on paired associates
tasks yet preserved performance on gradually acquired skills such as read-
ing words or tasks requiring the recovery of shared structure, such as learn-
ing of new complex stochastic grammar (Scoville & Milner, 1957; Cleere-
mans, 1993). (Moreover, the hippocampus seems specialized for rapidly
acquiring information through sparse, separated representations, in con-
trast with the distributive, overlapping representations of posterior cortex
(O’Reilly, Braver, & Cohen 1999).) In the Bisley and Goldberg task, the hip-
pocampus’ ability to rapidly acquire arbitrary associations is crucial for the
individual to recognize what goal should be in place (e.g. when a yellow
triangle means that attention should be maintained in the northwest quad-
rant of visual space). But this hippocampus must be capable of projecting
its rapidly learning information into a region that stores information about
goals in a way that can be flexibly updated.
active maintenance: Not only must the region in consideration store goal-
related information in a way that is rapidly updated, but it must actively
maintain that temporarily goal-relevant information so long as it is rele-
vant. Once the hippocampus has provided the arbitrary association to de-
termine what goal should be in place, the mind must maintain this goal
rather than let it decay. In other words, for the Bisely and Goldberg task, in
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addition to the normalized recurrence like network which incorporates the
LIP and sources of visual information, as well as the hippocampus to pro-
vide ”fast-memory” information about temporarily associated, there must
be a region devoted to active maintenance of goal-related information until
the goal becomes irrelevant. Note that neither single interactive systems nor
fast-learning systems can do this, for similar reasons of functional incompat-
ibility as discussed above (O’Reilly, Braver & Cohen 1999; O’Reilly & Frank
2006)
competitive biasing Finally, the same region which actively maintains infor-
mation must be capable of strategically ”biasing” the competition between
potential spatial regions for the limited-capacity resource of attentional fo-
cus (Desimone 1998; Desimone & Duncan 1995; Miller & Cohen 2001). If
the active maintenance region is maintaining attention in the southeast, and
a stimulus appears in the southeast, the bump of activation in the LIP de-
voting attentional resources to the southeast should persist. If the active
maintenance region is maintaining attention in the southeast, and two stim-
uli appear in the southeast AND in the northwest, the bump of activation in
the LIP corresponding to the northwest should subside, and the activation
corresponding to the southeast should be maintained.
Thus, in sum, information processing requirements suggest that the mind
must have a working memory system that is capable of (a) actively maintaining
information over the course of the task, (b) competitively biasing the competi-
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tive dynamics for limited capacity resources like attention and behavior, and (c)
flexibly updating itself whenever the task demands change. Due to functional
incompatibilities between the memory systems, it seems that the slow-learning,
posterior-cortex like single interactive systems could not provide these function-
alities.
4.4.2 Prefrontal cortex: Neurophysiological properties
Interestingly, the properties of prefrontal cortical neurons provide precisely the
features necessary to subserve these information processing needs. We describe
these in turn:
• representational robustness: First off, we know that the prefrontal cortex
is specialized by a representational robustness that would subserve the ac-
tive maintenance of representations (Miller 2000). Prefrontal cortical neu-
rons can maintain activity patterns over the course of delays, and moreover,
in contrast to delay-active neurons in temporal and posterior parietal cortex,
they can do so even in the face of intervening sensory stimuli. (Miller, Li,
& Desimone 1993; Miller, Erickson, & Desimone 1996; Constantinidis and
Steinmetz 1996; Di Pellegrino and Wise, 1993).
• dynamic gating: Second, basal ganglia provides dynamic gating into the
prefrontal cortex (O’Reilly & Frank 2006). Dopamine has a seemingly para-
doxical effect on prefrontal cortical neurons: it both increases spike rates (via
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enhancing persistent Na+ currents and reducing inactivating K+) and de-
creases spike rates (via reducing Ca 2+ currents and depressing AMPA and
NMDA components of EPSP′s). As it turns out, these effects converge to
stabilize prefrontal representations in the face of interfering sensory stimuli
(Durstewitz, Kelc, & Gunturkun 1999). More specifically, dopamine has the
triple effect of (a) strengthening the currently held prefrontal representation,
(b) weakening the influence of afferent sensory information, and (c) sup-
pressing spontaneous activity (Durstewitz, Kelc, & Gunturkun 1999; Durste-
witz, Seamans, & Sejnowski 2000). Similarly, dopaminergic dips destabilize
prefrontal cortical representations. Thus, recalling the arguments on goal
pursuit, the basal ganglia assessment of motivational value appears to de-
termine when the prefrontal cortex switches between actively maintained
goals. Dynamic gating models of basal ganglia-prefrontal cortical loops
(Hazy, Frank, and O’Reilly 2006; Montague, Hyman, & Cohen 2004) point
out that, according to a temporal differences framework, dopamine fires pre-
cisely when a more valuable goal can be achieved if behavior is redirected
towards that goal – and thereby causes the prefrontal cortex to adaptively
let in representations which guide behavior through active maintenance.
Based on these features, predominant models of executive control in com-
putational neuroscience (Hazy, Frank, and O’Reilly 2006; Montague et al
2004) have been positing that the basal ganglia help the prefrontal cortex to
”know what goals to have.”
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• recurrent hierarchical position: Finally, the prefrontal cortex is specialized
by sitting on top of a hierarchy (Fuster 1997; Fuster 2000), providing the pre-
frontal cortex with immediate privileged access to many disparate domains
that would subserve top-down competitive biasing. For example, one re-
searcher (Young 1993; see also Stephan, Hilgetag, Burns, O’Neill, Young, &
Kotter 2000) developed a 72 by 72 entry connectivity matrix for these cor-
tical regions, coding reciprocal connections as a 2, one-way projections as
a 1, and unreported connections as a 0. In this way, each region could be
assigned a coordinate in a 72-dimensional ”connectivity space.” Using mul-
tidimensional scaling (Shepard 1980), Young projected this space onto a two
dimensional plot which optimally fits the connectivity matrix – i.e., such that
the distances between the points on the plane were as close as possible to the
reverse rank order of the ’proximities’ between areas in the connection ma-
trix. The results are shown in the figure. Sensory domains occupy the lower
part of the figure. The visual system is on the left, the somatosensory-motor
is on the lower right, and the auditory system is on the upper right. The
frontolimbic domain is at the top of Figure 4.10. As Merker 2004) says, the
frontal limbic region is the ”common connective center of gravity of the en-
tire cortical system.”
Moreover, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex provides rich and diverse recur-
rent feedback from its privileged position in the cortical hierarchy. The dlPFC
has reciprocal cortio-cortical connections with a large array of cortical and
subcortical areas posterior parietal cortex, inferior temporal cortex, superior
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Figure 4.10: Seventy-two regions of cortex in connectivity space, from
Young 1993.
temporal polysensory areas, anterior cingulate cortex, retrosplenial cortex,
parahippocampal gyrus, the mediodorsal nucleus of the thalamus, and it
also sends feedback to the frontal eye field, the pre-supplementary motor
area, the premotor cortex, the caudate nucleus, and (indirectly, via retrosple-
nial area 36 and the posterior presubiculum) to the hippocampus indirectly
(Funashini 2001; Fuster 1997; Pandya & Barnes 1987). In addition, neuro-
physiological data from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex suggests that this
top-down recurrence modulates sensory processing, such as in visual corti-
cal areas (Miller, Erickson, & Desimone 1996; Kastner & Ungerleider 2001),
as well as a large array of other cognitive activities, such as episodic memory
and retrieval (Funahashi 2001).
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These considerations suggest that the prefrontal cortex could provide just the
right physical mechanism for implementing working memory. The biological
structure of the system matches the three informational processing requirements
for a working memory system. In fact, detailed biologically plausible compu-
tational modeling has supported the notion that a specialized working memory
region with prefrontal cortical properties is necessary to perform cognitive control
tasks requiring top-down flexibility (e.g., Rougier et al., 2005). To substantiate this
claim, let us consider two cognitive tasks that require flexible switching between
strategic goals: the Stroop task and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST). Both
of these cognitive tasks require participants to flexibly toggle their cognitive pro-
cessing in accordance with actively maintained strategic goals that may switch
from trial to trial. The Stoop task requires a controlled override, requiring people
to categorize color word stimuli according to ink color rather than word name (as
is typically done; Engle 2002). The WCST requires participants to switch from trial
to trial among categorizations according to the color, shape, texture, etc. of multi-
feature stimuli (Miyake et al 2000). In the brain, it is widely believed that good
performance on these two cognitive control tasks requires the use of the prefrontal
cortex to flexibly toggle between goals (Cohen, Braver & O’Reilly 1996). The sim-
ulations by Rougier et al (2005) arrived at the same conclusion. In particular, sin-
gle interactive system networks without a specialized flexible control mechanism
seem to lack the computational capacities to excel at (1) switching between goals
(toggling outputs based on flexible strategic goals) and (2) transferring knowledge
between goals (e.g., Rougier et al., 2005). A multiple interacting systems model
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– which included a basal ganglia component for learning motivational value, a
prefrontal cortex component for maintaining the current goal representation, and
dynamic gating between them – outperformed a single interactive system model
on the both WCST and Stroop task. These simulations have supported the notion
that single interactive system models seem able to describe only the ”slow learn-
ing system” of the brain, i.e. the posterior cortex (see O’Reilly, Braver, & Cohen
1999). That is, although single interactive system models, like the posterior cor-
tex, are capable of processing sensory stimuli and language, a working memory
system is necessary for modeling cognitive control via flexible strategic goals.
4.4.3 Control parameters: The dynamical systems concept
So far, we have argued that top-down flexible processing requires a component
that looks different than the slow-learning, posterior-cortex-like processing of the
single interactive systems (e.g., NR, SRN, LEABRA, DFT). We have also identified
the prefrontal cortex as the likely substrate of those functionalities. In this section,
we match the features of top-down flexible processing with a concept (and cor-
responding geometric interpretation) from the mathematical theory of dynamical
systems.
To do this, let us consider the simple dynamical system:
x˙ = r + x2,
which is pictured in Figure 4.11.
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Figure 4.11: A saddle-node bifurcation, from Strogatz 1994.
Since this system only has a single dimension, it is really no more than a dif-
ferential equation. That simplicity provides a nice convenience, as we can very
easily understand the behavior of this system by graphing the change in x, x˙, as a
function of the state of x. Thus, we can read out the system′s attractor landscape
from the graph. The state space is the single dimension graphed on the horizontal
axis, and the attractor landscape in this case is the parabola over that horizontal
axis. The attractor landscape above the x-axis describes how the system will move
from the point; so positive values of the parabola mean the system will increase
in value from the current point, negative values mean the system will decrease in
value from the current point; high negative values mean the system will quickly
decrease in value from the current point; etc.
Recall the definition of an attractor, provided earlier, and note that an attractor
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exists whenever perturbations to a point disappear, such that the system snaps
back into the original point. In a one dimensional system such as this one, an at-
tractor exists if and only if the graph of x˙ crosses the abscissa with a negative slope.
So in panel (a) for instance, we see that the black dot is an attractor – neighboring
points on the x-axis are ”attracted” to it, in the sense that the system′s dynamics
move neighboring points increasingly closer to the black dot with time.
Now to illustrate the dynamical systems interpretation of top-down flexibility,
we will concern ourselves with the role of the r variable. Let us assume first that
r is some positive number, r > 0. Then the differential equation is a parabola that
is always above the abscissa, as shown in frame (c). Thus, the system will always
grow without bound. For any starting initial condition, x, the value of x will al-
ways increase over time – in fact growing exponentially. Of course, because the
value here accelerates off into infinity, this simple dynamical system is not per-
fectly realistic, at least for r > 0. But this very simple dynamical system could
perhaps model the population growth rate: the birth rate minus death rate plus
immigration rate. As an example, we can imagine that ”x” represents the popu-
lation growth rate of some insects, and ”r” represents the amount of tree shrubs
available to a population of insects.
Now, imagine reducing r slightly to r0, such that 0 < r0 < r. In this case,
the parabola shifts downward slightly, meaning that the dynamics of growth to
infinitely have slowed down at each state x So because of the shift in r, our pop-
ulation growth rate no longer shows quite as much dynamical increase. The shift
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in r has shifted our attractor landscape.
Now imagine sliding the value of r down to a negative level, such that r < 0.
Note that something very interesting has happened: there is a qualitative change
in the dynamics. Suddenly, now, the net population rate only grows if it is suffi-
ciently negative (i.e., lots of deaths and emigration). Otherwise, the net population
rate will decrease. Reducing ”r” past the threshold of r = 0 has had an immediate
devastating effect on our population.
The point is to notice the role played by the variable r. That variable is not
part of the state of the ”system” – the population growth rate is given by x. Yet
the variable r has an important effect on the dynamics. Whereas for r > 0 any
initial population growth rate would increase without bound, now most popula-
tion growth rates will decrease, and in fact will decrease all the way to a negative
value, meaning our population will eventually die out!
In essence, if the dynamical system governs the future of the population and
r < 0, then the population may look healthy now, but it is destined for failure. The
equation has an attractor at the value x = r, and r represents a negative growth
rate. Note, however, that there is one hopeful feature of this system′s attractor
landscape. Namely, the system can escape its bleak future if some external per-
turbation shifts the value of r back upwards to ranges where r > 0. In that case,
the state of the system will grow without bound (assuming there is no meddling
from external forces into the system′s own inherent dynamics).
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We call this variable ”r” a control parameter, because it controls the system′s
dynamics. In particular the variable ”r” determines the attractor landscape for a
given dynamical system. In our case example, when the control parameter slid
past the value r = rc = 0, the attractor landscape qualitatively changed. At that
moment, an attractor was born (note also that a repeller was born as well, on the
other side of the attractor). We call this qualitative change in the system′s dynam-
ics, caused by the control parameter, a bifurcation. Moreover, we call the point rc at
which this occurs a critical point. However, these terms are not important for our
argument; merely the more general point that the control parameter shifts around
the attractor landscape of the system.
As an example, a dynamical systems model has been made by bioecologists to
describe the population of a pest known as spruce budworms ”x” living in a for-
est of balsam fir trees. Generally birds keep these pests in check, but sometimes
the population of pests has an ”outbreak” (Ludwig, Jones, & Holling, 1978; see
also Strogatz 1994). Thus, bioecologists have attempted to model the population
dynamics of the spruce budworm. In these models, the change in the budworm
population variable (x) was modeled by a function, f(x,r) dependent upon preda-
tion by birds (i.e. predation is a function of state, x) and forest variables such as the
amount and proximity of trees (r). The forest variables were modeled by the con-
trol parameter (r), because trees grow and die on a much slower timescale (their
lifespan in the absence of budworms is 100-150 years), than the fast timescale of
the budworm population (they can increase their density fivefold within a year).
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4.4.4 Thesis: Flexible top-down processing as the adaptive selec-
tion of attractor landscapes
Our thesis is that, from a dynamical systems standpoint, the prefrontal cortex ex-
erts flexible top-down control by selecting attractor landscapes that govern the dy-
namics of the rest of the brain. In order to arrive at this conclusion, we must inte-
grate the three previous subsections, exploring the three-way correspondence that
exists between functional demands (i.e the information processing requirements
of working memory), neural implementation (i.e. the distinctive neurophysiolog-
ical characteristics of the prefrontal cortex), and dynamical systems modeling (i.e.
the role of control parameters). In particular, we show that the role played by the
control parameter ”r” with respect to a dynamical system is the same role played
by ”working memory” with respect to information processing and the same role
played by ”prefrontal cortex” with respect to the brain. Let us pursue this three-
way correspondence with respect to general dynamical system, which can be writ-
ten as
x˙ = f (r, x) (4.2)
where x describes the state of the system in an arbitrary number of dimensions.
The three-way correspondence is laid out in Table 4.2:
Since we have already described the correspondences between the neurobi-
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Table 4.2: Flexible top-down control: A three-way correspondence be-
tween model, behavior, and implementation
Information Processing Properties of Behavior of a
Facet Requirements Prefrontal Cortical Dynamical Systems
for Working Memory Neurons Control Parameter
1 active maintenance representational robustness invariance to state dynamics
2 flexible gating dopaminergic gating superordinate dynamics
3 competitive biasing hierarchical recurrent feedback dependent variable to state
ology of the prefrontal cortex and the information processing requirements of
working memory, in the section below we will relate the information process-
ing requirements of working memory to the properties of a control parameter of
a dynamical system.
• Correspondence 1: When we say that the control parameter is ”invariant to
state dynamics,” we mean that as the system evolves over time according
to the equation (4.2). The variable r does not change; that is, r does not
appear on the left hand side of the equation. Thus, even as x changes in
our dynamical system, r remains constant, and it does so regardless of x. In
actuality this hard-and-dry relationship is an artifact of modeling. In real-
life systems, r does typically change, but the point is that it changes at a
much slower timescale than the x variable. Recall that in the budworm and
forest dynamical system, the forest variable were modeled by the control
parameter r, because trees grow and die on a much slower timescale (their
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lifespan in the absence of budworms is 100-150 years) than the fast timescale
of the budworm population (they can increase their density fivefold within
a year). The key point is that the control parameter r is largely invariant to
the evolution of the state x.
Now we note that the notion of the control parameter r corresponds to the
”active maintenance” role of a working memory system. Just as r is invariant
or stable to the evolving dynamics of a system, the actively maintained goal
is stable regardless of the evolving dynamics of a particular sensory repre-
sentation or behavioral choice. For example, in the visual attention task, the
actively maintained goal to maintain attention to the northwest should re-
main stable regardless of the evolving dynamics of the spatial attention sys-
tem, until a new goal is provided. That is, if you should be devoting your
attention to the northwest quadrant of visual space, something should keep
the system′s attractor landscape still, regardless of what perturbations are
introduced into the system′s dynamics by unpredictable visual distractors.
Thus, from a dynamical systems perspective, properly informed by systems
neurobiology, the prefrontal cortex is setting up a control parameter r gov-
erning the dynamics of the spatial attention system-, and this actively main-
tained control parameter is what holds the attractor in desired region of vi-
sual space.
• Correspondence 2: Now recall the informational processing requirement
of ”flexible gating”: namely goal-related information must govern mental
processing dynamics during a certain task set, and then after some period
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of dynamics under its jurisdiction, the goal-related information must switch.
We observe that the control parameter r of a dynamical system provides pre-
cisely this capacity, because its dynamics are ”superordinate.” As discussed
earlier, the parameter r does not change due to relatively fast changes in
the state variable x, but it is perfectly capable of changing due to its own
slower dynamics. The neurobiological observations from the previous sub-
section suggest that dopaminergic gating could be shunting in new values
of r when task demands change.
• Correspondence 3: For the third correspondence, we note simply that, as
shown in (4.2), the control parameter of a dynamical system is a dependent
variable of the differential equation. Thus, the dynamics of the system de-
pend upon its value. It is in that sense that the control parameter can provide
a ”top-down biasing” of the competitive dynamics of real-time mental pro-
cessing (Desimone 1998; Miller and Cohen 2003).
These relationships suggest (especially in conjunction with the neurocompu-
tational dynamics frequently used to model posterior cortex) that the prefrontal
cortex is maintaining an r governing the dynamics of the rest of the system, x
(which would correspond to areas lower in the hierarchy, including but not nec-
essarily limited to posterior and motor cortex, and their corresponding functions
of sensory categorization an action selection). Thus, from a dynamical systems
perspective, the prefrontal cortex is selecting attractor landscapes. Moroever, this
r is clamped into place by the midbrain dopamine systems, and thus, the firing of
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dopamine causes the prefrontal cortex to maintain a specific attractor landscape
over posterior cortical space. This functionality (maintaining an attractor land-
scape at the time-scale of working memory) corresponds to the notion that the
PFC maintains ”task representations” (Monsell 2003), because the given attrac-
tor landscape would presumably subserve particular dynamics for categorization
and action selection relevant to the pursuit of a particular goal (that is, the attractor
landscape would contain particular attractors or destinations for the dynamics, as
well as a particular set of possible paths for moving to those destinations).
The notion that the brain must have a control parameter for the dynamics in
order to perform well on certain tasks (namely, those requiring top-down flexible
processing, such as the Bisley and Goldberg task) corresponds extremely closely
with the notion of ”options” (Botvinick, Niv, & Barto 2009) in hierarchical rein-
forcement learning. The notion of ”options” arose when the machine learning
community discovered that, for optimal performance in reinforcement learning
tasks, agents needed to be able to select not only ”simple actions,” but also tem-
porarily maintained policies (mappings from states to actions; see Barto & Ma-
hadevan 2003). That is, the agent must be capable of selecting not only (primitive)
actions, but also full-on action policies. These higher-order selections are called
”options.” The brain seems to stumbled upon this very solution itself, since the
neurophysiological properties of the prefrontal cortex make it work just like a
control parameter.
Finally, good performance on tasks require the timing of the shifts in the at-
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tractor landscape to be optimized, and that is exactly what is suggested by dy-
namic gating theory (O’Reilly and Frank 2006). As we reviewed in the motiva-
tion section, midbrain dopamine neurons fire precisely when the mind unexpect-
edly achieves motivational gains (either in externally delivered rewards or simply
state improvements), and these moments are precisely when the prefrontal cortex
would clamp down on the attractor landscape. Thus, the system would seem
to flexibly shift r (and therefore the attractor landscape) on its own, according to
changes in the motivational structure of the environment. For that reason, we
could have titled this chapter ”motivated executive control” – if dynamic gating
theory is correct, then it is dopaminergic firing which governs the shifts in the at-
tractor landscape defined over posterior cortex, motor cortex, subcortical regions,
and the rest of the brain.
4.5 Closing thoughts
4.5.1 Distributed interactive control
Whereas dual systems theory holds that ”controlling” is the property of a single
privileged system (see for example Kahneman′s table) we find that in an interac-
tive system, multiple facets of control are distributed across multiple neurobiolog-
ical structures. Recall Fuster′s (2000) statement, ”Pursuing methodological neat-
ness, we have often been misled to the localization of cognitive functions that are
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not localizable.” Similarly, here we see that attempts to localize control face imme-
diate ”who′s the boss?” problems. From a dynamical systems perspective, control
is a fractionated rather than unitary concept, so these same issues with localiza-
tion simply reproduce themselves during any attempt to ”theoretically localize”
control into a dual systems framework. We make two arguments here. First of
all, remember our argument that ”control must be responsive” (from the intro-
duction, based on arguments of optimal control). However, prefrontal cortical
representations are clamped for the duration of a task set (and similarly from the
other perspectives on flexible top-down control – the dynamical systems control
parameter is invariant to the evolution of state; the working memory processing
requirement is for active maintenance). The restriction would severely impover-
ish the prefrontal cortex′s ability to control, because the clamping would force the
prefrontal cortex into open-loop policies, which, as we argued in the introduction,
are quite impotent. However, luckily the actor (in the basal ganglia), by virtue of
being unclamped, remains free to be responsive to state, and in fact, according to
a hierarchical reinforcement learning approach, the actor would be in charge of
selecting new prefrontal representations whenever necessary based on the state.
Thus, in a certain sense, the actor is in charge of the prefrontal cortex. (And in
fact, pursuing this logic even further, the critic is in charge of the actor). To make
a more complete argument about the distributed nature of control, consider once
again the selective visual attention tasks related to the LIP. In these tasks as well,
it could be asked where the control occurs. On the one hand, the LIP appears to
implement the control, since it is bringing its neural firing patterns back to the
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desired location in the space of locations for spatial attention. Yet, it could al-
ways be stipulated that some other region, higher up in the functional hierarchy,
is controlling the LIP – perhaps for instance the PFC. From a dynamical systems
perspective, we can decompose ”flexible top-down control” into multiple aspects
– first, there is the dynamical attraction (the very process which reestablishes the
dominance of the top-down goal over pesky unintended distractors). This dy-
namical attraction process occurs in the LIP. Second, there is the prior selection of
the attractor landscape. This landscape selection process occurs in the dorsolat-
eral BG. Third, there is the adaptive critic which, through feedback, is responsible
for teaching the actor how to best select the attractor landscapes. This critiquing
process occurs in the ventral BG. Fourth, there is the actual presence of the reward
structure in the environment, which governs this entire process. The primary
rewards occur in lateral hypothalamus. Finally, there is the maintenance of the
control parameter, which occurs in the prefrontal cortex. In other words, we see
here that by investigating the dynamics, we have revealed a control by committee
– each playing its specialized role in an interactive cooperative process – rather
than control by dictatorial fiat, whereby some hot-shot intellectual superstar re-
peatedly bullying the classroom′s unrelenting dunce.
The distributed nature of control in an interactive dynamical system is illus-
trated in Figure 4.12
By investigating this control hierarchy, we are led from the decision layer by
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Figure 4.12: Control is distributed throughout interactive dynamical sys-
tem. Figure adapted from Botvinick, Niv, & Barto 2009 to in-
corporate table
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way of prefrontal cortex through the subcortex, eventually back to the environ-
ment itself! According to the logical causal chain, the environment provides the
basis for the structuring of the critique of the selections of the control parame-
ter, and the control parameter determines the actual establishment of top-down
control by transforming the irrelevant distractor. If a dual systems model wanted
to cleave this network into a ”control system” and an ”automatic system,” how
would it do so? There is no obvious solution. The LIP provides the actual func-
tional transformation from perturbation to goal-relevant action, and in that sense
it would seem to be the executive controller. On the other hand, tracing the chain
of command backwards five steps, we end up at the lateral hypothalamus! Hardly
the typical proposal for a central executive. In short, the game doesn’t make sense
for a reason, because the control functionality requires these different pieces to fit
into a unified puzzle in order for control to ”work.”
We cannot attribute psychological control in the brain to any single domi-
nant head chef, because control simultaneously replicates itself at multiple spatial
scales in a hierarchical interactive system. We start with one of our conclusions:
whereas systems select states, control parameters select attractor landscapes. This
notion recalls the fact that the functionality of control is commonly linked to
”metacognition,” as for example in Richard Petty′s Metacognitive Model (Petty,
Brinol, & DeMarree 2007). Because control parameters have their own dynamics,
just along a superordinate time scale relative to the state variable, we could by
induction make new dynamical systems out of the control parameters, whereby
some meta-control parameter governs the dynamical selection of the control pa-
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rameters. Given the hierarchical view of the PFC itself (Reynolds and O’Reilly
2009; Fuster 1997) there is reason to believe that these meta-dynamical systems
are, in turn, nested within yet further higher-order dynamical systems. The pur-
suit would be a natural one, given the basic brain organizational principle of
”loops within loops” (Merker 2004). Thus, while some researchers have called
for a theory developing an understanding of the cooperations between multiple
distinct dynamical networks (Ganguli et al. 2008), a very important instantiation
of this endeavor would be to develop a theory of ”nested dynamical systems,” and
this may mean that the brain sciences are requiring the pursuit of new mathemat-
ical frameworks in the field of applied dynamical systems. In fact, so long as a dy-
namical system has multiple control parameters, and therefore multiple nestings
at potentially multiple levels, the possibility stands to developing a dynamical
systems approach to linguistic functionalities like variable argument binding and
recursive transformations. In this way, dynamical systems could satisfy Fodor and
Pylyshyn (1988)′s influential complaint that connectionist networks lack the ”sys-
tematicity” evident in human language – e,g,., that it is impossible to understand
”John loves Mary” without understanding ”Mary loves John.” Moreover, we can
also pursue our argument in the other direction, towards the periphery, recalling
the model from the ”selection” chapter on how the brain keeps the eyes still (Se-
ung 1996; Polk, Simen, Lewis & Freedman 2002).. In that model, the ”controller”
for the eyes are the premotor neurons medial vestibular nucleus (MVN) and the
prepositus hypoglossi (PH). Although that system is believed to be a feedforward
system, if we ask what controls the premotor neurons, we arrive at another dy-
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namical system with another control parameter. Thus, while the ”control” of eye
gaze direction can be posed as a microcosm of our dynamical systems framework,
that does not belittle the theory, but rather points towards a fundamental fact
about ”the fractal nature of control.”
4.5.2 The ”dynamic projections” hypothesis of psychological
control
A particularly fascinating variant of this theoretical framework is that the control
parameter in the prefrontal cortex defines a projection of the higher-dimensional
posterior cortical space. In other words, the prefrontal cortex causes a projection
of the high-dimensional dynamics of posterior cortical space onto small regions of
the space – i.e. ”subspaces” or ”manifolds” – that would be adaptive for the par-
ticular task at hand. (Note that this hypothesis is a special case of the ”attractor
landscape selection” hypothesis; here the prefrontal cortex would need to select
a special kind of attractor landscape such that all the interesting competitive dy-
namics would occur in only small regions of posterior cortical space.) Thus, we
call this hypothesis the ”manifold selection” hypothesis, or alternatively, the ”dy-
namic projections” hypothesis about psychological control.
Recent work in neuroscience has suggested that the prefrontal cortex may
enact top-down control by implementing subspace projections in the posterior
cortex. For example, although LIP-space contains high-dimensional popula-
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tion codes for devoting attention to different spatial locations, neurophysiolog-
ical recordings have revealed that controlled attention and integrative decision-
making tasks cause LIP to exhibit low-dimensional dynamics (Ganguli et al. 2008).
In particular, imagine that LIP neurons are firing stably at some attractor point in
space. When a visual distractor appears, the neurons go haywire. But when that
set of LIP neurons takes its state-space trajectory back towards the original at-
tractor, it always travels back to the attractor along a single dimension. Dynamic
movement along this particular dimension is meaningful, as it precisely reflects
the amount of slowly integrating evidence for a perceptual decision. Although
the paper did not investigate the dynamic projections hypothesis directly, it seems
reasonable that, as the task goals change (and participants must maintain atten-
tion at different locations), the prefrontal cortex must be projecting the dynamics
onto different single dimensions cutting through the high-dimensional space.
We find further support for the dynamic projections hypothesis by investigat-
ing once again the simulations of Rougier et al. (2005). The researchers compared
the performance of a single interacting system models with multiple interacting
system models on cognitive control tasks, such as the WCST and the Stroop task.
They found that a multiple interacting systems model which included a basal
ganglia component for learning motivational value, a prefrontal cortex compo-
nent for maintaining the current goal representation, and dynamic gating between
them outperformed the single interactive system models. Moreover, even though
the additional components were designed simply to implement the specialized
properties of the prefrontal cortex (active maintenance and hierarchical recurrent
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connectivity) and basal ganglia (adaptive criticism and dynamic gating), these
components interacted to construct a fascinating emergent property: rather than
representing specific features of stimuli (e.g., blue), the prefrontal cortical neu-
rons ended up representing content-less (i.e., more abstract) dimensions. For in-
stance, after training on the Stroop and WCST tasks, the prefrontal neurons end
up representing ”shape”, or ”color”, or ”size”, without specifying which shape or
color or size. In this way, the prefrontal cortex ended up performing the syntactic
binding of the rule-based symbolic computations – the assignment of variables
to roles believed (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988; Pinker 1997) to be the sin qua non of
human language and symbolic logic thought. However, the prefrontal cortex per-
formed these functions within a dynamic self-organizing system whose structure
is parallel, distributed, and network-like. Thus, the multiple interacting systems
models can implement ”rule-based behavior” without losing interactivity or its
non-symbolic, parallel, and distributed processing properties.
Now let us look more deeply at how the prefrontal cortex was affecting the
posterior cortex in the Rougier et al. (2005) simulation. Their posterior cortex
represented each stimulus inside a 145-unit layer. Thus, a medium-sized blue
square stimulus with a given texture and location would have a 145-dimensional
representation. (That is, the stimulus would be represented by a particular pat-
tern of neural firing rates over 145 neuronal units, and thus would be captured
by a point in a 145-dimensional Euclidean space). However, when the prefrontal
cortex in that model was maintaining the strategic goal relevant to the current
trial of the WCST (e.g. to categorize by color), it seemed to be effectively project-
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ing the posterior cortical representation onto a smaller dimensional subspace (e.g.
19-dimensional representation). The smaller-dimensional representation would
preserve the posterior cortical information relevant for the current goal – e.g. the
stimulus’ color – while discarding information irrelevant to the current goal – e.g.
the stimulus’ size, shape, texture, and location. But as the agent′s strategic goals
flexibly changed over the course of the task, the prefrontal cortex flexibly shifted
its projections. That is, the prefrontal cortex component, through dynamic gat-
ing from the basal ganglia, flexibly switched between different lower-dimensional
representations (color or shape or location) of the same high-dimensional stimuli.
In fact, these low-dimensional projections seem to be precisely what are respon-
sible for the effective performance of the multiple systems model in Rougier et
al (2005), who found strong correlations between (a) the model′s performance
on strategic flexible goal tasks and (b) how well the prefrontal cortex component
learned orthogonal dimensions that it could feedback into the posterior cortex.
Thus, we propose that the prefrontal cortex may be adaptively selecting a
lower-dimensional subspace upon which to project the high-dimensional repre-
sentations of the posterior cortex. The dynamics of mental processing (e.g. compe-
tition between different candidate mental representations or behavioral choices)
would occur along these low dimensional subspaces, and thus the dynamic com-
petition between mental representations would take different courses under dif-
ferent goals. While the mathematics of this proposal do not appear to be com-
pletely worked out (Steve Strogatz, personal communication), it is known that
the reduction to a subspace does frequently results in a well-defined vector field
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so long as the system contains an attracting invariant manifold (John Gucken-
heimer, personal communication).
The ”dynamic projections” hypothesis provides an interesting, tractable the-
oretical explanation for social psychological phenomena involving the executive
control of the implicit mind. For example, research in evaluative readiness has
demonstrated that a deliberately adopted strategic goal – such as the desire to
win a game or to perform well academically – can moderate implicit attitudes
within a matter of milliseconds (Ferguson & Bargh 2004; Ferguson 2008) . An out-
standing theoretical problem is: how can we explain evaluative readiness? That
is, how do flexible strategic goals influence implicit attitudes? Evaluative readi-
ness suggests a great deal of fluidity between flexible strategic goals and implicit
attitudes. For instance, when an undergraduate student decides to head for the
library to study for a final exam, her temporarily adopted strategic goal would
cause her to experience greater implicit positivity towards libraries, books, and
parties; however, just minutes later, if the student decides to step outside for a
smoke break to make new friends, her newly adopted strategic goal would cause
her to experience greater implicit positivity towards a cigarette. Current theoret-
ical models in social psychology do not readily explain this ”strategic fluidity” –
the transient nature of strategic goals and their influence on implicit attitudes (for
further discussion, see Ferguson and Wojnowicz 2011).
To help us approach this strategic fluidity, let us briefly revisit how implicit
attitudes are measured in the evaluative readiness literature. A person′s evalu-
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ation of ”cigarettes” for example is typically measured based on reaction times
to positive words such as ”good” after being primed with a stimulus word like
”cigarette.” From the perspective of most connectionist networks with distributed
representations, reaction times are a proxy for proximity in state space (how long
it takes the mind to transition between distributed patterns) (e.g., Cree, McRae, &
McNorgan 1999). In other words, more similar distributed patterns would show
stronger priming. Thus, when a person wants a cigarette, the distributed pat-
tern for ”cigarette” and the distributed pattern for positive concepts like ”good”
should look more similar than when a person doesn’t want to cigarette. This
means that a person′s currently operating strategic goal should modulate the rep-
resentation of concepts! How might this be happening?
We argue here that the ”dynamic projections” hypothesis provides an excel-
lent mechanism for understanding evaluative readiness. That is, we hold that
the prefrontal cortex seems to be adaptively selecting a lower-dimensional sub-
space upon which to project the high-dimensional representations of the poste-
rior cortex. The selection of the subspace depends upon the currently operating
strategic goal (studying vs. socializing). When the prefrontal cortex chooses a dif-
ferent strategic goal, it actively maintains a different firing pattern, which thereby
projects the posterior cortical representations onto a different subspace. This pro-
jection mechanism would explain evaluative readiness, because priming times
(reflecting evaluations) would depend upon the projection onto various lower-
dimensional subspaces.
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Figure 4.13: Hypothetical distributed representations for libraries, good,
and parties
For a simple cartoon example, imagine a posterior cortex with only three neu-
rons. Then, the ”high-dimensional” posterior cortical representations for seman-
tic concepts would have 3 dimensions, and lower-dimensional projections would
have fewer dimensions (perhaps 2). Figure 4.13 shows some hypothetical dis-
tributed representations for libraries, good, and parties in the hypothetical three-
neuron posterior cortex. Figure 4.14 depicts these same three hypothetical repre-
sentations in three-dimensional Euclidean space, where (x,y,z) = (-4,0,10) for ”par-
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Figure 4.14: The relative positivity of libraries vs. parties depends upon
how the prefrontal cortex projects high-dimensional represen-
tations onto low-dimensional subspaces
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ties”, (4, 1,9) for ”libraries”, and (4,1,1) for ”good.” Whether the mental represen-
tations for ”libraries” and ”good things” are close to each other or far depends
on how the prefrontal cortex projects the pattern-formation dynamics onto sub-
spaces. If the projection occurs along the plane Q, then ”libraries” primes ”good”
very strongly, much more strongly than ”parties.” If the projection occurs along
the plane P, ”libraries” would not prime ”good” very strongly, especially in com-
parison to ”parties.”
The main point is that some recent multiple interacting systems models sug-
gest that – based on the distinguishing properties of the prefrontal cortex and
basal ganglia – dimensionality projections are what allows the prefrontal cortex to
achieve flexible cognitive control in accordance with current motivations. In the
case of the Rougier et al. (2005) model of the WCST, the prefrontal cortex provided
a mechanism through which the model could flexibly shift around the similarity
groupings of blue squares vs. green squares vs. green circles, in accordance with
task demands. We can construe evaluative readiness in exactly the same way –
the prefrontal cortex provides a mechanism through which the posterior cortex
flexibly shifts around evaluations of books and libraries vs. parties and beers de-




5.1 Summary of Dissertation
In summary, this dissertation attempted to support a dynamical interactive ap-
proach to mental processing, particularly in social contexts.
The empirical chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) investigated the dynamics of men-
tal processing by recording hand-movement trajectories during an evaluative
decision-making task. Despite the fact that these evaluative decisions were made
explicitly, in both chapters, we found evidence that the decision-making dynamics
were biased by informational sources that were implicit. In Chapter 2, the sources
of informational bias were negative racial associations, which were assumed to
be aversive and implicit based on previous research. In Chapter 3, the sources
of informational bias were subliminal conditioning, which can be regarded more
directly and self-evidently as implicit. These findings support theories of mental
processing that involve a single set of interactive computational principles, and
would not be as elegantly predicted or explained by dualistic theories of men-
tal processing, which have not yet (to date) provided a dynamical account of the
explicit mind, or of how the explicit mind would interact with the implicit mind.
The theoretical chapter (Chapter 4) attempted to push forward by develop-
ing a theory of psychological control that arises out of a single set of interactive
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computational principles. In that chapter, we investigated three frequently men-
tioned capacities that a psychological controller should have (decisive selection,
strategic goal pursuit, and top-down processing flexibility), and we determined
how an interactive system could accomplish these functions. We described these
control capacities with respect to a dynamical systems framework, so that the du-
alistic notion of a separated homunculus making a decisive selection, striving for
distant end states, or shifting goals on the spot could be replaced by tangible al-
ternative concepts representing how these phenomena could work in a dynamical
neural system.
5.2 Limitations
A major limitation of the empirical studies is that they do not themselves fully
address a more recent resurgent debate in the literature about whether hand-
movement trajectories in competitive decision-making tasks reflect a continuous
evolution of the decision-making process (as argued by Spivey, Knoblich, Dale,
& Grosjean 2010) or the results of a discrete decision-making process, whereby a
succession of two discrete motor commands are superimposed onto each other
(as argued by van der Wel, Eder, Mitchel, Walsh, & Rosenbaum 2009). These
research groups have both constructed computer simulations that generate con-
tinuously curved hand-movement trajectories from the polynomial equations of
Henis and Flash (1995) (which describe how hand-movement trajectories move
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over time from an initial (X,Y) coordinate to a desired (X,Y) coordinate). How-
ever, the models make very different assumptions about processing mechanisms.
Spivey et al (2010) construct hand-movement trajectories based on the assump-
tion of a continuously evolving decision-making process. They construct hand-
movements through the superposition of two commands – a straight-line to the
response and a straight line to the competitor – whose weights depend upon the
continuously evolving activation levels of the underlying interpretation at any
given time. In contrast, van der Wel et al (2010) construct hand-movement trajec-
tories by assuming an initial completely vertical motion (planned to move from
the start box to midpoint between the targets) followed by an initial completely
horizontal motion (planned to move from the midpoint between the targets to the
chosen target). In the van der Wel et al (2010) model, the temporal evolutions
of the successive discrete movements are also governed by the Henis and Flash
(1995) equations, but the two movements are superimposed when they overlap,
thus creating trajectories which look continuously curved. Because the second
movement is presumed to begin later on average in the cohort condition than in
the control condition, the cohort condition′s trajectories curve out more towards
the competing response, even though the underlying mechanism is discrete (i.e.,
merely a delayed discrimination).
Spivey et al (2010) has made the case that previous mouse-tracking data has
supported continuous decision-making process on the basis of two empirical ar-
guments that I will review here. First, hand movement trajectories curve towards
competitor response options even when the chosen response is located completely
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vertically upward. Second, hand movement trajectories in many data sets (in-
cluding some unpublished data from the subliminal dynamics project described
in Chapter 3) show early deflections (in angles of departure from the stimulus
box), which the discrete model cannot generate. While the present writer agrees
that these observations favor the continuous processing model over the discrete
processing model, it is true that the data incorporated in the current dissertation
do not directly address these concerns, which is a clear limitation. In the ideal
case, since this dissertation’s empirical studies cannot resolve these theoretical
questions in and of themselves, further research would disentangle whether the
observed trajectories towards ”like” and ”dislike” evaluations are generated by a
continuous or discrete decision-making process.
Another limitation of the empirical studies is the experimental logic in Chapter
2 motivating the design and interpretation of Study 2. Subsequent to publication
of that research, reviewers of this dissertation have pointed out the fallacy in our
usage of the lack of significance in one context to make an argument about the
difference in contexts. That is, in Chapter 2, we argued in the following way: con-
ditions A and B are significantly different in experiment 1 and not significant in
experiment 2, ”Thus the results of experiment 1....” In actuality, one must demon-
strate a significant interaction for such an argument to be made. Thus, subsequent
to publication of the research, we have attempted to explore support for such an
interaction. We ran a linear regression of maximum hand movement deviation
on study and stimulus (black people vs. white people), including an interaction
term for study and stimulus. We used robust standard errors and clustering on
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subject id to account for possible heteroscedasticity between subgroups and for
correlation between measurements on the same subject. Comparing Study 2 and
Study 1, we found that the interaction term study*stimulus approached marginal
significance, t(121)=1.59, p=.11. Comparing Study 3 and Study 1, we found that
the interaction term study*stimulus was significant, t(123)=3.18, p=.002. How-
ever, the latter statistical investigation is inconclusive; for instance, the significant
interaction term in comparing Study 3 and Study 1 could have been driven by the
difference in stimulus labeling (e.g. African Americans vs. black people) rather
than the difference in competitor response (chemical vs. dislike). Future research
should provide a more appropriate and conclusive investigation of the role of the
competing response box in eliciting hand-movement curvature.
At the theoretical level, the arguments of the dissertation have not strayed very
far from the very elementary level of a qualitative debate about whether mental
processing should be construed as a dynamical system or not. In this disserta-
tion, the concept of dynamical systems used has been the mathematical concept,
whereby a dynamical system is a set of coupled differential equations (see for ex-
ample Hirsch, Smale, & Devaney 2004’s textbook Differential equations, dynamical
systems, and an introduction to chaos; or Guckenheimer & Holmes 1990’s textbook
Nonlinear oscillations, dynamical systems, and bifurcations of vector fields). As has been
pointed out, the claim ”system x should be viewed as a dynamical system” is an
extremely weak claim, as nearly any observable process in the world could be
described through a dynamical systems model. However, there are merits of de-
fending even this weak claim. In particular, there are some necessary features of a
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non-trivial dynamical systems model; these would include (a) interactivity (i.e. at
least some of the components of the system interact) and (b) numerical represen-
tation (i.e the state of the components can be meaningfully represented by a scalar
or vector). Theoretical approaches to cognition in social psychology (especially
dual systems models) are frequently NOT dynamical systems. Some dual systems
approaches fail necessary condition (a) (see e.g., Rydell & McConnell 2006); they
posit rule-based and associative systems which do not interact. Other dual sys-
tems approaches fail necessary condition (b) (see e.g. Gawronski & Bodenhausen
2006); they posit rule-based and associative systems which are ”allowed” to in-
teract, but they do not have components whose states have numerical represen-
tations. Thus, although the claim ”mental processing should be understood as a
dynamical system” is very weak, it meaningfully excludes large classes of theoret-
ical models in social psychological psychology. Thus, we believe that the primary
thesis of this dissertation – that mental processing should be considered as a dy-
namical system – is important and meaningful. The dissertation favors building
social psychology theory out of biologically plausible models of cognition which
are largely popular outside social psychology (such as O’Reilly’s LEABRA mod-
els; or Spivey’s Normalized Recurrence model). Since these models use popu-
lation codes to explain apparently rule-based phenomena, they satisfy necessary
condition (b), and because of the principles of mutual inhibition, reciprocal feed-
back, and partial cascading, they satisfy necessary condition (a). However, since
the dissertation has devoted much of its effort towards defending the very pre-
liminary argument that mental processing should be considered as a dynamical
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system, rather than not, there remains an incredible amount of follow-up work
to explore and test the many implications for typical social psychological experi-
ments and theory.
Along those lines, a major limitation of the theoretical chapter is that the the-
oretical ideas need to be channeled into clear empirical predictions for psycho-
logical control tasks in social psychological (or other) settings. I hope that future
research may be aided by this dissertation’s attempt to describe how psychologi-
cal control phenomena could arise through dynamic interactions; that is, that the
mind flexibly selects motivated attractor landscapes. Providing empirical corrob-
oration of some of the main ideas would greatly bolster the argument. In particu-
lar, it would be interesting to devise an empirical study that would seek support
for the most strongly stated claim – that of the dynamic projections hypothesis.
The dynamic projections hypothesis subsumes the other three ”theses;” thus em-
pirical research supporting the dynamic projections hypothesis would also pro-
vide solid support for the chapter′s broad argument about psychological control
from an interactive perspective. However, at the current moment in time, col-
lectable behavioral data (such as mouse-tracking, reaction-time tests, etc) relate to
these more fine-grained theoretical proposals of the dynamical systems approach
in frustratingly sketchy and tenuous ways. It is my hope that future research will
continue to either develop more fine-grained measurement techniques, or to de-
vise more clever ways to use the current measurement techniques.
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